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Deep Neural Networks enable Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents to learn behaviour
policies directly from high-dimensional observations. As a result, the field of Deep Rein-
forcement Learning (DRL) has seen a great number of successes. Recently the sub-field
of Multi-Agent DRL (MADRL) has received an increased amount of attention. How-
ever, considerations are required when using RL in Multi-Agent Systems. For instance
Independent Learners (ILs) lack the convergence guarantees of many single-agent RL
approaches, even in domains that do not require a MADRL approach. Furthermore,
ILs must often overcome a number of learning pathologies to converge upon an optimal
joint-policy. Numerous IL approaches have been proposed to facilitate cooperation, in-
cluding hysteretic Q-learning [130] and leniency [159]. Recently LMRL2, a variation of
leniency, proved robust towards a number of pathologies in low-dimensional domains,
including miscoordination, relative overgeneralization, stochasticity, the alter-exploration
problem and the moving target problem [223]. In contrast, the majority of work on ILs
in MADRL focuses on an amplified moving target problem, caused by neural networks
being trained with potentially obsolete samples drawn from experience replay memories.
In this thesis we combine advances from research on ILs with DRL algorithms. How-
ever, first we evaluate the robustness of tabular approaches along each of the above
pathology dimensions. Upon identifying a number of weaknesses that prevent LMRL2
from consistently converging upon optimal joint-policies we propose a new version of
leniency, Distributed-Lenient Q-learning (DLQ). We find DLQ delivers state of the
art performances in strategic-form and Markov games from Multi-Agent Reinforcement
Learning literature. We subsequently scale leniency to MADRL, introducing Lenient
(Double) Deep Q-Network (LDDQN). We empirically evaluate LDDQN with extensions
of the Cooperative Multi-Agent Object Transportation Problem [31], finding that LD-
DQN outperforms hysteretic deep Q-learners in domains with multiple dropzones yield-
ing stochastic rewards. Finally, to evaluate deep ILs along each pathology dimension we
introduce a new MADRL environment: the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG). We find
lenient and hysteretic approaches fail to consistently learn near optimal joint-policies in
the AFG. To address these pathologies we introduce Negative Update Intervals-DDQN
(NUI-DDQN), a MADRL algorithm which discards episodes yielding cumulative rewards
outside the range of expanding intervals. NUI-DDQN consistently gravitates towards
optimal joint-policies in deterministic and stochastic reward settings of the AFG, over-




This thesis completes a journey that began just over six years ago, when I traded my
job as a security manager at an investment bank in Switzerland for a chance to study
the field of artificial intelligence at the University of Liverpool. I have grown a lot both
personally and professionally since making this decision. More importantly, Liverpool
has become a home for my family, in particular my two sons Payton and Michael, who
have both developed scouce accents.
It goes without saying that I would not have reached this point without receiving
support from a lot of people. Here is my attempt to give thanks to everyone who helped
me along the way. I apologize in advance for anyone whom I fail to mention.
First I have to thank my wife Nui. To provide sufficient context, we were expecting
our second child, Payton, following the completion of my BSc in Artificial Intelligence in
2016. We spent a significant amount of time considering the feasibility of me attempting
a PhD while supporting and raising a young family. In the end we concluded that we
would regret not attempting this path, and I am proud to say that together we have faced
and overcome every single challenge along the way. Nui, thank you for your patience
over the past three years. In particular during the weeks where I have been away on
trips and you have had to look after the kids by yourself, and the countless weekends
(and holidays) where I have been preoccupied with my research. You have sacrificed a
lot, and I just want to let you know that I really appreciate everything you have done
to support me.
Payton and Michael, thank you for constantly reminding your dad what is important
in life. My progress pales in comparison to your recent achievements. Watching the
two you learn to read, swim and master countless other activities has been a constant
source of inspiration. I fear that I have often been preoccupied and impatient due to my
attempts at balancing my research with demonstrating and other work related activities.
For this I apologize, and I will do my best to make it up to both of you. I also want to
thank my parents, Chris and Pat, and my nan, Joyce, for all their support of the years
and for providing me with the necessary tools and work ethic to embark on this journey.
I have been fortunate to have received a significant amount of support and input from
both my primary and secondary supervisors, Karl Tuyls and Rahul Savani. Both have
become my role models with regards to my research activities and also in everyday life.
Karl, thank you for introducing me to the world of multi-agent learning. For most of my
adult life I have been looking for a topic to immerse myself into, and you have provided
xxi
me with the opportunity, guidance and freedom to explore my research interests ever
since my final year undergraduate project. Rahul, thank you for looking out for me and
always being there when I needed you. I really appreciate all the opportunities that
you have provided, and thank you for taking a keen interest in my research activities
throughout my PhD. I also want to take this opportunity to thank Daan Bloembergen
for his guidance and support. I hope that I can continue to collaborate with the three
of you in the years to come. I also want to thank my examiners, Daniel Kudenko, Enda
Howley and Martin Gairing for taking the time to read my work, travelling to Liverpool
and giving me valuable feedback.
Learning to be a researcher and a parent have not been the only challenges that I
have faced throughout this experience. I am an introvert by nature, and if I am honest
the prospect of running tutorial sessions used to terrify me. I therefore want to take
this opportunity to thank Irina Biktasheva for essentially headhunting and forcing me
to provide tutorials for the department’s Biocomputation module. While I found this
prospect very daunting when you first approached me, I am very grateful that you
pushed me outside of my comfort zone, and allowed me to discover that I do in fact
enjoy teaching.
Since February this year I have also been working as a data scientist in our univer-
sity’s Geographical Data Science Lab (GDSL). Balancing writing up my PhD thesis with
my research activities for the GDSL has not always been an easy task, and I want to
thank Alex Singleton and Mark Green for all their support over the past months. I also
want to thank James Butterworth, Jacopo Castellini, Tom Spooner, Shan Luo, Frans
Oliehoek, Danushka Bollegala, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Harry Flore and Adriaan Broer
for valuable feedback and conversations throughout my PhD. Furthermore, I want to
thank the HAL Allergy Group for partially funding my PhD and gratefully acknowledge
the support of NVIDIA Corporation with the donation of the Titan X Pascal GPU that
enabled this research.
The past few years have included a number of highs and lows. A particular challenge
has been the recent passing of our colleague and friend Benjamin Schnieders. Benjamin,
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for being a part of my life. I learnt a lot
from you, and I wish I could have given you more in return. You had a positive influence
on not just me, but every member of the smARTLab, and you are missed very much;




Intelligent autonomous agents and robots have the potential to reshape our society over
the coming decades. This prediction is based on recent success stories, where solutions
have been found for challenging virtual and real world problems, including: DeepMind’s
AlphaGo beating Go world champion Lee Sedol [183, 184], the coordination of aerial
vehicles [26, 32, 58, 161], and the emergence of self-driving cars [92, 128]. A significant
number of these successes can be attributed to breakthroughs in the field of deep learning,
enabling deep neural networks to learn solutions to problems that humans solve using
intuition [62, 63, 83, 105, 113, 129, 138].
Deep neural networks can be trained to extract compact features from complex high
dimensional input samples [62, 113, 143]. Their flexibility has led to breakthroughs in nu-
merous fields, including computer vision [62, 101, 113], language processing [40, 188, 232]
and generative modeling [63, 73, 106, 171, 186]. Deep neural networks are also widely
used as function approximators in the field of reinforcement learning, enabling behaviour
policies to be learned using high-dimensional observations, thereby establishing the field
of deep reinforcement learning [80, 81, 115, 137–139, 217].
This thesis focuses on deep reinforcement learning within the context of multi-agent
systems, a type of distributed system inhabited by autonomous agents that are capable
of interacting with each other [5, 21, 148, 210, 211, 215, 227]. Both static and adap-
tive agents may inhabit multi-agent systems [97]. However, adaptive agents are more
desirable, as interactions can have unforeseen consequences, while the dynamics of an
environment can potentially change over time [5, 30, 149]. As we shall see, learning in
multi-agent systems is far from trivial, even within domains that do not require a deep
reinforcement learning approach. However, there are numerous applications where using
a centralized single-agent learning approach is infeasible, due to physically distributed
components, conflicting objectives, or a scarcity in resources [23, 148, 169, 189, 197].
Markets that can benefit from adaptive agents range from virtual environments to real-
world settings, including recycling robots [149, 199], sensor networks [19, 135, 149,
178, 179], decentralized network routing [148], smart cities [140], multi-robot coordi-
nation [3, 19, 37], collision avoidance [26, 36], traffic control [126, 127, 144, 148, 149],
1
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distributed load-balancing [148], electronic auctions [148], trading [20, 85, 191], resource
allocation [13, 47, 48, 181], and computer games [53, 74].
1.1 Learning in Multi-Agent Systems
Agents situated within multi-agent systems frequently receive observations and a nu-
meric feedback signal while interacting with their environment [19, 30, 157, 213, 215].
Feedback signals can be sparse and are typically less informative than the labels required
by supervised learning [197, 200]. Furthermore, learners typically receive insufficient in-
formation to infer the intentions and goals of other agents within the system [211]. As
a result adaptive agents implemented with incentive based learning algorithms are fre-
quently applied to multi-agent systems, e.g., reinforcement learning or co-evolutionary
algorithms [44, 200]. Using the feedback signal, incentive based learners attempt to
maximize the rewards received through interacting with their environment [157, 200].
Reinforcement learning agents for instance learn via trial and error, using a scalar re-
ward (feedback) signal to estimate the expected utility for executing an action given an
observation [200]. However, despite a large number of reinforcement learning algorithms
having convergence guarantees in single-agent environments [30, 199], approaches such
as Q-learning are known to fail to converge upon optimal policies, even in relatively
simple multi-agent systems [21, 44, 74, 87, 99, 130, 156, 160, 169, 189, 197]. Multi-agent
learning literature meanwhile provides a rich taxonomy of pathologies that adaptive
agents must overcome in order to converge upon optimal policies. This has resulted in a
number of incentive based learning algorithms being extended to help agents overcome
the identified pathologies [21, 99, 130, 131, 156, 159, 223].
1.2 Motivation & Scope
The majority of the multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms discussed in this thesis
have been designed to facilitate coordination among learning agents. The objective is
to enable two or more agents to reach a consensus regarding which joint actions to
perform [99]. Our focus is on fully cooperative team games with one global feedback
signal, where each agent receives an equal reward at each time step [131].
Typically two types of learning are studied in cooperative multi-agent systems: joint-
action learning (also known as team learning) and concurrent learning [157, 215]. Tra-
ditional single-agent learning approaches can perform well when applied to joint-action
learning with one centralized controller [29]. However, a criticism of centralized joint-
action learning is that the number of real world domains where an entity can observe
and control all agents within the system is limited [132]. An alternative approach to-
wards joint-action learning is for each learner to update utility values for joint-actions
– consisting of the learner’s own action and those chosen by the other agents in the
system at each time-step – while maintaining a belief over the other learning agents’
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current strategy [38]. However, joint-action learning does not scale well, as increasing
the number of agents leads to an exponential increase of the size of the observation-action
space [33, 44, 74, 87, 130, 169, 189, 197]. As a result maintaining utility values for each
observation-action combination received from all agents within the system can become
infeasible. Furthermore, In many multi-agent systems information from other agents is
unavailable due to a physically distributed architecture or limitations with regards to the
agents’ ability to communicate with each other [11, 132, 189, 204]. Finally, (decentral-
ized) joint-action learners fail to consistently converge upon optimal joint policies, both
in traditional and high-dimensional settings [38, 157, 197]. This finding is disturbing,
given that agents have far less information in real world settings, where frequently the
actions taken by the other agents cannot be observed [99, 157].
In this thesis we focus on isolated concurrent learners, which are better known as
independent learners. Each independent learner is essentially implemented with a single-
agent reinforcement learning algorithm, and therefore other agents are treated as part
of the environment [19, 30, 215]. Despite being unable to observe the actions taken and
rewards received by other learners [38, 111], independent learners are considered more
scalable than joint-action learners [19, 33, 157, 169, 189]. However, the convergence
guarantees of most machine learning methods are based on the assumption that the
environment’s dynamics remain stationary [19, 30, 199, 215]. Introducing independent
learners to a system violates this assumption, and as a consequence each learning agent
must continuously adapt to the non-stationary policies of the other agents within the
system [44, 157, 215]. This particular pathology is known as the moving target problem
(non-stationarity problem), where small changes in the learned policies can have large
unpredictable consequences in the emergent behaviours of the independent learners col-
lectively [44, 157, 211, 215]. Other pathologies that can prevent independent learners
from converging upon an optimal joint-policy include1:
• Miscoordination: This pathology occurs in domains where more than one opti-
mal policy exists for each agent, however, only some combinations of these individ-
ual optimal policies are compatible across agents [38, 99, 132, 159]. To provide an
example of miscoordination we shall consider a task with two robots A and B, who
must take turns passing through a narrow doorway. The robots can choose between
two actions: wait and move. Assuming each robot learns a policy where an action
is selected with 100% probability, we have two optimal policies: 〈wait,move〉 and
〈move,wait〉. However, joint-policies using the remaining action combinations,
〈wait, wait〉 and 〈move,move〉 will lead to miscoordination, where neither robot
can reach the other side of the door.
• The stochasticity problem: Reinforcement learners are often situated in do-
mains that yield stochastic rewards (e.g., pulling a lever on a one-armed bandit
1We provide formal definitions for each pathology in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.
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which yields a reward chosen from a stationary probability distribution [4, 200])
and non-deterministic transitions (e.g. walking on a slippery surface [68]).
• The alter-exploration problem: Managing the exploration-exploitation trade-
off is one of the keys to reinforcement learning’s success [200]. However, exploration
adds noise to the utility value estimates maintained by independent learners, who
must take into account the probability of at least one agent exploring at each
time-step [131].
• Relative overgeneralization: Independent learners can be drawn towards sub-
optimal wide peaks in the reward search space due to a greater likelihood of
achieving collaboration there. Relative overgeneralization occurs when pairing an
independent learner’s available actions with arbitrary actions by the other agents
results in a sub-optimal action having the highest utility estimate [224].
• Deception: Independent learners can be deceived by states yielding a high local
reward, that ultimately lead on to poor future rewards (also known as the delayed
reward problem) [223]. As a result greedy agents can be led astray from high-value
trajectories.
A significant number of independent learning algorithms have been proposed in
multi-agent reinforcement learning literature to mitigate the above pathologies [19, 21,
33, 99, 130, 159, 160, 169, 189, 223, 224]. Many of these algorithms are inspired by
human coping mechanisms [99]. For instance, despite having a common objective, co-
operative learning agents are not guaranteed to converge upon an optimal joint policy,
especially when confronted with a reward space where miscoordination is associated
with high penalty values [99]. Humans can be observed to adopt an optimistic dispo-
sition towards each-other when attempting to solve a problem with a high likelihood
of miscoordination. As per behavioral game theory [50], football players for instance
repeatedly attempt challenging passes when awarded a free-kick outside the opponent’s
penalty area. Despite safe passing options being available, that will allow the team to
maintain possession, the free-kick taker remains optimistic that the risky pass could
catch the defense off-guard and lead to a goal. Inspired by this concept numerous opti-
mistic approaches have been applied to incentive based learning. Prominent examples
frequently discussed in multi-agent reinforcement learning literature include distributed
Q-learning [110], hysteretic Q-learning [130, 152] and leniency [21, 159, 160, 213, 223].
However, despite these efforts none of the above approaches can completely address
the outlined pathologies, even in relatively simple stateless games with a small discrete
action space [21, 33, 38, 99, 159, 160]. Furthermore, current approaches towards inde-
pendent learning within high-dimensional domains with a large state-space can amplify
multi-agent learning pathologies [53, 74]. For example: the architectures used in deep
reinforcement learning are trained using stochastic gradient descent [138, 139]. However,
gradient based methods are likely to fail when trained via strongly correlated updates
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that break the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data assumption [174].
To break the temporal correlation between sequences of encountered states Mnih et
al. [138, 139] turn to experience replay memories that store state-transition tuples as
the agent explores the environment [116]. However, the use of experience replay mem-
ories amplifies the moving target problem in multi-agent deep reinforcement learning,
due to each agent’s network being trained using potentially obsolete samples that may
no longer reflect the current dynamics of the environment. In this thesis we empirically
and algorithmically evaluate to what extent leniency [21, 156, 159] and other optimistic
extensions can help deep reinforcement learning agents overcome multi-agent learning
pathologies and converge upon an optimal joint-policy in fully-cooperative settings.
1.3 Problem Statement
In the previous section we observe that independent learning remains an open problem.
Recently Wei and Luke [223] conducted an evaluation of state of the art independent
learning algorithms. A variation of leniency called Lenient Multi-agent Reinforcement
Learning 2 (LRML2) emerged as the most robust algorithm. However, none of the
approaches evaluated can consistently overcome a combination of relative overgeneral-
ization and the stochasticity problem. While LMRL2 is less susceptible towards these
pathologies, a significant number of LMRL2 runs failed to converge upon optimal joint-
policies when confronted with excessive stochasticity. This finding is worrying, especially
given that the authors’ evaluation was conducted using two-player games that were ei-
ther stateless, or only consisted of a small number of low-dimensional states. Questions
remain whether LMRL2 struggles with the above pathologies are due to a sub-optimal
choice of hyperparameters and Q-value initialization, or if further algorithmic modifica-
tion are necessary to improve the robustness of lenient learners.
A further open question is the scalability of independent learning approaches that
do achieve high convergence rates upon optimal joint-policies within low-dimensional
settings to domains with a large high-dimensional state-space. While scalability is a
challenge for most machine learning techniques, this is particularly the case for multi-
agent learning [30]. Panait and Luke [157] observe that many traditional methods are
likely to fail once applied to partially observable environments inhabited by a large num-
ber of agents. Furthermore, scaling frequently requires algorithmic modifications [131].
For example: a number of independent learning algorithms rely on count based methods,
where learners keep track of the number of times an action has been executed within a
given state [21, 99, 131, 159, 160, 205, 213]. Lenient learners for instance map a decaying
temperature value to each state-action pair, which determines the amount of leniency
that is applied towards a utility value update [21, 156, 159]. The temperature value
mapped to the state-action pair is decayed following a utility value update, resulting in
lenient learners applying less leniency towards utility value updates for frequently visited
state-action pairs. In low dimensional settings temperature values can be maintained in
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a discrete low-dimensional data structure. However, further considerations are required
for maintaining temperature values for semantically similar state actions pairs within a
high-dimensional state-space.
For independent learning algorithms that have been scaled to multi-agent deep re-
inforcement learning, considerations are required regarding evaluation [87]. Temporally
extended high-dimensional domains are required where the learners’ susceptibility to
multi-agent learning pathologies can be established. However, while the multi-agent re-
inforcement learning literature provides numerous stateless and low-dimensional games
to determine an algorithm’s robustness towards specific pathologies, equivalent domains
are lacking for multi-agent deep reinforcement learning. We consider that multi-agent
deep reinforcement learning can benefit from domains where independent learners’ sus-
ceptibility towards each of the above pathology dimensions can be established.
1.4 Research Questions
Below are five research questions that have been distilled from the problem statement
outlined in the previous section.
Q1: Can existing independent learning approaches mitigate multi-agent learning patholo-
gies within n-player repeated single-stage strategic-form team-games?
Chapter 4 & 5
Q2: Can algorithmic modifications improve the policies learnt by lenient learners?
Chapters 5 & 7
Q3: Can we design high-dimensional domains for evaluating the susceptibility of deep
reinforcement learners towards multi-agent learning pathologies?
Chapters 6 & 7
Q4: Can leniency be scaled to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning?
Chapter 6
Q5: Can independent learners overcome relative overgeneralization while making de-
cisions using noisy utility values backed up from stochastic follow-on transitions?
Chapter 7
The chapter(s) within which each of these questions is addressed is provided in italics
at the end of each question. Concrete answers are subsequently provided to each question
in Chapter 8.
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1.5 Relation to Published Work
The background knowledge presented in Chapters 2 and 3 is based on the work of
other authors, where we cite relevant sources from literature. In Chapters 4 and 5 we
present our most recent work, which is in preparation for a submission to the Journal of
Machine Learning Research. In Chapter 4 we re-evaluate existing independent learner
baselines within n-player repeated single-stage strategic-form games, while in Chapter 5
we introduce a novel leniency algorithm. Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 are based on two
(full) conference publications, respectively:
• Gregory Palmer, Karl Tuyls, Daan Bloembergen, and Rahul Savani, Lenient Multi-
Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning, In Proceedings of the 17th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018, pp. 443–451.
• Gregory Palmer, Rahul Savani, and Karl Tuyls, Negative Update Intervals in Deep
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, In Proceedings of the 18th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019, pp. 43–51.
Other Research: Not all research conducted over the past three years fits into the
scope of this thesis. Other efforts include a collaboration with the HAL Allergy Group on
the automated inspection of opaque liquid vaccines and work conducted with Benjamin
Schnieders, Shan Luo and my supervisor Karl Tuyls on the topic of one-shot object
segmentation for industrial robotics:
• Gregory Palmer, Benjamin Schnieders, Rahul Savani, Karl Tuyls, Joscha-David
Fossel, and Harry Flore, The Automated Inspection of Opaque Liquid Vaccines.
To appear in the 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020.
• Benjamin Schnieders, Shan Luo, Gregory Palmer, and Karl Tuyls, Fully Convolu-
tional One-Shot Object Segmentation for Industrial Robotics. In Proceedings of
the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Sys-




This chapter outlines the core concepts that serve as the foundations of the contributions
presented in this thesis. First an introduction to reinforcement learning is provided,
followed by a summary of the breakthroughs that enabled the field of deep reinforcement
learning [115, 137–139, 217]. Finally, we discuss concepts from game theory that have
been used to describe and evaluate multi-agent learning [23, 38, 99, 130–132, 148, 182,
194, 210, 215, 223].
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
Learning through trail-and-error via interaction with an environment is a concept that
underlies the majority of theories on learning and intelligence [23, 38, 132, 200, 210, 215,
221]. Reinforcement learning is a branch of machine learning based on this concept,
where idealized learners learn through trial and error while interacting with a dynamic
environment [96, 132, 143, 148, 200, 210, 215, 221]. The learners can perceive the envi-
ronment’s current state, perform actions and observe their impact on the environment
through a numeric reward signal (as depicted in Figure 2.1) [19, 97, 200, 215]. Inspired
by the pleasure and pain signals observed in biological systems, a reward signal defines
the desirability of the transition that take place within the environment, and can be
seen as a stochastic function that maps state-action pairs to rewards [200, 210].
Figure 2.1: Diagram depicting the agent-environment interaction of an idealized
reinforcement learning agent. Upon executing an action ut at time t, the agent
receives state xt+1 and reward rt+1 responses at time t+ 1. This illustration is
adapted from Sutton and Barto [200].
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Interactions with the environment produce large amounts of information regarding
the consequences of actions [200, 221]. The objective of reinforcement learning agents
is to utilize this information to maximize the total reward received while interacting
with the environment [19, 96, 200, 210, 215]. Actions resulting in desirable transitions
are to be reinforced, i.e., executed with a greater likelihood in the future [23, 200].
However, rewards may be stochastic, delayed or accumulated over a trajectory of state-
transitions [23, 200, 222]. As a result action or value functions are used to estimate
the long term rewards that an agent can expect to receive starting from the current
state [200, 221]. Such functions account for the rewards received during follow-on states,
while the reward signal only indicates the immediate reward. Therefore, while the imme-
diate reward might appear less desirable, action and value functions can help determine
long term benefits. The notion of expected utility can be used to guide the agents
towards actions that lead to states with higher rewards [19, 132, 148, 200, 213].
Machine learning algorithms are typically said to belong to one of two groups: (i) su-
pervised learning, where models are trained using labelled data; (ii) unsupervised learn-
ing, where algorithms are designed to find hidden structures in unlabelled data. However,
Sutton and Barto [200] argue that reinforcement learning is in fact a third paradigm,
which can be distinguished from supervised and unsupervised learning problems, as the
learners: (i) are situated in a closed loop (see Figure 2.1); (ii) do not receive any labelled
information regarding the desirability of actions; (iii) learn from reward signals received
over multiple time steps.
A further distinction between reinforcement learning and other machine learning
paradigms, is that a carefully considered trade-off is required between exploration and
exploitation in order to discover preferable states and actions [19, 96, 97, 200, 210,
215]. Balancing this trade-off is non-trivial. Due to stochasticity each state-action
combination must be explored sufficiently, in order to establish a reliable estimate of
the expected reward [200]. As we shall see, further considerations are required within
multi-agent settings, in particular within domains where exploration is likely to result
in miscoordination [5, 38, 99, 130–132, 210].
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are well suited for modelling problems with
delayed reinforcement [96]. Therefore, in the sections below we use MDPs to formalize
the concepts outlined above.
2.2 Finite Markov Decision Processes
Sutton and Barto [200] consider any method capable of solving a MDP a reinforcement
learning algorithm. Finite Markov Decision Processes describe a class of problems (fully
observable environments) that defines the field of reinforcement learning, providing a
suitable model to formally describe the interactions between reinforcement learners and
their environment [89, 96, 118, 143, 165, 194, 200, 213]. Formally:
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Definition 2.2.1 (Markov Decision Processes). A MDP is a tuple 〈X ,U ,R,P, γ〉,
where: X is a finite set of states; for each state x ∈ X there exists a finite set of
possible actions U ; R is a real-valued payoff function R : X × U × X ′ → R, where
Ru(x, x′) is the expected payoff following a state transition from x to x′ using action u;
P is a state transition probability matrix P : X ×U ×X ′ → [0, 1], where Pu(x, x′) is the
probability of state x transitioning into state x′ using action u; γ is a discount factor
γ ∈ [0, 1] weighting the value of future rewards.
In this thesis we shall assume that the environments proceed along evenly spaced
discrete time-steps t [213]. Furthermore, a MDP is an environment within which every
state has the Markov property: every state retains all relevant information independent
of the history of transitions leading up to the state, therefore the state transition prob-
ability fully depends on the current state [194, 200, 210, 215, 221]. A policy within a
MDP can be formulated as a function that takes a state X and returns an action U [97]:
π : X → U . (2.1)
Providing an agent is situated within a domain with the Markov property (where
the state transition probabilities and rewards depend only on the current state) and
is given sufficient time to explore, then reinforcement learning guarantees convergence
upon an optimal policy [94, 185, 200, 201, 210, 216]. As outlined above, the aim of a





To obtain the value of being in a state x conditioned on the current policy π we can use




Pπ(x)(x, x′)[Rπ(x)(x, x′) + γVπ(x′)]. (2.3)
The value is calculated recursively using all follow-on states x′. As is custom we define
the optimal value function indicating the value of a state given an optimal policy π∗(x)
as V∗(x) = maxπVπ(x), where π∗(x) selects the action u with the maximum expected





Pu(x, x′)[Ru(x, x′) + γV∗(x′)]
}
(2.4)
If the transitions and reward functions for a MDP are known, then using the Bellman






Pu(x, x′)[Ru(x, x′) + γV(x′)]
}
(2.5)
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However, the focus of this thesis is on independent learners, which update their policies
concurrently within a shared domain. As such, the reward and transition functions
depend on the joint-actions taken by all agents within the system. Therefore, since
the Markov property no longer holds, and we also no longer have any guarantees of
convergence [21, 74, 87, 99, 130, 135, 148, 156, 160, 169, 189, 197, 210], we turn to model
free reinforcement learning approaches.
2.3 Q-learning
The Q-learning algorithm introduced by Watkins [221, 222] is considered one of the most
important breakthroughs in reinforcement learning [199]. Using a dynamic programming
approach, the algorithm learns action-value estimates (Q-values) independent of the
agent’s current policy. Q-values are estimates of the discounted sum of future rewards
(the return) that can be obtained at time t through selecting an action u ∈ U in a state
xt, providing the optimal policy is selected in each state that follows. Q-learning is
therefore an off-policy temporal-difference learning algorithm.
In domains with a low dimensional state space Q-values can be maintained using
a Q-table. Q-values are updated as follows: upon choosing an action ut in state xt
according to a policy π, the Q-table is updated by bootstrapping the immediate reward
rt+1 received in state xt+1 plus the discounted expected future reward from the next
state, using a discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1] and scalar α to control the learning rate:




Qt (xt+1, u)−Qt (xt, ut)
)
(2.6)
However, sequential decision problems can have a high-dimensional state space. In such
instances Q-values can be approximated using a function approximator, for instance
using tile coding [15, 66, 79, 191] or a neural network [9, 107, 115, 137–139, 174, 201, 217].
The parameters θ of the function approximator can also be learned via experiences
gathered by the agent while exploring their environment, choosing an action ut in state
xt according to a policy π, and updating the Q-function by bootstrapping the immediate
reward rt+1 received in state xt+1, plus the expected future reward from the next state
(as given by the Q-function) [138, 139, 217]:
θt+1 = θt + α
(
Y Qt −Q (xt, ut; θt)
)
∇θtQ (xt, ut; θt) . (2.7)
Here, Y Qt is the bootstrap target which sums the immediate reward rt+1 and the current
estimate of the return obtainable from the next state xt+1 assuming optimal behaviour,
discounted by γ ∈ (0, 1] (Eq. (2.8)). The Q-value Q (xt, ut; θt) therefore moves towards
the target by following the gradient ∇θtQ (xt, ut; θt).
Y Qt ≡ rt+1 + γmax
u∈U
Q (xt+1, u; θt) . (2.8)
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2.4 Exploration
Regarding the exploration/exploitation trade-off that is critical for reinforcement learn-
ing agents to converge, ε-greedy and soft-max exploration are two popular strategies
frequently referred to in reinforcement learning literature [19, 132, 200, 215]. For ε-
Greedy exploration the agent selects action u = argmaxuQ(x, u) with a probability
1 − ε and a uniformly random action with probability ε [139, 200, 209, 215, 229]. The
exploration rate ε can either remain constant or be decayed over time using a decay
factor µ. Soft-max action selection policies meanwhile compute the probability with













where a scalar τ ∈ [0,∞) can be decayed to ensure that the action selection becomes
greedier over time [18, 122]. Out of the two methods ε-greedy is more standard in Q-
learning. Tuning the Boltzmann strategy is frequently a non-trivial task [208]. Nonethe-
less, the Boltzmann strategy is frequently combined with Q-learning, as we shall see in
Chapter 3. In deployment agents trained using ε-greedy typically use an argmax action
selection policy, where the action with the largest Q-value is selected at each stage.
2.5 Deep Learning
Deep neural networks are trained to extract compact features from complex high di-
mensional inputs, combining layers of hierarchical features into ever more complex con-
cepts [62, 113, 143]. In this thesis we shall be working with Convolutional Neural Net-
works (ConvNets), which are geared towards extracting features from inputs in the form
of arrays and tensors [113]. For instance, a ConvNet trained to classify images consists
of layers of neurons, with the first layer extracting edges, which are combined into cor-
ners and contours by the next layers, before subsequently being combined to form the
object parts that enable a classification [62, 113]. Traditional ConvNet architectures
consist of multiple linear convolution and pooling layers stacked up on top of each other,
followed by fully connected layers, which precede the output layer [62, 113, 196]. The
convolutional layers are banks of filters which are convoluted with an input to produce an
output map [62, 93, 113]. A non-linear activation function is subsequently applied to the
output map such as the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) [145]. Through stacking multiple
non-linear layers the network can be trained to implement complex functions, that are
sensitive towards minute details within inputs, while simultaneously being able to ignore
less relevant features [113]. Providing the individual modules of the network are smooth
functions of their respective inputs, the network can be trained to minimize an objective
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function by computing gradients via the back-propagation procedure [62, 113]. Deep
neural networks can therefore be trained end-to-end using stochastic gradient descent.
ConvNet’s strength lies in their large learning capacity, which can be adjusted
through changing the network’s depth and breadth [105, 228]. Furthermore ConvNets
take advantage of assumptions regarding the location of pixel dependencies within im-
ages, reducing the number of weighted connections compared to a fully-connected neural
network [105]. For example, pixels within a neighbourhood depicting an object are usu-
ally highly correlated independent of location within the image [77]. This ability of deep
neural networks to learn hierarchies of concepts has proven valuable in numerous fields,
including computer vision [62, 101, 113], generative modeling [63, 73, 106, 171, 186],
speech and language processing [40, 188, 232]. Deep neural networks have also been
widely used as function approximators in the field of incentive based learning, into
which both reinforcement learning and evolutionary algorithms fall, allowing agents to
learn control policies directly for high-dimensional observations of their environment.
2.6 Deep Q-Learning
In deep reinforcement learning a multi-layer neural network is used as a function approxi-
mator, mapping a set of n-dimensional state variables to a set of m-dimensional Q-values
f : Rn → Rm, where m represents the number of actions available to the agent [138, 139].
Over the past decades neural networks have often been used as function approximators
in reinforcement learning literature [117, 136, 198, 201]. However, as mentioned, the
recent successes in the field of deep learning have enabled neural networks to identify in-
tricate structures and extract compact features from complex high-dimensional samples,
such as images and frame-sequences [62, 101, 113]. Using deep neural network architec-
tures as function approximator has allowed reinforcement learning approaches to master
complex environments with a high-dimensional state space [116, 137, 139, 183, 217].
The Deep Q-network (DQN) introduced by Mnih et al. [139] updates parameters θ
using stochastic gradient descent, randomly sampling past transitions experienced by
the agent that are stored within an experience replay memory D [116, 139, 143, 174].
Transitions are tuples (x, u, x′, r) consisting of the original state x, the action u, the
resulting state x′ and the immediate reward r. The network is trained to minimize the
time dependent loss function,
Lt (θt) = E(x,u,x′,r)∼U(D)
[
(Yt −Q (x, u; θt))2
]
, (2.10)
where (x, u, x′, r) ∼ U(D) represents minibatches of experiences drawn uniformly at
random from the set of samples stored inside the experience replay memory D [138, 139],
t the current iteration, and Yt is the target:
Yt ≡ r + γQ(x′, argmax
u∈U
Q(x′, u; θt); θ
′
t). (2.11)
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Equation (2.11) is a form of double Q-learning [216] in which the target action is
selected using weights θ, while the target value is computed using weights θ′ from a
target network. The target network is a more stable version of the current network,
with the weights being copied from the current to the target network after every n
transitions [217]. Double-DQNs have been shown to reduce overoptimistic value esti-
mates [217]. This is interesting for our current work, since we are interested in scaling
optimistic independent learning approaches to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning,
to allow the learning agents to converge towards an optimal joint policy.
2.7 Policy Gradient Methods
While a DQN is used to approximate a value function, it is worth noting that deep
neural networks can also be trained to approximate a policy [7, 55, 87]. If we consider
value function and policy methods as individual sets, then at the intersection we find
actor-critic methods, where a critic learns a value function that is used to guide the
training of the actor [201]. Policy based methods have a number of advantages over
value based methods that use an implicit policy, such as being suitable for physical
control tasks. Lillicrap et al. [115] for instance introduced Deep Deterministic Policy
Gradient (DDPG), an off-policy actor-critic architecture that can master tasks with a
high-dimensional continuous action space. DDPG also uses an experience replay mem-
ory D to train the two networks. In contrast Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic
(A3C) replaces D with an asynchronous training scheme, obtaining uncorrelated state-
transitions samples from multiple CPUs. The method is on policy, with each of the
agents computing their respective gradients locally, before using the gradients to update
the global network prior to synchronization. While the contributions in this thesis focus
on scaling modified Q-learning algorithms that encourage cooperation, we shall discuss
modified versions of the above actor-critic algorithms while providing a recap of the
current state of the art of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning in Section 3.3.
2.8 Game Theory
Reinforcement learning was traditionally intended for single agent applications with
stationary dynamics. However, this assumption no longer holds in the multi-agent case.
As a result we must now consider the learning and interaction mechanisms of a group of
agents inhabiting the environment [38, 95, 213, 215]. A popular approach towards multi-
agent learning is to deploy independent learning agents that are each implemented with a
single-agent reinforcement learning algorithm [19, 89, 99, 130–132, 213, 223]. Each agent
independently learns a policy, and treats the other agents as part of the environment [19,
89]. However, convergence guarantees only exist for reinforcement learning algorithms
in domains where: (i) state transition probabilities P remain stationary; and (ii) every
state has the Markov property [111, 148, 215]. By ignoring each other the multi-agent
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learning problem effectively becomes a single-agent learning problem, where interactions
with cohabiting agents are implicitly observed in what is considered a stochastic non-
stationary environment [19, 44, 148]. The Markov property therefore no longer applies
to multi-agent systems inhabited by independent learning agents [111, 148, 215]. Due
to learners updating their policy in parallel the state-transition probabilities are no
longer guaranteed to remain stationary [19, 21, 74, 87, 99, 148, 169, 189, 197, 210, 213].
MDPs are therefore unable to capture the interdependencies of systems inhabited by
independent learners. However, due to multiple agents interacting we have a game.
Thus, in this section we introduce relevant models from game theory, that provide a
suitable framework through which to describe and evaluate multi-agent learning [38, 99,
118, 148, 182].
To express ideas clearly game theory relies on a considerable amount of notations
and definitions [60]. To ensure that interpretations remain consistent across disciplines,
caution is necessary when applying terminology from game theory to multi-agent rein-
forcement learning. This section therefore provides a taxonomy of the game theoretic
terminology and definitions used within the context of this thesis. We focus on indepen-
dent learning within two types of games: stateless games that assume the environment
remains stationary, and Markov games, a direct generalization of MPDs, which assume
the agent interacts with a dynamic environment [118, 148, 182]. In the sections below
we will formally define each of these game types. Furthermore, the focus of this thesis
is on fully-cooperative settings. We shall therefore also introduce the notion of team-
games. Although the strategic interactions in game theory typically take place between
players, we shall use the terms agent and player interchangeably. In addition, to pre-
vent confusion in later chapters, we refer to actions taken by agents in stateless games
as a ∈ A while actions in Markov games are denoted as u ∈ U . A summary of the
correspondence of terminology between the domains of game theory and reinforcement
learning is provided in the Table 2.1 [19].






Table 2.1: Corresponding terminology for reinforcement learning and game theory.
2.8.1 Strategic-Form Games
Game theory uses mathematical objects to define strategic interactions between play-
ers [148]. For simplicity research in multi-agent reinforcement learning initially focused
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on strategic-form (normal-form) games, which are known as both stateless and single-
state games [38, 99, 130–132]. Formally:
Definition 2.8.1 (Strategic-Form Game). A n-player strategic-form game (also known
as a normal form game and single-stage game) is defined as a tuple (n,A1...n,R1...n)
where n represents the number of players, A1...n the joint action space (A1 × ...×An),
with Ap being the set of actions available to player p, and Rp is the reward function
Rp : A1 × ...×An → R for each player p [24].
We note that in strategic-form games players make their choices simultaneously.
Strategic-form games with n = 2 are commonly known as bimatrix games. As the name
indicates, bimatrix games can conveniently be captured using matrices. Figure 2.2 pro-
vides an example. Players I and II are referred to as row and column players respectively.
Therefore, the rows represent the actions available to player I, while the columns capture
the actions available to player II. The matrix cells contain the reward that each player
receives upon applying a joint-action. For n-player strategic-form game a n-dimensional















Figure 2.2: Two-player strategic-form game example, where players I and II are
referred to as row and column players respectively. The matrix cells contain the
reward that each player receives upon applying a joint-action.
Each player’s behaviour is defined by a (mixed) strategy π, which maintains prefer-
ences over the available actions [19, 210]. Formally:





which assigns a probability πap to each action a ∈ A for player p, πp : Ap → [0, 1], such




p = 1. If there exists
an action a where πap = 1, then the strategy πp is a pure strategy, where for all other
actions a′ ∈ Ap, where a′ 6= a, we have πa
′
p = 0. Otherwise we have a mixed strategy.
The outcome of a game (which we discuss in more detail in Section 2.8.8) is con-
ditioned on the behaviour of each player, and is therefore determined by the players’
joint-strategies profile:
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Definition 2.8.3 (Strategy Profile). A strategy profile is a vector −→π = (π1, ..., πn) that
contains a strategy for each of the n players.
2.8.2 Markov Games
Strategic-form games provide a framework within which to study stateless multi-agent
reinforcement learning algorithms. However, the MDP framework used for studying
singe agent reinforcement learning also accounts for probabilistic transitions between
states. As per the above definition strategic-form games are stateless games. There-
fore we require a richer framework that generalizes both strategic-form games and
MDPs [118, 148, 182, 215]. Here game theory also offers a solution. In 1953 Shapley
extended strategic-form games to Markov games (also known as stochastic games) [180].
Formally:
Definition 2.8.4 (Markov Games). A Markov game is defined as a tuple (n,X ,U ,P,R),
that has a finite state space X , for each state x ∈ X a joint action space (U1× ...×Un),
with Up being the number of actions available to player p, a state transition function
P : Xt × U1 × ... × Un × Xt+1 → [0, 1], returning the probability of transitioning from
a state xt to xt+1 given an action profile u1 × ... × un, and for each player p a reward
function: Rp : Xt×U1× ...×Un×Xt+1 → R [180]. We allow terminal states (absorbing
states) at which the game ends. Finally, each state x ∈ X is fully-observable.
Therefore, Markov games assume Markovian transitions that are conditioned on
transition probabilities for the joint-actions of all players [118]. Reducing the number of
players to one converts the Markov game into a MDP [148]. Furthermore, a strategic-
form game can be thought of as a Markov game with one state, where all joint-action
combinations result in a transition into an absorbing state [114, 148]. A player’s strategy
for Markov games is defined as follows:
Definition 2.8.5 (Strategies in Markov Games). For each player p, the strategy πp
represents a mapping from the state space to a probability distribution over actions:
πp : Xp → ∆(Up).
Therefore, transitions within a Markov game are determined by a joint strategy:
Definition 2.8.6 (Joint Strategy). The notation π refers to a joint strategy of all
players. Joint strategies excluding player p are defined as π−p. The notation 〈πp,π−p〉
refers to a joint strategy with player p following πp while the other players follow π−p.
2.8.3 Partially Observable Markov Games
Over the past decades Markov games have established themselves as a mathematical
framework for studying multi-agent learning [114, 118, 132, 148]. However, many multi-
agent environments are in-fact partially observable. A famous example of a domain with
partial observability is multiple agents playing football (soccer), where each player only
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receives a local (potentially noisy) observation using their sensors [149, 193]. Formally,
games where learners only receive noisy partial observations of their environment can
be defined as partially observable Markov games [114]:
Definition 2.8.7 (Partially Observable Markov Games). A Partially observable Markov
game is defined as a tuple (n,X ,O,U ,P,R) that has a finite state space X , an obser-
vation function Op : X → Rd, which returns a d-dimensional observation for player p,
for each state x ∈ X a joint action space (U1 × ... × Un), with Up being the number of
actions available to player p, a transition function P : Xt×U1× ...×Un×Xt+1 → [0, 1],
returning the probability of transitioning from a state xt to xt+1 given an action profile
u1 × ...× un, and a reward function: Rp : X × U1 × ...×Un ×Xt+1 → R for each player
p [114, 180]. We allow terminal states (absorbing states) at which the game ends.
2.8.4 Repeated Games
Repeated games are frequently used as a test bed for novel multi-agent reinforcement
learning algorithms [38, 99, 130–132, 213, 215]. In a repeated strategic-form game the
agents repeatedly play the same strategic-form game while being allowed to choose a
different action during each iteration. We observe that in the multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning literature the term repeated game has become synonymous with repeated
strategic-form game [130, 131, 148, 223]. However, a Markov game can also be re-
peated [41, 51, 86]. A repeated Markov game (also known as a repeated stochastic game)
is a Markov game where there exists at least one state x ∈ X that is absorbing (termi-
nal) [41, 51, 86]. Upon entering an absorbing state the game is reset, and the players play
the next iteration [41, 51, 86]. Therefore, we argue that repeated strategic-form games
should be distinguished from repeated Markov games (or repeated stochastic games) to
promote consistency across disciplines.
The criteria used to evaluate repeated games include the total reward (for games
that are not played infinitely), discounted future payoffs and the expected average re-
ward [220]. In Markov games for instance we can compute the expected gain (also known
as the expected sum of future rewards) for each player:
Definition 2.8.8 (Expected Gain). Given a joint policy π the gain for each player p
starting from a state x is defined in Equation (2.12), where rp,t refers to the reward







2.8.5 Incomplete Information and Bayesian Games
In traditional game theory the players are aware of each others’ utility functions [213].
However, in multi-agent reinforcement learning the agents frequently only have limited
information regarding the game (system) within which they are interacting, often being
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unable to observe the actions and rewards of the other agents [148, 211]. Instead the
learners adapt their policy over time by updating their utility value estimates, thereby
adjusting to the other agents’ non-stationary policies [44, 148, 211]. Multi-agent rein-
forcement learning therefore often views (or uses) strategic-form games as a distributed
bandit problem [38]. This is in contrast to classical game theory, where the players con-
sider the consequences of their own choices in relation to rational decisions by the other
players, where factors that determine the player’s choices are [210]:
1. the preference over the stability of outcomes resulting from each strategy, e.g.,
where switching to an alternative strategy will result in a lower payoff;
2. the strategic choices that the opponents are likely to make in response the player’s
own actions, based on beliefs about the other players.
Rational decisions are also assumed in repeated games with incomplete information,
where a lack of full information can result from:
1. not being able to observe the exact state, e.g., the hand of an opponent in poker;
2. or not knowing the type of player, e.g., their exact reward function. Although we
note that each player maintains a belief (distribution) over the types of the other
players.
This set of games is frequently referred to as Bayesian games, since the players
typically employ a Bayesian approach towards unknown variables, e.g., the belief (dis-
tribution) over which type the other player is (i.e. what their payoff matrix is) [78].
2.8.6 Monitoring Conditions in Repeated Games
If the repeated games have imperfect monitoring conditions, where the agents cannot
observe each others’ action choices, the agents must learn a policy via an observable
signal from previous encounters, for instance using the reward signal [1, 98]. However, the
players can maintain beliefs over what type the other player is, with regards to the payoff
matrix [78]. This is in contrast to the majority of multi-agent reinforcement learning
algorithms that are applied to strategic-form games, including those discussed within
the main contribution chapters of this thesis. Typically independent learners choose
actions based on utility values computed via the reward signal without reasoning about
the other agents’ available actions and decisions [38, 86, 99, 130–132, 148]. However,
while the majority of the state-of the-art multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms
are designed for repeated interactions with fixed opponents (or teammates), there have
been efforts towards learning best responses for arbitrary opponents in repeated games
[34, 41, 42, 51, 86]. For example, similar to work on Stochastic Bayesian Games, which
focus on incorporating beliefs over opponent types into observations, Hernandez-Leal and
Kaisers [86] utilize Bayesian policy reuse for a fast detection of opponents in repeated
Markov games, enabling players to choose from best response policies learned during an
offline training phase.
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2.8.7 Game Types
The reward function of both strategic-from and (partially observable) Markov games
can help us differentiate between game types. Below we outline three types of games
frequently discussed in multi-agent reinforcement learning literature: purely competitive
(zero-sum) games, team-games and general sum games:
• Purely Competitive (Zero-Sum) Games: A game is a zero-sum game if the
total of all players’ rewards adds up to 0.
• Team-Games: A game is a team game if all n players receive the same reward,
i.e., R1 = R2 = · · · = Rn = R. Thus, team-games can be thought of as fully coop-
erative settings, where players have a shared objective to maximize their common
return [31, 38, 132]. We note that team-games are not to be confused with the
coalition games discussed in cooperative game theory, where groups of players form
coalitions to compete against other players [231].
• General-Sum Games: The payoffs in general-sum games can be arbitrary [148].
Social dilemma are frequently formulated as general-sum games [177]. We illustrate
three famous examples of social dilemmas in Figure 2.3: the prisoner’s dilemma,
chicken and stag hunt games [114]. In these games the actions available to the
agents can be interpreted as to either cooperate or defect. Therefore, for the
bimatrix games outlined in Figure 2.3, each stage game has four possible outcomes:
R (mutual cooperation); S (cooperating when the other player defects); T (giving
in to temptation and defecting when the other player cooperates) and P (both
players defect) [114]. A general sum game is considered a social dilemma if the
following four inequalities hold [114, 123]:
1. Mutual cooperation yields a higher payoff than mutual defection: R > P .
2. Mutual cooperation yields a higher payoff than being exploited: R > S.
3. Mutual cooperation is preferred to an equal probability of unilateral cooper-
ation and defection: 2R > T + S.
4. Either exploitation is more profitable than mutual cooperation, or mutual
defection is preferable to being exploited: T > R or P > S respectively.
We note that the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature also distinguishes
between two types of reward function: (i) local rewards determined by each learner’s ob-
servable part of the system and individual contribution, (ii) global rewards determined
by the learners’ collectively performance within the system [10, 46, 178, 233]. Both
reward function types introduce additional challenges. For instance, depending on the
system, learners can converge upon a sub-optimal joint-policy when attempting to max-
imise local rewards [46]. In contrast, despite global reward being more likely to help
learners act within the system’s interest, noise introduced via the actions taken by the
other agents can give rise to the credit assignment problem [178].

















































Figure 2.3: Social Dilemmas: (a) Illustrates outcome variables R (mutual
cooperation), S (cooperating when the other player defects), T (giving in to
temptation and defecting when the other player cooperates) and P (both players
defect), whose inequalities can be used to determine if a general sum game is in-fact a
social dilemma [114, 123]; (b) The Prisoner’s Dilemma; (c) Chicken and (d) Stag
Hunt. Actions are to Cooperate or Defect.
In this thesis we empirically evaluate the extent to which independent learners can
overcome multi-agent learning pathologies within team-games while recieving a global
reward signal. However, in Chapter 3 we conduct a literature review of the current state
of the art of multi-agent reinforcement learning, providing the necessary context for our
contributions. The literature review also includes recent work conducted using zero-sum
and general-sum games and approaches that learn from local reward signals.
2.8.8 Equilibrium Concepts
In multi-agent learning the interdependence of agents’ policies frequently limits the
extent to which each agent can maximize their individual payoff. As a result defining
a desired outcome in multi-agent reinforcement learning can be challenging, e.g., in
settings where agents have conflicting goals it is impossible for each agent to reach
their respective maximum expected gain [148]. Since the agents are computing best
responses to each others’ actions, multi-agent reinforcement learning literature often
relies on the equilibria concepts defined in game theory to evaluate the outcome of
games [132, 148]. Two equilibrium concepts commonly used in game theory to define
solutions in games are the Nash equilibrium [146] and Pareto optimality [132]. A group
of agents have converged upon a Nash equilibrium if no agent can improve it’s long-term
gain by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy [132, 146]. Formally:
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Definition 2.8.9 (Nash Equilibrium). For a Markov game, a joint policy π∗ is a Nash
equilibrium iff no player i can improve it’s gain through unilaterally deviating from π∗:
∀i,∀πi ∈ ∆(X ,Ui), ∀x ∈ X ,Gi,〈π∗i ,π∗−i〉(x) ≥ Gi,〈πi,π∗−i〉(x). (2.13)
Therefore, no player will observe an increase in expected gain upon unilaterally
deviating from a Nash equilibrium. While Markov and strategic form games may have
more than one Nash equilibrium, from a group perspective Nash equilibria are often
sub-optimal [132]. In contrast Pareto-optimality defines a joint strategy π̂ from which
no player i can deviate without making at least one other agent worse off [132].
Definition 2.8.10 (Pareto Optimality). A joint-strategy π is Pareto-dominated by π̂ iff :
∀i,∀x ∈ X ,Gi,π̂(x) ≥ Gi,π(x) and ∃j,∃x ∈ X ,Gj,π̂(x) > Gj,π(x). (2.14)
A joint policy π̂∗ is Pareto optimal if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other π.
Traditional game theory makes assumptions that do not necessarily reflect the dy-
namics of the real world, e.g., hyper-ration players that are capable of correctly pre-
dicting other players in an equilibrium [60, 90, 172, 210]. Furthermore, determining
whether players have converged upon a Nash equilibrium remains on open challenge for
many multi-agent learning problems. These notions inspired John Maynard Smith [187]
to apply evolution concepts from biology to game theory, resulting in the paradigm of
evolutionary game theory. In contrast to traditional game theory, the question at the
core of evolutionary game theory is to what extent can a player learn to optimize their
behaviour in-order to maximize their return [210]. Learning in evolutionary game the-
ory occurs by conducting repeated games, where players with strategic preferences are
randomly drawn from large populations to interact with other players while having no
information regarding their preferences [225].
Evolutionary game theory provides solid foundations for modeling decision mak-
ing under uncertain conditions within complex domains, and is suitable for modeling
learning agents within the context of multi-agent systems. For instance, Wiegand [226]
introduced an evolutionary game theoretic model for cooperative co-evolutionary algo-
rithms, while evolutionary game theory’s replicator dynamics have been extended to
study the convergence guarantees and visualize the basins of attraction for numerous
multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms [21, 97, 156, 214].
More recent work in this area has shown that asymmetric games can be decomposed
into symmetric counterparts, enabling an evolutionary game theoretic analysis of the
original asymmetric game [212], and the introduction of α-Rank [151], a principled evo-
lutionary dynamics methodology which can be used to rank agents within meta games
(empirical games), while providing insights into learning dynamics and basins of attrac-
tions. However, given that the independent learners studied in this thesis are situated
within team-games, our aim is to evaluate to what extent we can enable independent
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learners to converge upon joint policies that are Pareto optimal. Identifying the Pareto
optimal solutions and Nash equilibria is relatively trivial for the games within which our
evaluations are conducted. Nevertheless, despite the simplicity of these games, consid-
erations are required to enable independent learners to converge upon a Pareto optimal
joint-policy.
2.9 Roadmap
In this chapter we outline the learning algorithms that serve as the foundations for
the methods introduced and evaluated throughout this thesis. We also provide a recap
of the necessary terminology from game theory to describe the multi-agent learning
problem. In the next chapter we shall use this terminology to formally define the multi-
agent learning pathologies that confront independent learners within team-games, before
providing a summary of independent learning algorithms designed to overcome these
pathologies. We subsequently discuss the current state of the art of multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning, which includes extensions of the deep reinforcement learning




In this chapter we conduct a survey of the current state of the art of multi-agent re-
inforcement learning. First we shall discuss the multi-agent learning pathologies that
confront fully-cooperative independent learners. This is followed by a recap of indepen-
dent learning algorithms designed to mitigate the outlined pathologies. Finally, we give
an overview of research conducted to date in the relatively young field of multi-agent
deep reinforcement learning, providing the necessary context for our own contributions.
3.1 Multi-Agent Learning Pathologies
One of the benefits of studying team-games, compared to zero-sum and general-sum
games, is that the proof of convergence on a global Nash-equilibria is relatively sim-
ple [157]. Identifying the optimal joint-action in these games is trivial for rational players
when the reward space is observable. However, converging upon an optimal joint-policy
is significantly harder when no information is available regarding the structure of the
reward space and the actions chosen by other agents [30, 38, 99, 130, 132, 148, 159, 160].
Independent learners attempt to overcome the challenge of receiving imperfect informa-
tion through estimating utility values using a reward signal. However, due to multi-
agent learning pathologies independent learners’ utility value estimates are often noisy,
increasing the likelihood of convergence upon a sub-optimal joint-policy (or not converg-
ing at all). In this section we shall therefore define the independent learning problem
along six axis, based on six pathologies frequently observed in multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning literature: miscoordination, relative overgeneralization, stochasticity, the
alter-exploration problem, the moving target problem and deception. We briefly men-
tioned these pathologies in Chapter 1. However, in this section we formally define each
pathology. Addressing one pathology often leaves agents vulnerable towards others. We
discuss this in detail, while considering the implications of tackling multi-agent learning
pathologies in complex environments.
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To understand the pathologies, we consider two types of independent learners, ab-
breviated as i, attempting to estimate the quality of an action a when paired with the
actions A′ available to the other agent [99, 110, 223]:















Miscoordination (also known as the Pareto-selection problem) is a common pathology in
repeated games [38, 99, 132]. It can occur when two or more incompatible Pareto-optimal
equilibria are present [132]. As a consequence of the equilibria being incompatible, one
agent choosing an action from an alternative equilibria is sufficient to lower the gain.
For example, there are two Pareto optimal equilibria in the Bimatrix game in Figure 3.1,
〈A,A〉 and 〈B,B〉. Both joint actions result in a reward of 10 for each agent. However,
mixing actions from the two equilibria reduces the reward to 0. Formally we can define
miscoordination as follows [132]:
Definition 3.1.1 (Miscoordination). Two equilibria π and π̂ are incompatible iff the
gain received for pairing at least one agent using a policy π with other agents using a
policy π̂ results in a lower gain compared to when all agents are using π:












Figure 3.1: Bimatrix game example with two Pareto optimal equilibria [223]
3.1.2 Relative Overgeneralization
Relative overgeneralization occurs when agents gravitate towards a robust but sub-
optimal joint policy, due to noise induced by the mutual influence of each agent’s ex-
ploration strategy on the other agents’ learning updates [226]. It is a type of action
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shadowing, occurring in games where a sub-optimal policy yields a higher payoff on av-
erage when each selected action is paired with an arbitrary action chosen by the other
agent [158]. A shadowed equilibrium is an equilibrium defined by a policy π that is shad-
owed by a policy π̂ in a state x, where at least one agent exists who when unilaterally
deviating from π, will receive a gain G〈πi,π−i〉(x) less than the minimum gain that can
be obtained for deviating from π̂ [132]. Formally:
∃i∃πiG〈πi,π−i〉(x) < minj,πj
G〈πj ,π̂−j〉(x). (3.4)
Relative overgeneralization occurs in games where, as a result of a shadowed equi-
librium, the agents converge upon a sub-optimal Nash Equilibrium that is Pareto-
dominated by at least one other Nash Equilibrium [122, 132]. As a result of relative
overgeneralization, independent learners can be drawn to sub-optimal but wide peaks
in the reward space, due to a greater likelihood of achieving collaboration there [158].
This problem is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which depicts a reward space for continuous
actions. The x and y axis represent the continuous actions for agents i and j, while
the z axis illustrates the reward for each joint-action 〈ai, aj〉. While M represents the
optimal action for agent i, pairing M with arbitrary actions by agent j results in a lower
utility on average compared to when agent i chooses action N .
Figure 3.2: An illustration of a reward space for continuous actions where the
relative overgeneralization pathology is present. The x and y axis represent the
continuous actions for agents i and j, while the z axis illustrates the reward for each
joint-action 〈ai, aj〉. For agent i action M can lead to the optimal reward, providing
agent j chooses the correct response. However, due to miscoordination being less
severely punished for actions approaching N , the agents are drawn towards a
sub-optimal Nash equilibrium. This illustration is taken from Wei and Luke [223].
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3.1.3 Stochasticity of Rewards and Transitions
A deviation of multi-agent reinforcement learning literature from traditional economic
game theory is the assumption that the payoffs received can be stochastic, with joint-
actions not always resulting in a deterministic reward for each agent [99, 148]. Given that
stochasticity (of both rewards and transitions) are a central pathology of multi-agent
reinforcement learning, in this thesis we consider both partially and fully stochastic
rewards. Deterministic and fully stochastic reward functions exclusively return deter-
ministic and stochastic rewards respectively for each A1...n. For a partially stochastic
reward function there exists up to |A| − 1 joint actions A1...n for which a stochastic
reward is returned, while the remaining joint actions return deterministic rewards [99].
We illustrate this problem with two variations of a bimatrix-game in Figure 3.3.
In the deterministic reward variation, Sub-Figure 3.3(a), relative overgeneralization can
be overcome with maximum-based learning, where learners consider each action i based
on the observed maxj(i, j). However, this approach leaves learners vulnerable towards
misleading stochastic rewards. For example, by making the game partially stochastic,
Sub-Figure 3.3(b), the joint action 〈C,C〉 yields stochastic rewards of 14 and 0 with 50%
probability. Therefore, maximum based learners are drawn towards 〈C,C〉, despite each
agent only receiving a reward of 7 on average. In temporally extended games additional
stochasticity can emerge as a result of environmental factors such as noisy observations
[102] and probabilistic state transitions [164]. Meanwhile, independent learners facing
the curse of dimensionality must overcome challenges introduced by noisy approximated

































Figure 3.3: Two variations of a bimatrix game that confronts independent learners
with relative overgeneralization. For the deterministic variation (a) maximum based
learners will converge upon the optimal joint-action 〈A,A〉, by ignoring the
miscoordination penalties. For (b) joint-action 〈C,C〉 yields stochastic rewards of 14
and 0 with 50% probability, towards which maximum based learners are drawn.
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3.1.4 The Alter-Exploration Problem
The exploration-exploitation trade-off required by reinforcement learners adds to the
challenge of learning noise-free utility estimates. Matignon et al. [132] define global
exploration, the probability of at least one of n agents exploring as 1− (1− ε)n, where
each agent explores according to a probability ε. In environments with a shadowed
equilibrium, as defined in Section 3.1.2, higher global exploration can result in agents
converging upon a sub-optimal joint policy, as exploration can lead to penalties [132].
3.1.5 The Moving Target Problem
As mentioned, an environment can no longer be considered Markovian when multiple
independent learners update their policies in parallel, thereby losing the property that
guarantees convergence for a large number of single-agent learning algorithms [24, 199,
211, 215]. This problem is amplified in multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, where
using an experience replay memory D often results in deprecated transitions being sam-
pled during training [53, 152, 155].
3.1.6 Deception
Deception can occur in Markov games with |X | > 1, where utility values are calculated
by incorporating backed up rewards from follow-on states from which pathologies such
as miscoordination and relative overgeneralization can also be back-propagated [223].
This pathology leaves maximum based learners vulnerable towards overestimating the
expected utility of actions that result in state-transitions towards high utility states
that occur with a low probability. Furthermore, independent learners can be drawn
away from optimal state-transition trajectories in the presence of states with high local
rewards that lead to states with low future rewards [223].
3.2 Independent Learning Approaches
A number of games exist where independent learners using standard Q-learning are
unable to converge upon equilibrium play [38, 99, 130, 148]. In team-games this is of-
ten due to the learners being confronted with the learning pathologies outlined above.
However, an increased interest in independent learners over the past decades has led
to the development of algorithms that have proven effective within a range of chal-
lenging repeated strategic-form and Markov games [41]. Despite these developments
independent learning still lacks a silver bullet approach, even for team bimatrix games
[33]. Therefore, before we discuss algorithms designed to facilitate cooperation within
high-dimensional settings (Section 3.3.1), in this section we provide a recap of indepen-
dent learning algorithms that have proven robust in low-dimensional settings, including:
distributed Q-learning [110], hysteretic Q-learning [130], Frequency Maximum Q-value
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(FMQ) [99], Recursive Frequency Maximum Q-value (Recursive-FMQ) [131] and Le-
nient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning 2 (LMRL2) [223]. Each of these approaches
is implemented with either a modified value function (hysteretic Q-learning), a mod-
ified exploration method (FMQ and Recursive-FMQ) or both (distributed Q-learning
and LMRL2). A third independent learning approach frequently discussed in the multi-
agent reinforcement learning literature is to manipulate the learners via a shaped reward
signal [27, 28, 44–46, 67, 69, 124]. Therefore, while the focus of this thesis is on mod-
ifying the value function and exploration method, in this section we shall also discuss
reward shaping as an alternative to the listed approaches.
LMRL2 is currently considered the state of the art independent learning approach
for mitigating the above pathologies within two-player strategic-form games and Markov
games with a small low-dimensional state space, enabling a high convergence rate even in
the presence of relative overgeneralization and stochasticity [223]. We verify this claim
in Chapter 4, evaluating to what extent LMRL2 (and the remaining approaches) can
converge upon optimal joint-policies upon increasing the scale of penalty values and the
number of learners. During this process we identify a number of LMRL2’s weaknesses,
which we subsequently address in Chapter 5. Finally, we scale and evaluate leniency
within a deep multi-agent reinforcement learning context in Chapters 6 and 7.
While LMRL2 represents the current state of the art, the approach requires care-
fully tuned hyperparameters that rarely translate across domains [223]. This finding
is worrying, as tuning hyperparameters is notoriously expensive within deep reinforce-
ment learning [89]. In contrast, decentralized and hysteretic Q-learning have lower over-
heads [130]. Furthermore, despite being less robust towards a combination of stochas-
ticity and relative overgeneralization, both approaches have been scaled to multi-agent
deep reinforcement learning [114, 121, 152, 203]. Decentralized and hysteretic Q-learning
therefore provide valuable baselines against which to compare our contributions.
In contrast to hysteretic and decentralized Q-learning, no equivalent deep approaches
currently exist for FMQ and Recursive-FMQ. Nevertheless, the two approaches are
relevant to our current work, as they both modify the learner’s exploration policy.
They therefore provide a means to gain valuable insights regarding the choice of explo-
ration method, e.g., helping us better understand the challenges regarding the tuning of
LMRL2’s own modified Boltzmann exploration strategy.
3.2.1 Decentralized Q-learning
Implementing learning agents with standard Q-learning is often referred to in multi-
agent reinforcement learning literature as decentralized Q-learning. While decentralized
Q-learning has a poor convergence rate when confronted with domains suffering from the
pathologies discussed in this chapter, it does provide a valuable baseline against which to
compare other approaches, and is therefore frequently featured in multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning literature. We introduced the full version of Q-learning in Section 2.3. The
stateless version of Q-learning used in previous work on strategic-form games computes
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Q-value updates using an exponential weighted moving average [38, 99, 130, 131, 148],
where the utility value after each episode is updated with the reward r as follows 1:
Q(a) = (1− α)Q(a) + αr. (3.5)
Decentralized Q-learners are therefore by definition average reward learners. This under-
lines why Q-learning struggles when confronted with multi-agent learning pathologies,
such as relative overgeneralization and miscoordination [38, 99].
3.2.2 Distributed Q-learning
Lauer and Riedmiller’s [110] distributed Q-learning is believed to be one of the earliest
attempts at designing an algorithm to help cooperative learners prevent relative overgen-
eralization. In contrast to decentralized Q-learning the algorithm maintains two tables,
a Q-table and a policy table π. In regular Q-learning a learning rate α < 1.0 ensures
that Q-value updates only incorporate a portion of the observed reward and follow-on
utility estimate. In contrast distributed Q-learning uses α = 1.0 for positive updates
that increase a Q-value estimate. Therefore, the current Q-value is completely replaced
with the observed reward and follow-on utility estimate [110]:
Q(xt, ut)← max{Q(xt, ut), rt+1 + γmax
u∈U
Q(xt+1, u)}. (3.6)
For the stateless version applied to strategic-form games Lauer and Riedmiller [110]
use γ = 0. The current policy table π is updated iff an improvement occurs with
regards to the maximum Q-value, allowing the agents to overcome the Pareto selection
problem [110]. At time step t = 0 actions are selected arbitrarily: π0(x) ∈ U . At each
time-step the policy table π is updated as follows:
πt+1(x)←
πt(x), if x 6= xt or maxu∈U Qt(x, u) = maxu∈U Qt+1(x, u).ut, otherwise. (3.7)
Distributed Q-learners perform well in deterministic games, but are vulnerable towards
misleading stochasticity due to being maximum based learners [99].
3.2.3 Hysteretic Q-learning
By setting the learning rate alpha = 1.0 for positive updates, distributed Q-learners are
effectively maximum based learners. Hysteretic Q-learning was introduced to address
distributed Q-learners’ tendency of gravitating towards sub-optimal equilibria, as a result
of being blind towards stochastic reward signals that would result in a lowering of a utility
estimate [130]. To address this issue hysteretic Q-learning introduces a second learning
1Q-values Qi are computed independently for each agent i. For simplicity we drop the subscript i.
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rate β < α. Given a temporal difference error δ,
δ ← r −Q(a), (3.8)
learning rate α is applied to updates where δ is positive, meaning the utility of an action
is currently being underestimated. Learning rate β, on the other hand, is applied when δ
is negative, giving the agent an optimistic disposition without entirely ignoring rewards
that would lower the agent’s utility estimate:
Q(a)←
Q(a) + αδ, if δ ≥ 0.Q(a) + βδ, otherwise. (3.9)
For Markov games δ is computed for state-action pairs:
δ = rt+1 + γmax
u∈U
Q(xt+1, u)−Q(xt, ut), (3.10)
and subsequently scaled using either α or β accordingly:
Q(xt, ut)← Q(xt, ut) +
αδ, if δ ≥ 0.βδ, otherwise. (3.11)
Hysteretic Q-learning is a form of optimistic learning with a strong empirical track
record in fully-observable environments, requiring less overhead than the majority of
independent learning approaches [12, 130, 132, 230]. However, hysteretic Q-learners still
incorporate maximum-based learning traits, due to their Q-value estimates being more
likely to reflect new superior results. Therefore, despite being introduced to address dis-
tributed Q-learners’ vulnerability towards misleading stochastic rewards, depending on
the values chosen for β, hysteretic Q-learners often converge on sub-optimal joint poli-
cies when simultaneously confronted with the pathologies of relative over-generalization
and stochasticity with regards to both rewards and stochastic transitions [223].
3.2.4 Frequency Maximum Q-value
The methods outlined above focus on modifying the Q-value update function. In con-
trast, Frequency Maximum Q-value (FMQ) [99] takes an alternative approach by modi-
fying the exploration strategy. Using a modified Boltzmann exploration (see Section 2.3),
FMQ applies an addition estimated value term EV to each Q-value while computing
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where:
EV (a)← Q(a) + c · freq(maxR(a)) ·maxR(a). (3.13)
In the above equation
• maxR(a) represents the maximum reward observed for action a;
• freq(maxR(a)) the likelihood of maxR(a) occurring, based on the number of times
maxR(a) was received divided by the number of times action a was selected;
• c determines the weighting of the FMQ heuristic. Therefore, c determines the
extent to which action selection should rely on high instead of average rewards.
The temperature T is determined using Equation 3.14:
T ← exp (−st)MaxTemp+ 1, (3.14)
where t represents the current time-step; s controls the rate of exponential decay;
and MaxTemp is the initial temperature. Two limitations of FMQ are that it only
marginally outperforms decentralized Q-learning when the variance of the reward func-
tion is high [99], and that it is limited to repeated strategic-form games [131].
3.2.5 Recursive Frequency Maximum Q-value
FMQ inspired Matignon et al. [131] to develop Recursive-FMQ (RFMQ), which the au-
thors subsequently scaled to Markov games2. Matignon et al. [131] developed Recursive-
FMQ to address FMQ’s weaknesses. For instance, the authors find that if the first
observation of the optimal joint-action is delayed, despite one of the agents frequently
choosing the optimal action, then the FMQ heuristic will enforce that the optimal ac-
tion remains an exploratory step. Thus the agents can only recover through repeatedly
executing the optimal join-action, enabling the frequency term to increase sufficiently
for both agents to converge upon the optimal joint-action. The first phase of exploration
is therefore critical for FMQ to succeed [131]. The authors’ mitigate this problem by




1, if r > Qmax(a).
(1− αf )F (a) + αf , if r = Qmax(a).
(1− αf )F (a), otherwise.
(3.15)
The recursive frequency term F (a) for action a is therefore reset to 1 when receiving
a reward r greater than the observed Qmax(a), with Qmax(a) subsequently set to r. If
r is not greater than Qmax(a), then F (a) is updated using a frequency learning rate αf
as outlined above in Equation (3.15). The frequency term F (a) therefore only decreases
in cases of miscoordination, due to the alter exploration problem, or due to a noisy
2The full version of RFMQ is named Swing between Optimal or Neutral (SOoN) [131].
Chapter 3. Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning 34
Algorithm 1 Recursive-FMQ
1: Input: Max steps T , learning rate α, frequency learning rate αf
2: Init: ∀a ∈ A, Q(a)← 0, Qmax(a)← 0, F (a)← 1, E(a)← 0, π(a) arbitrarily
3: for t = 0 to T do
4: Select a according to the ε-greedy selection method based on π
5: Apply a and observe reward r
6: Q(a)← (1− α)Q(a) + αr
7: if r > Qmax(a) then
8: Qmax(a)← r
9: F (a)← 1
10: else if r = Qmax(a) then
11: F (a)← (1− αf )F (a) + αf
12: else
13: F (a)← (1− αf )F (a)
14: E(a)← [1− F (a)]Q(a) + F (a)Qmax(a)
15: if E(argmaxo∈A π(o)) 6= maxo∈AE(o) then
16: Select a random action amax ∈ argmaxo∈AE(o)
17: ∀b ∈ A π(b)←
{
1, if b = amax.
0, otherwise.
reward [131]. Similar to FMQ, Recursive-FMQ also modifies the exploration strategy.
However, instead of using Boltzmann Exploration, ε-greedy exploration is applied to
a policy vector π. A parameter free linear interpolation heuristic for evaluating the
actions determines when to update π (Equation (3.16)). The complete Recursive-FMQ
algorithm as specified by Matignon et al. [131] is outline in Algorithm 1.
E(a)← [1− F (a)]Q(a) + F (a)Qmax(a). (3.16)
RFMQ can swing between optimist or neutral depending on whether the rewards
received are deterministic or stochastic respectively [131]. Therefore, in deterministic
strategic-form games the agents predominately rely on Qmax(a), while an increase in
stochasticity will result in the agents being guided by the average reward Q(a) when
choosing an exploration step [131].
3.2.6 Lenient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Lenient learning was originally introduced by Potter and De Jong [163] to help coop-
erative co-evolutionary algorithms converge towards an optimal joint-policy, and was
later applied to multi-agent reinforcement learning as well [160]. It was designed to
prevent relative overgeneralization [226], and has been shown to increase the likelihood
of convergence towards the globally optimal solution in stateless coordination games for
reinforcement learning agents [21, 22, 159, 160]. Lenient learners do so by effectively
forgiving (ignoring) sub-optimal actions by teammates that lead to low rewards during
the initial exploration phase.
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While initially adopting an optimistic disposition, the amount of leniency displayed
is typically decayed each time a state-action pair is visited [21, 22, 159, 160]. As a
result the agents become less lenient over time for frequently visited state-action pairs,
while remaining optimistic within unexplored areas. This transition to average reward
learners helps lenient agents avoid sub-optimal joint policies in environments that yield
stochastic rewards. Therefore, leniency is less vulnerable towards misleading stochastic
rewards than distributed and hysteretic Q-learning [223].
During training the frequency with which lenient reinforcement learning agents per-
form updates that result in lowering the Q-value of an action a is determined by leniency
and temperature functions L : A → R and T : A → R respectively [21, 22, 159, 160].
The stateless version of LMRL2 used on strategic-form games maintains temperature
values T (a) for each action a ∈ A. The mapping between actions and temperature
values for the function T is one-to-one, with each action being assigned a real-valued
temperature that is initially set to a defined maximum value. As in the original version
of leniency the temperature value associated with the selected action is decayed using a
decay rate ν following a utility value update [158, 159]:
T (a)← νT (a). (3.17)
The amount of leniency that should be applied during a utility value update is computed
using equation 3.18:






A constant k is used as a leniency moderation factor to determine how the temperature
value affects the drop-off in lenience.
A Q-value update is performed iff the temporal difference error δ is positive, or a




r, if Q(a) =∞(Only if initialization was to infinity).
Q(a) + αδ, if δ > 0 or z > L(a).
Q(a), otherwise.
(3.19)
With LMRL2 Wei and Luke [223] extend leniency [158, 159]: LMRL2’s temperature
values T are not only used to compute the amount of leniency that a learner should
apply towards updates that would lower a utility value, but are also used to guide
the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Similar to FMQ the Boltzmann action selection
method is modified. The average temperature value,
T ← meanaT (a), (3.20)
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Algorithm 2 LMRL2 for Repeated Strategic-Form Games
1: Input: Max steps T , MaxTemp, MinTemp, learning rate α, leniency moderation
factor k, exploration moderation factor ω, temperature decay rate ν
2: for all a ∈ A do
3: Q(a)← initialize(a), T (a)←MaxTemp
4: for t = 0 to T do
5: if T < MinTemp or maxaQ(a) =∞ then
6: u← argmaxaQ(a) (breaking ties randomly)
7: else
8: Choose a using probability distribution P obtained using Equation (3.21).
9: Execute action a and observe rt
10: Update Q(a) using Equation (3.19)
11: T (a)← νT (a)













Wei and Luke [223] add a MinTemp value for exploration to avoid floating point overflow
errors, and thereby prevent the agents from becoming completely greedy. The Q-value
update for LMRL2 are unaffected by the MinTemp value, and remain identical to how
leniency was described by Panait et al. [158, 159]. The complete algorithm for LMRL2
in repeated strategic-form games is outlined in Algorithm 2.
For Markov games leniency requires temperature values for state-action pairs:






For the temperature based exploration the average temperature value for the current
state, T (x) determines the action selection probabilities returned by the modified Boltz-
mann exploration method:
T (x)← meanuT (x, u). (3.24)











As a result agents are more likely to choose a greedy action within frequently visited
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Algorithm 3 LMRL2 for Markov Games
1: Input: Max steps T , MaxTemp, MinTemp, learning rate α, leniency moderation
factor k, exploration moderation factor ω, temperature decay rate ν
2: for all x ∈ X and u ∈ U do
3: Q(x, a)← initialize(x, u), T (x, u)←MaxTemp
4: x← initial state
5: for t = 0 to T do
6: if T (x) < MinTemp or maxaQ(x, u) =∞ then
7: u← argmaxaQ(x, u) (breaking ties randomly)
8: else
9: Choose u using probability distribution P obtained using Equation (3.25).
10: Execute action u and observe xt+1, rt
11: Update Q(x, u) and T (x, u) using Equations (3.28) and (3.27) respectively.
states while remaining exploratory for less-frequented areas of the environment. How-
ever, Wei and Luke [223] note that the choice of the moderation factor ω is a non-trivial
task, as Boltzmann selection struggles to distinguish between similar Q-values [96].
After each transition the temperature value for the current state-action pair are
decayed, where t is the current time-step. If the agents find themselves in the same initial
state at the beginning of each episode, then after repeated interactions the temperature
values for state-action pairs close to the initial state can decay rapidly as they are visited
more frequently. However, it is crucial for the success of the lenient learners that the
temperatures for these state-action pairs remain sufficiently high for the rewards to
propagate back from later stages, and to prevent the agents from converging upon a
sub-optimal policy. Wei and Luke [223] attempt to mitigate the premature decay of
temperature values by folding the average temperature for the n actions available to
the agent in xt+1 into the temperature that is being decayed for (xt, ut). The extent to
which this average temperature T t (xt+1) is folded in is determined by a constant υ as
follows:
Tt+1 (xt, ut) = β
Tt (xt, ut) if xt+1 is terminal.(1− υ) Tt (xt, ut) + υT t (xt+1) otherwise. (3.27)
The leniency Q-value update strategy now uses Equation (3.10) to calculate temporal
difference error δ. As above the Q-value updates are carried out if the δ is positive, or
a random variable z ∈ [0, 1] is greater than the leniency value L(x, u) computed for the
state-action pair (x, u):
Q(x, u)←

r, if Q(x, u) =∞(Only if initialization was to infinity).
Q(x, u) + αδ, if δ > 0 or z > L(x, u).
Q(x, u), otherwise.
(3.28)
The complete algorithm for LMRL2 in repeated games is outlined in Algorithm 3.
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3.2.7 Reward Shaping
The algorithms that we focus on in this section approach the independent learning
problem by either modifying the Q-value update equation (hysteretic Q-learning), using
modified action selection methods (FMQ and Recursive-FMQ), or both (distributed
Q-learning and LMRL2). However, it is worth noting that a significant portion of
the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature on independent learners is dedicated
towards a third approach: reward shaping, where agents learn using a shaped reward
signal. The literature on reward shaping typically focuses on helping agents overcome
the credit assignment problem, which can occur when global or local feedback signals
are sparse and difficult to attribute to the responsible learners [39, 46]. Two popular
reward shaping techniques designed to simplify the learning process through shaping the
reward and providing additional information are difference rewards and potential-based
reward shaping.
Difference Rewards: To remove the noise introduced by the actions of other agents
within the system, each learner i performs utility value updates using a shaped reward
(difference reward) Di. The difference reward is the difference between the global reward
G(z), where all agents are active, and the global reward G(z−i), where the contributions
of agent i are marginalized: Di(z) = G(z)−G(z−i); with z representing either states or
state-action pairs [46].
Potential-Based Reward Shaping: Previous research has shown that reward shaping
can prevent learners from converging upon the optimal policy when used incorrectly [44].
To address this issue Potential-Based Reward Shaping uses the discounted difference of
a potential function Φ (designed using domain knowledge), computed using the source
and destination states: F (x, x′) = γΦ(x′)−Φ(x) [44, 45]. The discount factor γ has the
same value as in the Q-learning update equation, which is rewritten as follows:
Q(x, u)← Q(x, u) + α
(









Both approaches enjoy a strong empirical track record [27, 28, 44–46, 67, 69, 124]
and have also been successfully combined [46]. However, as mentioned, potential based
reward shaping relies on measures such apriori information [49]. Meanwhile, differ-
ence rewards currently lack a general technique for computing Di within different do-
mains [147]. Team-games that can typically benefit from reward shaping approaches
include disaster rescue domains, ambulance dispatch and police patrolling where the
whole team receives a penalty when an insufficient number of agents respond to an in-
cident [147]. In such domains, Di is typically computed using a counterfactual term ci,
which effectively sidelines the agent i [39]. However, executing the simulation using each
counterfactual can require a significant amount of computational overhead [54]. Even if
a function approximator is used to approximate the difference reward rather than using
the simulator [39], finding an acceptable default action which sidelines the agents can
be challenging in many domains [54]. This is also the case for the domains used in this
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thesis, which are designed to evaluate the susceptibility of independent learners towards
the pathologies outlined in Section 3.1. Marginalizing the contributions of each agent
in the domains used in Chapters 4 – 7 represents a dilemma. Each action within the
n-player strategic-form and low-dimensional Markov games used in Chapters 4 and 5 has
interesting interdependencies with the action space of the other agent(s). Meanwhile,
in the Markov games in Chapters 6 and 7 contributions from all agents are required in-
order for an episode to terminate. Marginalizing one learner via a no-operation action
for instance is not feasible. We therefore leave the application of reward shaping tech-
niques within these domains for future work, and focus on methods that either modify
the Q-value update equation or the action selection method.
3.2.8 Comparison
Wei and Luke [223] provide a comprehensive evaluation of each of the approaches out-
lined in Sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.6. Evaluations took place in four strategic-from games from
multi-agent reinforcement learning literature and eight Markov games (six of which were
designed by the authors). Approaches were compared based on their ability to converge
upon correct and complete policies in self-play. Learners have converged upon a correct
policy if they behave optimally when following the policy from a designated initial state.
Learners who have converged upon a complete policy meanwhile behave correctly in
every state.
As mentioned, the authors found that LMRL2 outperforms the other methods, being
placed in top statistical tier for correct joint-policies for eleven out of the twelve games,
while also being in the top tier for finding complete solutions. Surprisingly decentralized
Q-learning performed reasonably well in games where the learners were not confronted
with relative overgeneralization. However, as we shall see in Chapter 4, these findings
do not scale as the penalty for miscoordination is increased [99]. Both distributed
and hysteretic Q-learning meanwhile were able to prevent relative overgeneralization in
deterministic domains, but struggled in games with stochastic rewards and transitions.
For FMQ the authors replicate previous results where the percentage of correct runs
decreases for domains where the variance of the reward function is high [99]. RFMQ
meanwhile was the second most consistent performer on strategic-form games. However,
SOoN, the scaled version of RFMQ, lacked consistency in Markov games.
Despite conducting evaluations using tuned hyperparameters for each domain, the
authors find that even LMRL2 fails to consistently converge upon correct joint-policy in
all of the games. This raises the question to what extent hyperparameter settings can be
found that deliver a consistent performance across each game. Our work in Chapter 4
aims to answer this question within repeated n-player strategic-form games, while in
Chapter 5 we propose our own extensions to improve the convergence rate of lenient
learners within repeated strategic-form and Markov games with a low-dimensional state
space. In Chapters 6 and 7 we turn to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, and
evaluate the extent to which findings from strategic-form and Markov games with a
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low dimensional state-space scale to domains suffering from the curse of dimensionality.
We provide the necessary background regarding the current state of the art in multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning research below, to provide sufficient context for our
contributions in the later chapters.
3.3 Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning
The emergence of deep reinforcement learning has opened up new possibilities with
regards to scaling multi-agent reinforcement learning to complex high-dimensional en-
vironments. However, considerations are required when applying single-agent architec-
tures to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning. For example, independent learners
sampling from an experience replay memory D will be confronted with sample obsoles-
cence, where, due to the non-stationarity pathology, state-transitions stored within D
become obsolete and thereby misleading [52]. Initial solutions to this problem were to
either disable the experience replay memory or reduce the sample capacity [52, 114].
However, these solutions both limit sampling efficiency and threaten the stability of the
function approximator [53]. A further issue that becomes more noticeable in partially
observable Markov games is the credit assignment problem, where agents receive spurious
reward signals following unobserved actions performed by teammates [197]. Sunehag et
al. [197] hypothesize that increasing the number of agents within a multi-agent system
will increase the credit assignment problem.
In this section we first discuss methods that have recently been proposed in multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning literature to address the above challenges and facility
cooperation between agents. We subsequently provide an overview of related topics, be-
fore briefly discussing the practical challenges of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning.
Finally we shall conclude this chapter with a discussion regarding the limitations of the
current state of the art.
3.3.1 Facilitating Cooperation
Multi-agent deep reinforcement learning literature has put forward a number of solutions
for addressing the credit assignment and sample obsolescence problems. One approach
is to mitigate both the credit assignment and sample obsolescence problems through
centralized learning [89]. Centralized learning reduces the multi-agent learning problem
to a single agent-learning problem through concatenating the observations from each of
the agents in the system, before feeding them to a network that outputs values (be it
Q-values, or action values) for each of the |A|n actions, where n represents the number
of agents [19, 74, 197]. However, centralized approaches are impractical, as increasing
the number of agents leads to an exponential increase in the size of the state-action
space [19, 44, 74, 89, 130, 169, 189, 197].
Gupta et al. [74] address this intractability by factoring the action space of the policy
to capture the action distributions for each agent, reducing the size of the action space
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from |A|n to n|A|. However, the authors limit their evaluation to domains where the
agents are homogeneous with regards to their action-space. Further drawbacks include:
(i) the approach does not address the issue of an exponential growth in the observation
space upon increasing n, and (ii) the model is centralized both during training and exe-
cution [74]. Finally, Sunehag et al.[197] observe that in practice centralized approaches
can fail to converge on an optimal policy due to the lazy agent problem, occurring when
a useful behaviour is learned for one of the agents, resulting in the other agents being
marginalized to prevent interference.
Hybrid approaches using centralized training for decentralized execution (CTDE)
have emerged as an alternative to centralized and decentralized methods [150]. The
concept behind CTDE is to optimize a joint action-value function at training time that
in turn optimizes at an individual level, thereby enabling agents to learn individual
action-value functions [150, 189]. Therefore, in contrast to centralized approaches, once
deployed CTDE allows agents to choose actions based on individual observations us-
ing their own action-value function, without having to refer to the joint-action value
function [169, 189, 197]. CTDE is suitable for domains with partial observability where
sufficient information can be made available at training time to enable centralized train-
ing [189]. In the paragraphs below we provide a summary of CTDE approaches outlined
in the deep multi-agent reinforcement learning literature, before turning to decentralized
learning approaches.
PS-TRPO: Gupta et al. [74] proposed one of the first CTDE algorithms for multi-agent
deep reinforcement learning: a parameter sharing approach where each agent has access
to the same policy network. The network is trained using a replay memory D, which
stores state-transition tuples obtained from all agents within the system. Therefore,
the observation-action space for each agent is reduced to the same size as for concur-
rent learners [74]. The authors find that parameter sharing outperforms centralized
and concurrent learning on one discrete task (Multi-Agent Pursuit) and two continuous
control tasks (Waterworld and Multi-Walker). Parameter sharing has two considerable
advantages: (i) it reduces the number of learn-able parameters, and (ii) having invari-
ant agents mitigates the lazy agent problem [197]. However, further considerations are
required in domains with specialized roles or for heterogeneous agents [197].
COMA: Inspired by difference rewards (see Section 3.2), Foerster et al. [54] propose
an actor-critic architecture with a centralized critic that is used to train actors using
Counterfactual Multi-Agent Policy Gradients (COMA). The approach tackles the credit
assignments problem, and attempts to estimate the contributions made by each agent
through computing a counter-factual baseline, marginalizing the impact of each actor in
turn. Foerster et al. [54] provide a proof of convergence to a local optimal policy, which
follows directly from the proof of convergence for singe-agent actor-critic algorithms.
However, this proof relies on COMA’s centralized critic.
MADDPG: Lowe et al. [120] introduce Multi-Agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradi-
ents (MADDPG), which extends the deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm [115]
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by adding a centralised critic network to train independent actor networks. However,
Rashid et al. [169] question the practicality of a fully centralized critic as the number of
agents increases.
Multiagent Soft Q-learning: Wei et al. [224] introduce Multiagent Soft Q-learning,
which converges towards a superior local optima compared to MADDPG [120] within
continuous action domains where learners must avoid relative overgeneralization. Mul-
tiagent Soft Q-learning augments rewards with an entropy term, thereby increasing the
likelihood of learners discovering multiple modes within a continuous action space [75,
224]. However, the approach is currently limited to single state continuous games, and
also requires a centralized critic.
Further successful approaches include training networks to approximate centralized
but factored Q-value functions [89]. Factorization in fully-cooperative games takes ad-
vantage of the fact that optimal actions across the agents are equivalent to the set of opti-
mal actions for each individual agent [189]. Value Decomposition Network (VDN) [197],
QMIX [169] and QTRAN [189] are recent examples of applying factorized joint-action
values into individual action-values for decentralized execution in domains with a high-
dimensional state space:
VDN: Sunehag et al. [197] introduce a value decomposition network (VDN) architec-
ture, an approach that learns an optimal value decomposition from the reward signal.
During training the gradient for the additive Q-value is back-propagated through the
individual DQN architectures, thereby mitigating spurious reward signals. Each agent
is therefore trained using it’s own observations, and can subsequently be deployed inde-
pendently of the other agents. Furthermore, the authors find that agents trained using
VDN outperform decentralized learners, and those trained using a centralized approach
by a large margin [197].
QMIX: A more recent approach, QMIX, estimates joint action-values as a non-linear
combination of agent-values, thereby helping agents learn optimal joint-action values
based on the additional information that centralized learning provides [169]. The au-
thors observe that the full factorisation of VDN is not necessary, and instead use a
mixing network that combines the individual Q values into a Qtot in a complex non-
linear way. The approach can therefore be applied to an increased number of potential
action-value functions compared to VDN, and outperforms VDN on a number of mi-
cromanagement tasks built in StarCraft II [219]. Furthermore, the approach performs
well in domains with heterogeneous agents. However, it can only be applied to problems
where a monotonicity assumption holds [169].
QTRAN: Son et al. [189] show that despite both VDN and QMIX being value based
approaches, their respective additivity and monotonicity assumptions limit the set of
games that each approach can be applied to. The authors demonstrate this using a
simple matrix game, and go on to propose a new method that is not conditioned on
these structural constraints, thereby being applicable to far wider range of domains:
QTRAN. An affine transformation transforms the original joint-action-value function
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Qjt into a new one Q
′
jt, that shares the optimal joint action with Qjt and is factorized
by additive decomposition. The authors accomplish this task via training three networks:
a joint action-value network; individual action-value networks and a state-value network
which is used to address the impact of partial observability. The authors go on to
demonstrate the superiority of their method over VDN and QMIX in predator-prey and
a Gaussian-squeeze task.
Despite the empirical success of VDN, QMIX and QTRAN, training networks to
approximate factorized value-functions remain an open challenge for complex coordina-
tion problems [89]. Castellini et al. [33] empirically evaluate the representational power
of neural network architectures, using a factorization to represent the joint-action-value
function based on the sum of smaller action-value functions defined over a coordination
graph [71]. A number of factorizations are evaluated, including single agent decompo-
sitions (each agent is represented by a single neural network); random partitions (each
agent is only involved in one factor); overlapping factors (a fixed number of factors is
picked at random from the set of all possible factors); and complete factorization. Eval-
uations were conducted using one-shot games with six agents, thereby capturing the
exponentially large joint-action space problem, while at the same time minimizing noise
and other confounding factors. A number of games were identified where all factor-
izations are unable to overcome multi-agent learning pathologies, in particular relative
overgeneralization. The authors note that only joint-action learners are able to currently
address these pathologies. For more benign domains, not suffering from pathologies such
as relative overgeneralization, the authors achieve near perfect reconstruction for both
complete factorizations of a modest factor size, random overlapping factors, and non-
factored action-value functions.
The above finding highlights the need for deep approaches capable of mitigating the
pathologies outlined in Section 3.1. An alternative approach towards overcoming the
challenges outlined above is to use decentralized learning agents with modified deep
reinforcement learning architectures [53, 120, 152, 154, 155, 234]. Given the amount
of work that has been conducted on concurrent and independent learning, a subset of
which we outline in Section 3.2, it should not come as a surprise that many of the recent
deep decentralized approaches draw inspiration from multi-agent reinforcement learning
literature.
For example, inspired by work on off-environment reinforcement learning [2, 56],
Foerster et al. [53] use importance sampling to estimate the probability of a joint-action
and subsequently apply a correction when a state transition tuple is sampled. However,
this approach requires the agents to maintain an action observation history for each
agent. The authors also introduce a second approach that uses fingerprints (consisting
of the iteration and exploration rate) to disambiguate the age of the state-transition
tuples. The authors’ fingerprints approach also draws inspiration from previous work,
in particular from hyper Q-learning [206], an approach that attempts to mitigate the
non-stationarity problem through each agent learning a policy conditioned on estimates
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of the policies of other agents, based on their behaviour. The authors evaluate their
approaches on a decentralized variation of the StarCraft unit micromanagement task,
finding fingerprints to be the more effective method for resolving the non-stationarity
problem.
While Foerster et al.’s [53] contributions focus on stabilizing the experience replay
memory, Omidshafiei et al. [152] consider multi-task reinforcement learning, where the
goal is for agents to master a set of related tasks that have shared characteristics.
Their approach is to extract knowledge from previous tasks to accelerate learning on a
novel task. The authors introduce multi-task multi-agent reinforcement learning (MT-
MARL), and propose a two-phase approach towards mastering a partially-observable
multi-agent multi-target capture domains, where all agents must capture their targets
simultaneously. During the first learning phase hysteretic Q-learning [130] is combined
with a Recurrent-DQN [80] and Concurrent Experience Replay Trajectories (CERTS)
to enable coordination in single task domains. During the second phase the knowledge
from specialized network is distilled into a generalized recurrent multi-task network,
using a supervised learning approach (regression), where the specialist networks generate
sequences of experiences 〈oi,t, Q(oi,t; Θ(i))i,t〉, consisting of observations o for agent i at
time-step t and the corresponding Q-values based on the specialized parameters Θ.
The majority of the approaches outlined in this section focus on mitigating the non-
stationarity and credit assignment problems. However, as outlined in Section 3.1, a large
number of multi-agent learning pathologies exist that can prevent multi-agent deep re-
inforcement learning agents from converging upon optimal joint-policies. Furthermore,
the finding that factored approaches fail to overcome pathologies such as relative over-
generalization in stateless games is concerning [33]. In Chapters 6 and 7 we therefore
evaluate the extent to which we can modify the (Double) DQN architecture to enable
independent learners to overcome relative-overgeneralization and the alter-exploration
problem in addition to the sample obsolescence problem [154, 155].
We wish to highlight at this point that the literature on multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning is diverse and does not exclusively focus on the challenges discussed above.
Indeed, in a recent survey Hernandez-Leal et al. [89] identify four (non-disjoint) cate-
gories within which work conducted to date can be placed: (i) learning cooperation;
(ii) learning communication; (iii) agents modeling agents; and (iv) analysis of emergent
behaviors. The literature discussed above has focused on learning cooperation. In the
remainder of this section we provide a brief summary of the work conducted in each of
the other three areas. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the current state of the art.
3.3.2 Enabling Communication
While this thesis focuses on agents learning implicit coordination strategies, enabling
agents to communicate has been one of the long term goals of artificial intelligence re-
search. Agents capable of explicit communication are hypothesized to be more likely
to achieve coordination while interacting with other agents, provide a means through
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which to allow humans to interpret agent behaviour, and potentially even provide an-
swers regarding how language is developed [141]. In contrast to research from natural
language processing, e.g., machine translation, answering questions, and sentiment anal-
ysis, research on learning communication has predominately focused on agents learning
their own communication protocols to achieve coordination while solving cooperative
tasks [89]. Agents are judged to possess an understanding of language when they can
utilize communication protocols to accomplish their goals in the domain within which
they are situated [59, 141]. The emergence of deep reinforcement learning has enabled
significant progress in this area [52, 103, 112, 141, 162, 195].
Foerster et al. [52] introducing Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL) and Differ-
entiable Inter-Agent Learning (DIAL). Both approaches use deep neural networks to ap-
proximate Q-values and messages to send to the other agent. RIAL uses CTDE. DIAL
meanwhile takes advantage of the fact that the communication channels are differen-
tiable, allowing gradients to be computed for the messages transmitted during training.
Therefore, DIAL is fully-differentiable across agents [52]. While the work conducted by
Foerster et al. [52] focuses on value based methods, other approaches have utilized policy
gradient approaches (where parameterized policies are trained directly with respect to
the expected return) [103, 112, 141, 162, 195]. For example, Mordatch and Abbeel [141]
investigate to what extent a grounded composition language can emerge, using streams
of abstract discrete symbols (to which no meaning has been assigned) within a coop-
erative partially observable Markov game. Upon adding vocabulary size penalties that
discourage synonyms the authors find that the agents settle on using a consistent set
of symbols for each meaning. Interestingly the authors also observe the emergence of
nonverbal communication cues when symbolic communication is disabled [141].
Malysheva [125] et al. introduce MAGnet, a network that maintains a relevance
graph neural network, trained to represent the relationship between agents and objects
within their environment. MAGnet is also implemented with a message generation
module, capable of passing messages based on the relevance graph. The authors applied
their architecture to the popular Pommerman environment [133], finding that MAGnet
outperforms DQN and MADDPG.
In contrast to the research outlined in this subsection all the agents evaluated in
this thesis are unable to communicate with each other via symbolic means. However,
for our deep experiments in Chapter 7 we also observe nonverbal communication. Our
motivation for focusing on implicit coordination is that communication can be expensive
in practical applications, and requires efficient protocols [11, 132, 204].
3.3.3 Agents Modelling Agents
This thesis focuses on evaluating the extent to which independent learners can converge
upon optimal joint-policies within repeated team-games. Our learners are unaware of
the presence of other learning agents in the strategic-form and Markov games that we
shall use for our evaluations in Chapters 4 and 5. Meanwhile, although the learners can
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observe other agents in the Markov games that we shall discuss in Chapters 6 and 7, the
algorithms do not attempt to explicitly model the other agents in the system. However,
a significant number of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning publications focus on
agents trained to model other agents and predict their actions and goals [89].
Approaches range from training separate networks to predict the policies of other
agents using hand crafted features [82] to learning them from raw observations using
auxiliary loss functions [91]. Meanwhile a variety of methods have been used to predict
the goals and actions of other agents. Self other modeling (SOM) [168] for instance
can be applied to settings where each agent is assigned a goal at the beginning of an
episode. SOM predict the other agent’s actions using the agent’s own policy network,
with a separate network subsequently inferring the other agent’s goals based on the
actions taken. Network parameters are updated at the end of each episode. However,
one of the disadvantages of this approach is that optimization takes longer, as additional
optimization steps are performed based on the actions that have been observed [89].
In contrast theory of mind approaches attempt to estimate the beliefs and mental
states of other agents [89]. For instance, Theory of Mind Network (ToMnet) [167] is
composed of three modules: a character network, a mental state network, and an action
prediction network. The character network uses trajectories from previous episodes to
estimate the agent type, whereas the mental state is inferred via observations from the
current episode. Outputs from both these networks are fed to the prediction network
together with the current observation, in order to predict the agent’s next action.
Other approaches in this area have been inspired by literature from game theory and
multi-agent learning [89], e.g., using networks to find approximate Nash equilibria in
two-player imperfect information games using Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) [84],
or Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) [109], a meta-algorithm for independent rein-
forcement learners that returns mixtures of approximate best response policies using an
empirical game theoretic analysis. PSRO addresses the fact that independent learning
agents implemented with approximators such as a DQN are likely to over-fit on each
other in repeated games. While the above approaches can be used in cooperative and
mixed settings, they are particularly useful in general sum games when an agent wants
to estimate whether the opponent/teammate is a cooperator or defector.
3.3.4 Analysis of Emergent Behaviors
Work on emergent behaviour primarily focuses on the extent to which modifying envi-
ronment impacts the learning dynamics of deep reinforcement learning algorithms [89].
For example, one of the first works on multi-agent deep reinforcement learning evalu-
ated decentralized DQNs learning to play pong, and the extent to which modifying the
reward function results in the agents cooperating or competing [203].
Leibo et al. [114] introduced a specific type of Markov game for studying multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning agents: the sequential social dilemma (SSD). In SSDs
inequalities in the reward space reflect those from social dilemmas (general-sum games)
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in the form of strategic-form games. The paper focuses on the extent to which policies
implementing cooperate and defect strategies emerge depending on on environmental
factors (with regards to an abundance of resources).
A proportion of our work in Chapter 7 is also concerned with emergent behaviours.
However, instead of being placed within SSDs our learners are situated within tempo-
rally extended versions of team strategic-form games, with the motivation of studying
the susceptibility of agents towards the learning pathologies outlined above within tem-
porally extended fully cooperative high dimensional domains.
3.3.5 Practical Challenges
Hernandez-Leal et al. [89] discuss two practical challenges of multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning research: hyperparameter tuning and coping with limited computational
resources. The authors note that optimizing deep learning architectures is far from triv-
ial, and there is a danger that a choice of sub-optimal hyperparameters can result in
a state of the art approach under-performing [134]. This result has been attributed to
the difficulty in training deep learning architectures, and the fact that the deep learning
community needs to learn more about hyperparameter tuning [89]. However, for smaller
research institutions limitations with regards to resources can add to the challenge.
Many deep learning architectures require GPUs in order for learners to converge within
a reasonable amount of time [143, 175, 176]. Training deep learning architectures to
converge typically requires hours, even on moderately complex domains. Furthermore,
memory limitations constrain the number of runs that can be launched in parallel, as
well as the number of (decentralized) agents that can inhabit a multi-agent system. This
makes hyperparameter tuning and gathering sufficient runs for bench-marking a chal-
lenging task [74, 89], and helps explain why a significant number of multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning experiments are conducted in simplistic grid-world like domains,
reducing the computational cost of conducting experiments [114].
3.3.6 Limitations
The majority of the research discussed in this section focuses on a small subset of the
pathologies outline in Section 3.1, such as the impact of stochasticity and the sample ob-
solescence problem [53]. One of the few exceptions is work conducted by Wei et al. [224]
on multi-agent soft Q-learning. However, multi-agent soft Q-learning is currently a
centralized training for decentralized execution approach that has only been tested
within a single state continuous game for two agents, with the authors investigating
the algorithm’s scalability to independent learners within sequential continuous games.
Rashid et al. [169] note that the simplest approach to multi-agent reinforcement learning
is to forgo centralised learning and CTDE in favour of concurrent learning. However, as
discussed in this section, the likelihood of convergence within multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning increases significantly when using centralized and factorized approaches,
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as the non-stationarity issue prevents decentralized agents from converging upon an op-
timal joint-policy [169]. Though even for CTDE approaches convergence upon optimal
joint-policies is also not guaranteed. As noted by Castellini et al. [33], overcoming multi-
agent learning pathologies such as relative overgeneralization is far from trivial, even
for factorized approaches. Meanwhile there exists a multitude of independent learning
approaches designed to help multi-agent reinforcement learning agents overcome multi-
agent learning pathologies, as discussed in Section 3.2. This raises the question to what




The work presented in this chapter is in preparation for a submission to the Journal
of Machine Learning Research.
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning publications in high ranking artificial intelligence conferences, including AAAI,
ICML, ICLR, IJCAI, NeurIPS, and AAMAS [89]. However, multi-agent reinforcement
learning is a topic that has been studied for decades. For instance, Lauer and Ried-
miller’s [110] distributed Q-learning is widely believed to be one of the first independent
learning approaches to address cooperative learning pathologies. The authors intro-
duced distributed Q-learning in the year 2000, thirteen years prior to Mnih et al. [138]
establishing the field of deep reinforcement learning.
In the years that followed a large number of independent learning algorithms were
introduced, each designed to address weaknesses identified in previous approaches [21,
99, 130–132, 156, 159, 160, 210, 223]. Therefore, multi-agent deep reinforcement learning
research can draw upon a wealth of past literature for both inspiration and guidance.
However, Hernandez-Leal et al. [89] warn of a deep learning amnesia, where researchers
either pay insufficient attention to findings discussed in existing literature, or where past
literature has not been cited.
The aim of this chapter is to address this amnesia by re-evaluating traditional in-
dependent learning approaches with the criteria of scalability to multi-agent deep rein-
forcement learning in mind. More specifically, we evaluate to what extent decentralized
Q-learning [38], hysteretic Q-learning [130], Frequency Maximum Q-value (FMQ) [99],
Recursive Frequency Maximum Q-value (RFMQ) [131] and Lenient Multi-agent Rein-
forcement Learning 2 (LMRL2) [223] can overcome relative overgeneralization and mis-
coordination in extended versions of four well studied strategic-form games (introduced
in Section 4.2). We establish the robustness of each approach towards an increase in the
number of learning agents, and the scale of the penalty values following miscoordination.
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Out of the listed approaches LMRL2 is considered the most robust method for pre-
venting relative overgeneralization from occurring within a stochastic reward space [223].
We conduct an extensive empirical evaluation in Section 4.4 to verify these claims, mo-
tivated by a cherry picking tendency that has emerged in multi-agent reinforcement
learning research, where only positive results are reported out of fear that reporting
negative findings can lead to a publication being rejected [89].
In addition, inspired by the finding that with sufficient hyperparameter tuning older
methods can outperform more recent approaches [89, 134], we consider to what extent
the performance of independent learners can be improved with carefully tuned hyperpa-
rameters. Furthermore, we consider the scalability of each approach to multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning (with the exception of decentralized and hysteretic Q-learning,
which have already been scaled to high-dimensional domains [121, 152]). In the next
section we discuss traits that we consider desirable in order to successfully scale an
independent learning approach to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning.
4.1 Desirable Traits of Independent Learners
The convergence properties for model-free deep reinforcement learning algorithms are
known to be brittle [76]. Applying a (potentially novel) approach to a domain for
the first time can therefore require a time consuming and meticulous hyperparameter
tuning process [89]. Deep learning’s hardware requirements have further implications
for this tuning process [175, 176]. Only a limited number of runs can be gathered in
parallel depending on the number of GPUs available (for approaches using an experience
replay buffer), or CPUs (when gathering samples in parallel that are communicated to a
centralized learner) [137]. Furthermore, the optimization of deep learning architectures
can require hours of training time [89]. Therefore, given that hyperparameter tuning is
expensive in multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, our aim is to identify independent
reinforcement learning approaches, that:
i require a limited amount of hyperparameter tuning;
ii are robust towards the multi-agent learning pathologies outlined in Section 3.1;
iii are scalable with respect to the number of learning agents;
iv are invariant towards the scale and variance of the reward function;
v use an efficient exploration strategy.
An idealized independent learning approach can therefore overcome multi-agent
learning pathologies within a wide range of domains, using a (near) identical hyper-
parameter configuration. However, achieving consistent convergence upon optimal join-
policies using a single hyperparameter configuration has proven challenging, even within
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stateless games with a small action space [99, 131, 223]. This observation is concern-
ing, given that one of the goals of multi-agent reinforcement learning is the develop-
ment of robust independent learners capable of converging upon the optimal joint-policy
within complex settings, with unfamiliar dynamics, while requiring a minimal amount of
hyperparameter-tuning. The aim of this chapter is therefore to identify hyperparameter
configurations that increase the likelihood of independent learners converging upon op-
timal joint-policies within the largest possible number of n-player strategic-form games.
Robust configurations are identified via an extensive hyperparameter sweep, allowing us
to visualize the inter-dependencies of each algorithm’s hyperparameters.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: first we outline the four
strategic-form games that we shall use for our evaluations. We subsequently empirically
re-evaluate the independent learning algorithms outlined above. However, with scala-
bility to complex temporally-extended, high-dimensional state-spaces in mind, our aim
is to identify robust hyperparameters for each algorithm to enable a consistent perfor-
mance across settings. Furthermore, we evaluate the scalability of each approach with
regards to coping with increasing penalty values (as in Kapetanakis and Kudenko [99])
and number of agents. We focus on the more robust algorithms identified by Wei and
Luke’s [223] empirical evaluation, selecting approaches that were among the statisti-
cally significant best performers. We therefore exclude distributed Q-Learning, which
struggles when confronted with stochasticity. We shall however include decentralized
Q-learning, as it provides a valuable baseline.
4.2 n-Player Strategic-Form Games
Over the past two decades repeated single-stage strategic-form team-games have often
been used as a test-bed for independent learning algorithms [21, 99, 130–132, 156, 159,
160, 210, 223]. At each time-step every agent simultaneously chooses and executes
an action [99, 130, 131]. In team-games the learners subsequently receive an identical
reward signal corresponding to the joint-actions [99, 130, 131]. This signal is used
to update their respective utility values. We conduct our empirical evaluation using
n-player strategic-form game versions of the four bimatrix games studied in past multi-
agent reinforcement learning literature [99, 130, 131, 160]: (i) the Climb Game [38]; (ii)
the Partially Stochastic Climb Game [99]; (iii) the Fully Stochastic Climb Game [99]; (iv)
the Penalty Game [38]. Below we provide a definition for each game, and discuss the
variations used to evaluate the independent learning algorithms.
4.2.1 The Penalty Game
The penalty game introduced by Claus and Boutilier [38] confronts independent learners
with the miscoordination pathology. We outline the bimatrix game version of the penalty
game in Figure 4.1. Increasing the magnitude of the penalty value p results in lowering
utility value estimates for actions A and C for average reward learners using random
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exploration. For example, p = −100 will result in agents being less likely to choose
actions A and C compared to when p = 0 [38]. The magnitude of p can therefore increase
the likelihood of convergence on joint-action 〈B,B〉, despite joint actions 〈A,A〉 and
〈C,C〉 yielding higher rewards. As a result the game has three deterministic equilibria
for the penalty values that we shall use for our evaluation below (The penalty values
are listed in Table 4.4): 〈A,A〉, 〈B,B〉 and 〈C,C〉, with both 〈A,A〉 and 〈C,C〉 being
Pareto optimal. In our empirical evaluation in Section 4.4 we shall investigate the extent
to which scaling the penalty value p causes the percentage of optimal joint-policies to
decrease. Furthermore, we conduct evaluations using n-player variations of the penalty
game [100]. The rewards in the n-player version are determined using Equation (4.1),















Figure 4.1: The Penalty Game [38]
r ←

10, iff ∀i, ai = A ∨ ∀i, ai = C,
2, iff ∀i, ai = B,
p, iff ∃i, ai = A ∧ ∃j, aj = C,
0, otherwise.
(4.1)
4.2.2 The Climb Game
Variations of the Climb Game [38] are frequently used to study the susceptibility of
independent learners towards relative overgeneralization. The bimatrix version of the
Climb Game is outlined in Figure 4.2. For the penalty values p outlined in Table 4.4
the Pareto-Optimal Nash Equilibrium is 〈A,A〉. However, assuming two independent
learners initially choose each of the actions available with equal probability, using an
average based algorithm, and a sufficiently large penalty p, player I will estimate that C









each of player II’s actions j [223]. Player II will come to the same conclusion, resulting
in the players gravitating towards the shadow equilibrium 〈C,C〉 (since the minimum
gain for one player unilaterally deviating from a joint-policy π consisting of choosing
joint-action 〈C,C〉 will be larger than or equal to one player unilaterally deviating from
the optimal joint-policy of choosing 〈A,A〉). If an alternative action is still being played
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with a small probability, then player I will move from action C to B. Subsequently
player II will also climb from C to B. At this point the agents will climb no further,
having reached a Pareto dominated sub-optimal Nash equilibrium 〈B,B〉 [38, 99, 160].
As with the penalty game we shall study the impact of increasing the penalty p on
the independent learning algorithms, and shall also conduct experiments with n-player
versions of the Climb Game. Learners receive a reward determined by Equation (4.2),




9 + nA, iff ∀i, ai = A,
5 + nB, iff 6 ∃i, ai = A ∧ ∀ai = B, ∀aj = C, j > i,

















Figure 4.2: The Climb Game [38]
4.2.3 The Partially Stochastic Climb Game
In the Climb Game outlined in Figure 4.2, relative overgeneralization can be overcome
with maximum-based learning, where agents consider each action i based on the ob-
served maxj(i, j). However, this approach leaves agents vulnerable towards misleading
stochastic rewards. Kapetanakis and Kudenko [99], for instance, introduce stochastic
variations of the Climb Game, where overoptimistic independent learners can be led
astray by misleading stochastic rewards. For example, in the Partially Stochastic Climb
Game described in Figure 4.3, the joint action 〈B,B〉 yields stochastic rewards of 14 and
0 with 50% probability. Therefore maximum based learners are drawn towards 〈B,B〉,
despite each agent only receiving a reward of 7 on average. For the n-player Partially
Stochastic Climb Game we add a stochastic reward to the case where all n players choose
B in Equation (4.3), where i and j represent agent indexes, and na represents the num-
ber of players that chose action a, and rewards x/y means rewards x and y are yielded
with 50% probability.
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r ←

9 + nA, iff ∀i, ai = A,
2(5 + nB)/0, iff ∀i, ai = B,
5 + nB, iff 6 ∃i, ai = A ∧ ∃i, ai = C ∧ ∀ai = B, ∀aj = C, j > i,
p, iff ∃i, ai = A ∧ ∃j, aj = B,
0, otherwise.
(4.3)
4.2.4 The Fully Stochastic Climb Game
The Fully Stochastic Climb Game variation yields stochastic x/y rewards with 50%
probability for each joint-action 〈ai, aj〉 for agents i and j (see Figure 4.4) [99]. For the
n-player Fully Stochastic Climb Game (Equation (4.4)) we add a stochastic reward to
each joint-action, where i and j represent agent indexes, and na represents the number
of players that chose action a, and rewards x/y means rewards x and y were yielded
with 50% probability. In addition to the penalty value p for miscoordination, we also
add a scalable penalty value l to lower the average utility for 〈A,C〉, 〈C,A〉 and 〈C,B〉.
r ←

10 + nA/8 + nA, iff ∀i, ai = A,
2(5 + nB)/0, iff 6 ∃i, ai = A ∧ ∀ai = B, ∀aj = C, j > i,


















Figure 4.3: The Partially Stochastic Climb Game: The joint-action 〈B,B〉 yields
stochastic rewards of 14 and 0 with 50% probability [99].
4.3 Previous Findings
Table 4.1 provides a recap of Wei and Luke’s [223] findings for each of the bimatrix
games outlined in Section 4.2. We observe that none of the approaches achieved a 100%
















Figure 4.4: The Fully Stochastic Climb Game: Each joint-action yields stochastic
rewards x/y, yielding rewards of x and y with 50% probability [99].
convergence on the optimal joint-policy across all games. However, LMRL2 is among the
statistically significant highest performing approaches in all games with the exception
of the Partially Stochastic Climb Game (verified using the Marasquilo procedure for
χ2). Meanwhile, Recursive-FMQ (RFMQ) outperformed all other approaches in the
Partially Stochastic Climb Game, while converging on the second highest correct run
total for the Fully Stochastic Climb Game. Interestingly (decentralized) Q-learning
struggles in the three Climb Game variations, while converging on the correct policy in
99.97% of runs in the penalty game. However, this is due to the selection of a rather
benign penalty value, p = −10. Scaling the penalty significantly changes the results
for decentralized Q-learning [99]. The results also reiterate distributed and hysteretic
Q-learner’s vulnerability towards misleading stochastic rewards, as evident from the low
convergence rates within the Partially and Fully Stochastic Climb Games. The results
outlined in Table 4.1 were achieved using tuned hyperparameters for each game. For
example, for each game LMRL2 was evaluated using a different leniency moderation
factor k. We list the default and tuned hyperparameters used by Wei and Luke [223] in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
4.4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we visualize the results from an extensive hyperparameter sweep for
LMRL2, decentralized Q-learning, hysteretic Q-learning, FMQ and RFMQ within the
n-player strategic-form games outlined above. We conduct 1,000 training runs for each
hyperparameter combination. This allows us to visualize and identify the best perform-
ing hyperparameter configurations for each strategic-form game, and evaluate to what
extent optimal hyperparameter configurations are over-fitting on the problem in ques-
tion. With regards to default parameters, to remain inline with previous work [99, 223]:
• Unless specified otherwise we use learning rate α = 0.1;
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Strategic Game LMRL2 Q-learning Distributed Q Hysteretic Q FMQ RFMQ*
Climb Game (DET) 99.99% 16.61% 100% 100% 99.56% 100%
Climb Game (PS) 9,930% 18.20% 28.21% 74.54% 98.57% 99.95%
Climb Game (FS) 90.16% 17.63% 38.74% 25.58% 38.94% 87.23%
Penalty Game 99.99% 99.97% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 4.1: A summary of Wei and Luke’s [223] strategic-form game results, where
deterministic, partially stochastic and fully stochastic rewards are abbreviated to
DET, PS and FS respectively. The authors verified the statistical significance of the
results using the Marasquilo procedure for χ2. A boldface was used to denote
algorithms that did not significantly outperform the other highest performing
approaches. The authors provide a summary table for both strategic form and
Markov games, and therefore denote the RFMQ column as SOoN. However, RFMQ is
the stateless version of SOoN, designed for strategic form games.
Algorithm Default Parameters
LMRL2 Temp decay rate ν ← 0.995, MaxTemp← 50, MinTemp← 2, leniency moderator k ← 1, Boltzmann moderator ω ← 1
Q-learning ε-Greedy exploration, ε← 0.1, ε decay rate µ← 1
Hysteretic ε-Greedy exploration, ε← 0.1, ε decay rate µ← 1, learning rate β ← 0.01
RFMQ ε-Greedy exploration, ε← 0.1, decay rate µ← 1, frequency learning rate αf ← 0.05
FMQ Heuristic weighting c← 10, MaxTemp← 500, MaxMove← 2000
Table 4.2: The table lists the default hyperparameters used by Wei and Luke [223]
during their evaluation of the algorithms outlined in Section 3.2. The default learning
rate for each algorithm was α← 0.1.
• Q-values are initialized to 0;
• With the exception of FMQ all training runs end after 15,000 iterations;
• To remain inline with past literature FMQ is trained for 2,000 iterations.
We implement the repeated strategic form games as outlined in Wei and Luke’s [223]
Appendix, where each iteration ends in a terminal (absorbing) state. Therefore, as
in previous work [38, 99, 130–132], we compute utility values using an exponentially
weighted moving average using the stateless version of each algorithm discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2. Finally, we list the scaled penalty values for each game variation in Table 4.4.
4.4.1 Decentralized Q-learning
Despite decentralized Q-learners being average reward learners by definition (see Equa-
tion (3.5)), Wei and Luke’s [223] empirical evaluation found that 99.97% of Penalty
Game runs converged upon an optimal joint-policy when the penalty value is p = −10.
The agents were implemented with a learning rate α = 0.05 and a fixed ε-Greedy explo-
ration rate of ε = 0.35. However, while this particular setting beats previous baseline
convergence rates for p = −10, scaling the penalty value p has been shown to result in
agents finding actions A and C less attractive [38, 99]. This raises the question of how
robust this hyperparameter setting will prove upon scaling p.
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Algorithm Climb Game Climb Game (PS) Climb Game (FS) Penalty Game
LMRL2 k = 107 k = 103 k = 101 k = 100
Q-learning ε = 0 ε = 0.01 α = 0.05 α = 0.05
ε = 0.35
Hysteretic β = 0.0001 β = 0.01 β = 0.001, ν = 0.99 β = 0.01




FMQ - - c = 200 -
RFMQ - αf = 0.05 αf = 0.03 -
- ε = 0.05 α = 0.03 -
Table 4.3: Tuned hyperparameter configurations used by Wei and Luke [223].
Reward Scale Penalty Game Climb Game Partially Stochastic Climb Game Fully Stochastic Climb Game (k, l)
Low -10 -30 -30 (-65, -5)
Medium -100 -300 -300 (-650, -50)
High -1000 -3000 -3000 (-6500, -500)
Table 4.4: Strategic-Form Games Penalty Look-up Table.
Interestingly we also observe 99.97% optimal joint-policies upon conducting 10,000
training runs using the above settings. However, this number decreases to 0% upon
setting the miscoordination penalty p to −100. Scaling p has a significant impact on the
Q-value estimates for each action, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. In Sub-Figures 4.5(a) and
4.5(b) we observe for runs that converged on 〈A,A〉 and 〈C,C〉 respectively, the average
Q-values for the respective actions were just above 6. Meanwhile, the estimated utility
of actions belonging to the alternative Pareto optimal solution was −6. The utility
estimates for actions upon which the agents converged being significantly lower than
10 can be explained by the increased global exploration resulting from using ε = 0.35
with a decay rate of 1.0. However, the average utility values for both actions drop
below −10 upon setting p to −100, as illustrated in Sub-Figure 4.5(c). Furthermore, we
observe a significant decrease in the average reward (Figure 4.6). Therefore, the optimal
hyperparameter setting identified by Wei and Luke [223] for the Penalty Game with
p = −10 does not scale to p = −100.
For our first hyperparameter sweep we investigate if hyperparameter combinations
exist that enable decentralized Q-learning to overcome an increased penalty p = −100,
while also using a stationary exploration strategy. We also evaluate the impact of in-
creasing the number of agents from two to four. Runs are gathered for each com-
bination of learning rate α = {0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005} and stationary exploration rate
ε = {0.35, 0.3, 0.25, 0.20, 0.15, 0.10, 0.05}. For each combination of the α and ε settings
Chapter 4. Evaluating Independent Reinforcement Learning 58
(a) p = −10, 〈A,A〉 (b) p = −10, 〈C,C〉 (c) p = −100, 〈B,B〉
Figure 4.5: The Penalty Game: Average Q-value comparison for decentralized
Q-learning agents for p = −10 and p = −100. For (a) and (b) we compute the
averages for runs that converged upon joint-policies 〈A,A〉 and 〈C,C〉 respectively.
Figure 4.6: Mean reward comparison for p = {−10,−100} in the Penalty Game.
(Decentralized Q-learning)
we gather 1,000 runs. In Figure 4.7 we use heat-maps to illustrate the percentage of
correct runs that converge upon an optimal joint-policy for each setting.
As expected we observe that scaling the penalty value p leads to a reduction in the
percentage of correct (optimal) runs for each setting (Sub-Figures 4.7(b) and 4.7(d)).
While the tuned parameters α = 0.5 and ε = 0.35 used by Wei and Luke [223] converge
to the optimal joint-policy for each of the 1,000 runs when p = −10, this number drops
to 0 upon scaling the penalty to p = −100. Interestingly, when p = −10 we observe
that in the two agent penalty game (Sub-Figure 4.7(a)) 100% of the runs converged
on the optimal joint-policy for (α = 0.05, ε = 0.35) and (α = 0.1, ε = 0.2). Overall
the largest percentages of optimal joint-policies were observed for larger learning rates
α and exploration rates ε. However, in the heat-map for two agents with p = −100
(Sub-Figure 4.7(b)) we observe that agents using a lower learning rate α are more likely
to converge to the optimal joint-policy, when combined with a low exploration rate ε.
Only a small percentage of runs converge upon the correct joint-policy when α > 0.01
and ε > 0.1. The highest percentages of runs are achieved for α = {0.01, 0.005} and
ε = 0.05.
With regards to scaling the number of agents, the heat-maps illustrate a significant
reduction in the percentage of correct runs upon increasing the number of agents from
two to four, even when p = −10 (Sub-Figure 4.7(c)). We observe that α = 0.1 and
ε = 0.1 deliver the highest convergence rate (36%). We hypothesize that, as a result
of an increase in global exploration, agents utilizing a larger exploration rate ε rarely
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(a) Agents: 2, p = −10 (b) Agents: 2, p = −100
(c) Agents: 4, p = −10 (d) Agents: 4, p = −100
Figure 4.7: Percentages of correct runs for decentralized Q-learning within variations
of the penalty game using ε-Greedy exploration with stationary exploration rates.
converge upon correct joint-policies in the four-agents setting. For instance, one of the
strongest settings in the two agent scenario (α = 0.05, ε = 0.35) only converges on
correct joint polices on 0.3% of runs. As in the two agent setting, scaling the penalty
to p = −100 results in learners with both low learning and exploration rates having
the largest convergences percentage. More specifically, we observe that agents with
α = {0.01, 0.005} and ε = 0.05 outperform the other settings (Sub-Figure 4.7(d)).
We hypothesize that learners benefit from lower learning and exploration rates within
the more challenging settings, due to a small percentage of agents choosing the optimal
joint-actions 〈A,A〉 during the initial steps. Subsequently a combination of low global
exploration and small update step size protect the agents from the alter exploration
problem. We provide evidence to support this hypothesis in Figure 4.8, which illustrates
the optimal joint-policy percentages for additional four-player, p = −100 runs, where
the agents receive a demonstration of the optimal joint-actions during the first iteration:
for each agent i action a was set to ai = A.
We observe that a relatively low likelihood of each agent exploring, with ε = 0.1, is
sufficient for the agents to converge to a sub-optimal joint-policy. Furthermore, even with
a small likelihood of exploration at each step, with ε = 0.001, we observe a significant
decrease in the number of optimal joint policies as learning rate α is increased from 0.05
to 0.1. We find that decentralized Q-learners are also more likely to converge upon the
optimal joint-policy within the three variations of the Climb Game when using lower
learning rates α and exploration rates ε (Figure 4.9). However, the percentage of optimal
join-policies remains low across all settings.
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of optimal joint-policies upon giving decentralized Q-learners
a supervised start within the four-player Penalty Game with penalty p = −100.
During the first iteration action ai = A for each agent i.
(a) Deterministic (b) Partially Stochastic (c) Fully Stochastic
Figure 4.9: Correct run percentages for decentralized Q-learners within the
two-agent low-penalty Climb Game variations. We observe a higher convergence rate
for learners using low exploration rates ε and learning rates α.
While Wei and Luke [223] evaluate decentralized Q-learning agents with a station-
ary exploration strategy, Matignon et al. [131] note that decentralized Q-learning can
often benefit from a greedy in the limit with infinite exploration (GLIE) strategy, e.g.
decreasing the exploration frequency throughout the training process. For instance,
using Boltzmann exploration with an initial temperature of 5000 and a decay rate of
0.997, Matignon et al. [131] report a 96.6% convergence rate in the penalty game with
p = −100. We conduct our own hyperparameter sweep using Boltzmann exploration for
MaxTemp = {50, 500, 5000} and decay rates {0.9, 0.99, 0.995, 0.996, 0.997, 0.998, 0.999},
conducting 1,000 training runs for each combination.
Figure 4.10: Convergence rates for decentralized Q-learners using Boltzmann
exploration within the medium-penalty two-agent Penalty Game.
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We illustrate the convergence rates in the heat-map in Figure 4.10. We replicate
the 96% convergence rate achieved by Matignon et al. [131] for MaxTemp = 5000
and a decay rate of 0.997. Furthermore, we observe three configurations that converge
on 99% of the runs conducted: {(MaxTemp = 500, Decay = 0.998), (MaxTemp =
50, Decay = 0.998) and (MaxTemp = 50, Decay = 0.999)}. In fact, we observe a
pattern where learners benefit from lower maximum temperature values and slower
temperature decay rates. Meanwhile, combining large maximum temperature values
with slow temperature decay rates, i.e., remaining exploratory leads to a large percent-
age of sub-optimal joint-policies (for example (MaxTemp = 500, Decay = 0.999) and
(MaxTemp = 5000, Decay > 0.997)). Similarly we observe a drop in convergence when
using a decay rate less than 0.997.
However, even with Boltzmann exploration decentralized Q-learners are unable to
prevent relative overgeneralization from occurring in the three Climb Game variations
(Figure 4.11). We do however identify settings that improve upon the results reported in
the literature: in all three Climb Game variations learners using a maximum temperature
of either 50 or 500, and decay rates 0.997 or 0.998 converge upon optimal joint-policies
on above 20% of runs.
(a) Deterministic (b) Partially Stochastic (c) Fully Stochastic
Figure 4.11: Decentralized Q-learning: Correct run percentages for two-agent low
penalty Climb Game variations using Boltzmann exploration.
The above results provide further evidence that baseline methods against which novel
approaches are benchmarked are often tuned insufficiently [87, 134]. While decentral-
ized Q-learning has been found to perform worse than state of the art methods in the
Penalty Game with p = −100 [99, 132], we show that competitive convergence rates
can be achieved with a carefully tuned Boltzmann exploration. However, the tuned hy-
perparameters are unable to deliver a consistent performance across domains. Further-
more, hyperparameter tuning is more expensive within complex domains. Therefore, the
above results reiterate the need for robust independent learning approaches. In partic-
ular, balancing the exploration-exploitation trade-off within high-dimensional domains
is a non-trivial problem [153, 192, 205]. Therefore, independent learning approaches are
required that are capable of overcoming relative overgeneralization and miscoordination
while mitigating the challenges introduced by scaled penalty values [99] and increased
global exploration [132].
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4.4.2 Frequency Maximum Q-value
In the previous section we establish that balancing the exploration-exploitation trade-off
is critical for decentralized Q-learners to mitigate multi-agent learning pathologies. We
now turn to Frequency Maximum Q-value (FMQ) [99]. While scaling FMQ to more com-
plex domains requires considerable modifications [131], we consider that valuable lessons
can be learned from this approach, especially with regards to modifying the Boltzmann
exploration method. We evaluate inter-dependencies between the temperature decay
moderator s and the EV term weighting factor c, by training agents implemented with
FMQ using each combination of the following settings:
• s = {0.002, 0.003, 0.004, 0.005, 0.006};
• c = {10, 50, 100, 150, 200}.
To remain inline with previous research [99, 223] we set:
• MaxTemp = 500.0;
• MinTemp = 1.0.
With the exception of the Fully Stochastic Climb Game, we identify numerous hy-
perparameter configurations that converge upon correct joint-policies within 100% of
the runs for the low-penalty, two-player versions of each game1. We discuss the results
from our evaluations within the penalty and climb games in detail below.
Penalty Game: We observe that FMQ scales well in the Penalty Game when increasing
the scale of the penalty value and the number of agents, as evident from the heat-maps
illustrating the correct policy percentages for each EV term weighting factor c and
temperature decay moderator s configuration in Figure 4.12.
In the two-player Penalty Game we find that learners benefit from an increased
reliance on the FMQ heuristic as the penalty p increases. In Sub-Figure 4.12(c), for
instance, where p = −1000, we observe 100% convergence when c ≥ 150. Meanwhile,
the percentages of correct join-policies decreases for the majority of hyperparameter
configurations in arguably the most challenging domain setting, with four-agents and
high-penalty values, as illustrated in Sub-Figure 4.12(f). However, FMQ still delivers
high convergence rates for s = 0.002, including 99.4% when c = 10. Furthermore, we
observe that the learners benefit from lower decay moderators s in general in this setting,
therefore preferring a slow transition from explorers to exploiters.
An interesting anomaly emerges within the four-player penalty game. When p =
−10 we notice a sharp decrease in the percentage of optimal joint-policies for c = 10
and s = 0.002 (Sub-Figure 4.12(d)). Not only does this result stand out from the
100% convergence rate achieved by the other hyperparameter configurations, but upon
inspecting the heat-maps in Sub-Figures 4.12(e) and 4.12(f) it becomes apparent that
1We provide a detailed summary of our FMQ results in Appendix A, Section A.1.
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(a) Agents: 2, p = −10 (b) Agents: 2, p = −100 (c) Agents: 2, p = −1000
(d) Agents: 4, p = −10 (e) Agents: 4, p = −100 (f) Agents: 4, p = −1000
Figure 4.12: Heat-maps illustrating the correct run percentages for independent
learners using FMQ within six variations of the Penalty Game.
c = 10 and s = 0.002 achieved 97% and 99% for p = −100 and p = −1000 respectively.
Initially the 5.4% convergence rate for c = 10, s = 0.002 and p = −10 appears to be
an error. However, upon closer investigation we find there is a further critical inter-
dependency between parameters c, s and the value chosen for MaxTemp. Choosing
lower values for MaxTemp increases the percentage of optimal joint policies, as the
scatter plot in Sub-Figure 4.13(a) illustrates. However, we can also increase the number
of training iterations and give the learners more time to converge upon one of the Pareto
optimal equilibria, as the results of experiments conducted with MaxMove = 3000 in
Sub-Figure 4.13(b) demonstrate.
Sub-Figure 4.13(b) raises the question why convergence requires less iterations for
p = −100, and even fewer for p = −1000. Upon closer inspection, we observe that
while actions from one of the Pareto optimal solutions obtain the highest Q-values after
only a few iterations for each setting, including p = −10 (See Figure 4.14), due to the
Boltzmann selection method being able to distinguish between larger Q-values earlier,
the point at which the selection probabilities are distinguishable occurs significantly
earlier for larger penalty values p, as illustrated in Figure 4.15. Therefore, in this
particular setting the agents actually benefit from receiving larger penalty values.
This result has implications, given that in arguably the most challenging setting
(the four-agent penalty game with p = −1000), training agents with c = 10 and s =
0.002 resulted in the joint-best convergence rate (99%). Therefore, while FMQ has
the potential to overcome miscoordination in domains with severe penalties and n > 2
agents, selecting optimal hyperparamaters requires considerations regarding the scale
of the rewards, the desired temperature decay factor combined with the MaxTemp,
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(a) MaxTemp impact on optimal run % (b) Mean reward over 3000 iterations
Figure 4.13: The plots illustrate the interesting interdependence between FMQ
hyperparameters. We observe a delayed convergence for FMQ learners implemented
with c = 10, s = 0.002 and MaxTemp = 500 when confronted with the four-player
Penalty Game with penalty p = −10. Sub-Figure (a) illustrates how choosing a lower
MaxTemp value increases the percentage of optimal joint-policies for this particular
FMQ configuration, whereas Sub-Figure (b) illustrates that given more time, FMQ
learners with MaxTemp = 500 will eventually converge upon an optimal joint-policy.
The plot also illustrates, that due to the FMQ Boltzmann selection method the same
setting requires less time when the scale of the penalty value p is increased.
(a) 〈A,A,A,A〉, p = −10 (b) 〈A,A,A,A〉, p = −100 (c) 〈A,A,A,A〉, p = −1000
(d) 〈C,C,C,C〉, p = −10 (e) 〈C,C,C,C〉, p = −100 (f) 〈C,C,C,C〉, p = −1000
Figure 4.14: Q-values (averaged over 1K training runs) for FMQ in the four-player
Penalty Game. Illustrations are provided for runs that have either converged upon the
joint-actions 〈A,A,AA〉 or 〈C,C,C,C〉. The learners are implemented with an EV
weighting factor c = 10, and a temperature decay moderator s = 0.002.
and the extent to which the EV term should be incorporated into the action selection
mechanism.
Climb Games: The challenge of deciding to what extent the EV term should be relied
upon increases significantly for the Climb Game variations, where no single hyperparam-
eter configuration can be identified that scales well upon increasing the penalty values
and the number of agents. While we observe 100% convergence on correct policies in
the two-agent, low-penalty, deterministic and partially stochastic versions of the Climb
Chapter 4. Evaluating Independent Reinforcement Learning 65
(a) 〈A,A,A,A〉, p = −10 (b) 〈A,A,A,A〉, p = −100 (c) 〈A,A,A,A〉, p = −1000
(d) 〈C,C,C,C〉, p = −10 (e) 〈C,C,C,C〉, p = −100 (f) 〈C,C,C,C〉, p = −1000
Figure 4.15: FMQ Boltzmann selection probabilities for the four-player Penalty
Game. Learners are implemented with an EV weighting factor c = 10, and a
temperature decay moderator s = 0.002. The selection probabilities (averaged over 1K
training runs) are illustrated for runs that converge upon the joint-actions 〈A,A,A,A〉
or 〈C,C,C,C〉. Convergence requires fewer iterations for larger penalty values p.
Game, the percentage of correct policies drops significantly upon increasing the number
of agents and the scale of the penalty values. Furthermore, identifying a hyperparameter
configuration that enables a high-percentage of correct policies across domain settings
is non-trivial.
The heat-maps in Figure 4.16 illustrate the correct run percentages for the three
Climb Game variations in two and four-agents settings with medium sized penalty values.
We observe that the preference in the EV term weighting factor c shifts depending on the
game type and the number of agents. For instance, in the deterministic and partially
stochastic two-agent variations, learners using c = 50 consistently outperform other
settings, regardless of the value chosen for the decay moderator s. However, upon
scaling to the four-agent variations c = 10 outperforms agents using c = 50 and all
other configurations for 0.002 ≤ s < 0.006. Using c = 10 also enables the highest
percentage of correct runs on the four-agent Fully Stochastic Climb Game. However,
for the two-agent variation we observe that the agents prefer larger weighting factors c,
with c = 200 resulting in the highest convergence rates across all s settings. Interestingly
Wei and Luke [223] also choose c = 200 for the Fully Stochastic Climb Game. Finally,
we observe that learners in the two-agent Fully Stochastic Climb Game achieve higher
convergence rates using larger decay moderators s, in contrast to the other setting
(including the penalty game), where the learners generally perform better with lower
decay-moderators s. We are therefore unable to identify a single hyperparameter setting
for FMQ that enables consistent convergence across games.
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(a) Deterministic, 2-Agents (b) Partially Stochastic, 2-Agents (c) Fully Stochastic 2-Agents
(d) Deterministic, 4-Agents (e) Partially Stochastic, 4-Agents (f) Fully Stochastic 4-Agents
Figure 4.16: FMQ: Comparison of the percentage of runs that converge upon
optimal outcomes for two and four-agent versions of each Climb Game variation.
4.4.3 Recursive Frequency Maximum Q-value
As with all the independent learning approaches discussed in this chapter, for Recur-
sive Frequency Maximum Q-value (RFMQ) considerations are required regarding the
exploration-exploitation trade-off. The success of RFMQ hinges on learners maintain-
ing accurate estimates of the frequency with which Qmax(a) can be observed for each
action a ∈ A for coordinated outcomes. However, depending on the value chosen for
the frequency learning rate αf , frequent miscoordination can lead to deterioration of
the frequency terms. Therefore, high global exploration can result in RFMQ relying
exclusively on the Q-value estimates. One approach towards mitigating the deterio-
ration of the frequency terms is to choose a sufficiently small frequency learning rate
αf [131]. However, care is required when choosing αf , due to RFMQ implementing
maximum based learning as αf approaches zero, with αf = 0 implementing distributed
Q-learning [131]. To minimize the noise introduced by miscoordination Matignon et
al. [131] use a stationary policy, namely ε-greedy with a fixed ε. As a result we conduct
our hyperparameter sweep for RFMQ using the following parameters combinations:
• ε = {0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.005};
• αf = {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}.
We illustrate the optimal joint-policy percentage for each configuration in the low-
penalty bimatrix games in Figure 4.17. In Sub-Figure 4.17(d) we identify a number
of settings for the Penalty Game (p = −10) where 100% of training runs converged
upon the correct joint policy, only observing a small decrease in percentage of correct
joint-policies when learners use a low exploration rate ε = 0.05.
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(a) Climb Game (b) Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(c) Fully Stochastic Climb Game (d) Penalty Game
Figure 4.17: RFMQ: Correct run percentages for two-agent, low-penalty
implementations of the penalty game and the three variations of the Climb Game.
However, the convergence rates for the three Climb Game variations are below the
results reported in previous work [131, 223]:
• Deterministic Climb Game: We are unable to replicate the 100% correct runs
for the Climb Game [131, 223]. For the configuration used by Wei and Luke [223]
(ε = 0.1, αf = 0.05) we observe a convergence rate of 99.6%. We find this number
increases to 99.9% for the configuration used by Matignon et al. [131] (αf = 0.01
and ε = 0.05), who observed 100% correct joint-polices over 500 training runs.
• Partially Stochastic Climb Game: Matignon et al. [131] report a 100% con-
vergence rate for the Partially Stochastic Climb Game, while Wei and Luke [223]
report 99.95%. Our convergence rate for the setting used by Wei and Luke [223]
(αf = 0.05, ε = 0.05) is 98.5%. However, we do observe 99.4% correct policies for
αf = 0.05 and ε = 0.05.
• Fully Stochastic Climb Game: Wei and Luke [223] observe a 87.23% conver-
gence rate using αf = 0.3, α = 0.03, and ε = 0.1. In contrast we observe a
convergence rate of 37%, with αf = 0.3 leaving the recursive frequency estimates
vulnerable towards miscoordination, which we will discuss in more detail below.
Meanwhile, Matignon et al. [131] report a 56% convergence rate using αf = 0.01
and ε = 0.0.5. Our results in Sub-Figure 4.17(c) are approximately in-line with
those reported by Matignon et al. [131]. We observe an increase in the correct
run percentage for ε = 0.05. While we only observe 52.9% for αf = 0.01, we do
obtain 56.9% for αf = 0.1. In Figure 4.18 we show that the convergence rate can
be improved to 64.7% by lowering the exploration rate ε. However, for ε < 0.03
we observe a decrease in percentage of optimal runs.
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Figure 4.18: RFMQ: Correct run percentages for the two-agent low-penalty Fully
Stochastic Climb Game using frequency learning rate αf = 0.05.
Figure 4.19 illustrates the consequences of using a large frequency learning rate on the
Q-values, action evaluations E(a) and frequency estimates F (a). We compare Wei and
Luke’s [223] configuration (α = 0.03, αf = 0.3, ε = 0.1) against the best configuration
encountered during our evaluation (α = 0.1, αf = 0.05, ε = 0.03). For the runs gathered
using the large αf = 0.3 we observe a faster decay of the F (a) values, which drop below
0.5 after only a few episodes. This decay is significantly slower for αf = 0.05, resulting
in E(A) and Q(A) having the highest values on average. Using αf = 0.3 meanwhile
results in action C having the highest action evaluation value.
The convergences rates illustrated in Figures 4.17 and 4.18 introduce a dilemma re-
garding selecting a hyperparameter configuration that achieves an optimal performance
across domains. The Fully Stochastic Climb Game evidently requires an exploration rate
ε < 0.1. In contrast in the remaining games learners achieve their respective highest con-
vergence rates across αf settings using ε = 0.1. However, all three games benefit from a
ε < 0.1 upon increasing the scale of the penalty value, while suffering significant decrease
in the percentage of optimal policies across each hyperparameter combination (Figure
4.20). Furthermore, we observe that upon increasing the penalty values the learners ben-
efit from maintaining an optimistic disposition for longer, via a low frequency learning
rate αf .
(a) Climb Game (b) Partially Stochastic Climb Game (c) Penalty Game
Figure 4.20: Correct run percentages for RFMQ in the two-agent, medium-penalty
deterministic and partially stochastic Climb Games, and the Penalty Game.
In addition, we find that choosing an optimal exploration rate ε depends on the
number of learners present in the system. We demonstrate this by conducting additional
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(a) Q-values Config1 (b) Q-values Config2
(c) Action Evaluations Config1 (d) Action Evaluations Config2
(e) Frequency Estimates Config1 (f) Frequency Estimates Config2
Figure 4.19: A comparison of Q-values, action evaluation values E(a) and the
frequency estimates F (a) averaged over 100 runs for RFMQ in the Fully-Stochastic
Climb Game. We compare the configuration used by Wei and Luke [223]
(Config1 = {α← 0.03, αf ← 0.3, ε← 0.1}), against the best configuration encountered
during our evaluation (Config2 = {α← 0.1, αf ← 0.05, ε← 0.03}). In Sub-Figures
4.19(e) and 4.19(f) we observe that the frequency values deteriorate significantly
faster for Config1. As a result action C has the largest action evaluation value E
(Sub-Figure 4.19(c)), which in turn impacts the Q-values (Sub-Figure 4.19(a)).
experiments for a range of ε settings within the four-agent, low-penalty variation of each
strategic-form game. For each ε configuration we collect 1,000 runs. Each run consists
of 150,000 iterations, ensuring that the learners are given sufficient time to observe the
optimal joint action. We illustrate the correct run percentages in Figure 4.21.
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Figure 4.21: Correct run percentages for four-agent, low-penalty variations of each
strategic form game, when using αf = 0.01.
We therefore find that, with the exception of the Fully Stochastic Climb Game, an
increase in global exploration is required to enable convergence on an optimal joint-
policy. For each game ε = 0.2 results in the highest convergence rate. For the Penalty
Game we observe a 99% convergence rate. In contrast, Matignon et al. [131] achieve
91% in a different version of the four-agent Penalty Game, where a positive reward
only requires over half of the agents to choose either A or C, with the remaining agents
choosing any action other than B. The authors observed this result using fewer iterations
(50,000), and modifying their Qmax initialization, setting the max Q estimates to -100.
RFMQ requires an excessive number of iterations in order to achieve convergence due
to using a fixed exploration rate ε. In Figure 4.22 we illustrate the Qmax(a) estimates
for each action a ∈ A within the four-agent, low-penalty deterministic and Partially
Stochastic Climb Games. We divide 100 runs into correct and incorrect groups depend-
ing on the joint-policy, and subsequently plot the running average Qmax values. We
observe that for the correct runs only a few iterations were required for the learners to
establish the maximum Q-value that could be obtained for the joint-action 〈B,B,B,B〉.
Obtaining Qmax(A) meanwhile requires a large number of iterations on average.
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(a) Deterministic: Optimal Runs (b) Deterministic: Sub-Optimal Runs
(c) Partially Stochastic: Optimal Runs (d) Partially Stochastic: Sub-Optimal Runs
Figure 4.22: RFMQ Four-Agent Deterministic and Partially Stochastic Climb Game
average Qmax for optimal and sub-optimal runs. We observe that for the sub-optimal
runs more steps are required to establish the Q-max for action B.
For the correct runs in the Partially Stochastic Climb Game (Sub-Figure 4.22(c))
the estimate for Qmax(A) only stops increasing after 120,000 episodes. For the runs that
converged upon sub-optimal joint policies meanwhile (Sub-Figures 4.22(b) and 4.22(d))
we observe that on average the joint-action 〈B,B,B,B〉 is also underestimated through-
out each run. As a result the Q-value estimates for actions A and B are underestimated
throughout the incorrect runs (Sub-Figure 4.23(b) and 4.23(d)), while for the correct
runs the Q-value estimate for A rises above C after approximately 40,000 iterations.
This finding is worrying, given that the likelihood of observing the optimal joint-action
in an n-player Climb Game is 1/3n. Therefore, to mitigate an exponential increase in
the iterations needed to observe the optimal joint-action, independent learners clearly
require a more efficient exploration strategy than using a fixed exploration rate.
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(a) Deterministic: Optimal Runs (b) Deterministic Sub-Optimal Runs
(c) Partially Stochastic: Optimal Runs (d) Partially Stochastic: Sub-Optimal Runs
Figure 4.23: RFMQ Four-Agent Deterministic and Partially Stochastic Climb Game
average Q-Values for optimal and sub-optimal runs. We observe that for optimal runs
approximately 40,000 iterations are required until Q(A) is larger than Q(B).
4.4.4 Hysteretic Q-learning
The Partially and Fully Stochastic Climb Game results from Wei and Luke’s [223] anal-
ysis (See Table 4.1 above) serve as a reminder of hysteretic Q-learners vulnerability to-
wards misleading stochastic rewards. However, for the Partially Stochastic Climb Game
the 74% convergence rate observed by Wei and Luke [223] can be improved by using
Boltzmann exploration. Indeed, seven years prior to Wei and Luke’s [223] publication,
Matignon et al. [131] achieved a convergence rate of 82%, computing the Boltzmann
temperature value using τ = 5000e−0.003t, where t is the current time step, and using
learning rates α = 0.1 and β = 0.01, MinTemp = 2, MaxTemp = 40, and a tem-
perature decay rate of 0.99. Furthermore, whereas the results achieved by Wei and
Luke [223] used a different hyperparameter configuration for each strategic-form game
(See Table 4.3 above), Matignon et al.’s [131] configuration also achieves 100% conver-
gence upon correct policies in both the (deterministic) Climb Game and the Penalty
Game with p = −100. Therefore, the authors are able to overcome relative overgener-
alization within the Climb Game with a relatively low amount of optimism (in contrast
to the β = 0.0001 used by Wei and Luke [223]). As a result we conduct our hyperpa-
rameter sweep using Matignon et al.’s [131] configuration as a guide, using the following
hyperparameter combinations:
• β = {0.01, 0.001, 0.0001};
• MaxTemp = {50, 500, 5000};
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• s = {0.002, 0.003, 0.004, 0.005, 0.006}.
For the Partially Stochastic Climb Game we identify a number of configurations that
improve upon the percentage of correct joint-policies reported by Matignon et al. [132],
as illustrated in Figure 4.24. The highest convergence rate that we observe is 87%,
obtained by setting β = 0.01, s = 0.002 and MaxTemp = 500. However, the plots in
Figure 4.24 also illustrate the impact of hysteretic Q-learners using too much optimism,
with the majority of runs conducted with β = {0.001, 0.0001} converging upon sub-
optimal joint policies.
Regarding the performance of hysteretic Q-learners in the reaming games, we observe
100% convergence on correct joint-policies within the (deterministic) Climb Game and
the Penalty Game for β = 0.01, s = 0.002 and MaxTemp = 500 (See Figure 4.25).
In the Fully-Stochastic Climb Game meanwhile learners achieve a convergence rate of
over 30% for each configuration s when β = 0.01 and MaxTemp = 500, which is an
improvement upon the 25.58% reported by Wei and Luke [223] (achieved using β = 0.001,
and ε-greedy exploration with a ε decay rate of 0.99).
(a) MaxTemp = 50 (b) MaxTemp = 500 (c) MaxTemp = 5000
Figure 4.24: Low-penalty two-agent Partially Stochastic Climb Game convergence
rates for hysteretic Q-learning using Boltzmann exploration .
(a) Climb Game (b) Fully Stochastic Climb Game (c) Penalty Game
Figure 4.25: Results for the low-penalty two-agent Penalty Game plus the
Deterministic and Fully Stochastic Climb Game variations for hysteretic Q-learning
using Boltzmann exploration (MaxTemp = 500).
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Upon scaling the penalty values we observe that β = 0.01 provides insufficient opti-
mism for hysteretic Q-learners to prevent relative overgeneralization consistently in the
(deterministic) Climb Game. Indeed, each time the penalty value is increased, more
optimism is required (in the form of lower values for β) in order to prevent relative
overgeneralization (Sub-Figures 4.26(a) and 4.27(a) respectively). Similarly we observe
both an increase in the number of runs that converge upon an optimal joint-policy for
lower β values in the Partially and Fully Stochastic Climb Games, while observing a re-
duction with regards to the highest convergence rates achieved. For the Penalty Game
meanwhile we observe a slight lowering of the percentage of optimal joint-policies for
β = 0.01 upon scaling p to −1000 (Sub-Figure 4.27(d)).
(a) Climb Game (b) Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(c) Fully Stochastic Climb Game (d) Penalty Game
Figure 4.26: Repeated bimatrix game convergence rates for hysteretic Q-learning:
medium-penalty and MaxTemp = 500.
Next we consider hysteretic Q-learners scalability with regards to the number of
agents. In the four-agent Penalty Game we identify a multitude of configurations that
result in a 100% convergence rate during the runs conducted, even when confronted with
high penalty values (See Figure 4.28). However, we do observe more consistent conver-
gence across β and decay parameter s settings for the two larger initial temperature
values 500 and 5000.
Convergence in the four-agent Climb Game variations is not as consistent (see Ap-
pendix A). In Table 4.5 we provide a summary of the best performing configurations. In
particular, we observe that in the low and medium reward (deterministic) Climb Game,
relative overgeneralization can be prevented through using low settings for learning rate
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(a) Climb Game (b) Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(c) Fully Stochastic Climb Game (d) Penalty Game
Figure 4.27: Repeated bimatrix game convergence rates for hysteretic Q-learning:
high-penalty and MaxTemp = 500.
(a) MaxTemp = 50 (b) MaxTemp = 500 (c) MaxTemp = 5000
Figure 4.28: Hysteretic Q-learning convergence rates for the four-agent Penalty
Game with high-penalty values.
β. For the Partially Stochastic Climb Game the convergence rates for the low, medium
and high penalty values decrease to 63.9% and 62.3% and 50.9% respectively, requiring
more optimism than in the two-agent setting. Furthermore, as in the two-agent Partially
Stochastic Climb Game these percentages decrease significantly upon deviating from the
listed hyperparameters.
Therefore the amount of optimism required by hysteretic Q-learners is dependent
on the stochasticity within the reward space, the number of agents, and the scale of
the penalty values in the presence of the miscoordination and relative overgeneralization
pathologies. Despite these challenges we will return to hysteretic Q-learning in the
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Deterministic Partially Stochastic Fully Stochastic
Penalty β s MaxTemp % β s MaxTemp % β s MaxTemp %
Low 0.0001 0.002 500 100% 0.001 0.003 5000 63.9% 0.0001 0.004 50 33.8%
Medium 0.0001 0.002 500 95.2% 0.0001 0.002 500 62.3% 0.0001 0.006 50 26.5%
High 0.01 0.002 5000 50.3% 0.01 0.002 5000 50.9% 0.0001 0.005 500 13.7%
Table 4.5: Summary of the hyperparameters for hysteretic Q-learning that led to
the highest correct joint-policy percentages in the four-agent Climb Game variations.
chapters that follow. Given that hysteretic Q-learning is a relatively simple concept,
that only introduces one additional hyperparameter, it should not come as a surprise
that it was one of the first independent learning approaches to be scaled to multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning [152]. However, the findings discussed in this section
do illustrates the need for a mechanism capable of adapting the amount of optimism
applied to utility value updates by independent learners, which brings us to leniency.
4.4.5 Lenient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Lenient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning 2 (LMRL2) emerged as the most robust
independent learning approach from Wei and Luke’s [223] analysis. However, we observe
that a different leniency moderation factor k was used for each strategic-form game (See
Table 4.3 above). In Figure 4.29 we illustrate how the choice of leniency moderation
factor can either impede or accelerate an agent’s transition from maximum based to
average reward learner (assuming the same action is chosen at each time-step). Upon
closer inspection we observe that lenient learners implemented with the hyperparameters
chosen by Wei and Luke [223] for the (deterministic) Climb Game, a leniency moderation
factor k = 107 combined with a temperature decay rate of ν = 0.995, are maintaining
a maximum-reward learner’s disposition for over 4,000 episodes. Therefore, any suc-
cess achieved using this configuration with deterministic reward functions is unlikely to
translate to a stochastic reward space.
Figure 4.29: An illustration of the impact of the moderation factor k on the
leniency function using MaxTemp = 50 and a temperature decay rate ν = 0.995.
The above observation raises the question as to what extent we can identify values
for the leniency moderation factor k that allow LMRL2 to consistently converge upon
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the optimal joint-policy across settings. We therefore evaluate the interdependencies
between the following leniency moderation factors k and temperature decay rates ν:
• k = {100, ..., 107};
• ν = {0.99, 0.995, 0.999}.
Using the same maximum and minimum temperature setting as Wei and Luke [223]
(MaxTemp = 50, MinTemp = 2) we are able to replicate the authors’ findings for each
of the tuned hyperparameter configurations. We illustrate the results for our hyperpa-
rameter sweep for the two-agent low-penalty version of each game in Figure 4.30.
(a) Penalty Game (b) Climb Game
(c) Partially Stochastic Climb Game (d) Fully Stochastic Climb Game
Figure 4.30: LMRL2 convergence rates within the two-agent low-penalty versions of
the Climb and Penalty Games.
As with the other algorithms discussed in this chapter, we identify a number of
hyperparameter configurations where LMRL2 achieves a 100% convergence rate within
the Penalty Game when p = −10 (Sub-Figure 4.30(a)). We also verify that LMRL2
achieves the highest convergence rate within the Fully Stochastic Climb Game [223]
(Sub-Figure 4.30(d)). However, while we identify a number of configurations that result
in 100% convergence upon optimal joint-policies within the Deterministic and Partially
Stochastic Climb Games (Sub-Figures 4.30(b) and 4.30(c) respectively), none of these
settings overlap with the best performing configurations for the Fully Stochastic Climb
Game. While LMRL2 appears capable of consistent convergence using lower leniency
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moderation factors k and faster decay rates ν, we observe a significant drop in perfor-
mance upon using k ≤ 103. Meanwhile, LMRL2 is more likely to converge in the Fully
Stochastic Climb Game when using lower leniency moderation factors k = {101, 102}.
However, for LMRL2 there does exist a compromise hyperparameter configuration
that enables convergence with a high-likelihood across low-penalty two-agent settings:
k = 105 and ν = 0.995, where we observe 100% convergence within the Penalty Game
and the Partially Stochastic Climb Game, 99% in the Deterministic Climb Game, and
70% in the Fully Stochastic Climb Game. Furthermore, even upon increasing the le-
niency moderation factor k the convergence rate for ν = 0.995 remains above 67% for
the evaluated configurations within the Fully Stochastic Climb Game. We illustrate the
need for this compromise setting in Figure 4.31, which provides scatter plots illustrating
the average Q-values for each action within the Partially and Fully Stochastic Climb
Games. We observe that using large leniency moderation factors k combined with a
slow temperature decay rate within the two-agent, low reward versions of these games
leaves the learners vulnerable towards the very pathology combination that leniency was
designed to address: relative-overgeneralization combined with misleading stochastic re-
wards. Specifically, we observe that LMRL2 agents using large leniency moderation
factors k ≥ 4 combined with a slow temperature decay rate µ = 0.999 overestimate
the utility values for the sub-optimal action B (Sub-Figures 4.31(c) and 4.31(f)). In
contrast, we find that faster temperature decay rates can compensate for larger leniency
moderation factors k, with the average Q-values for the optimal action A being higher
than those belonging to actions B and C (Sub-Figures 4.31(a), 4.31(b), 4.31(d) and
4.31(e)).
(a) PSCG, µ = 0.99 (b) PSCG, µ = 0.995 (c) PSCG, µ = 0.999
(d) FSCG, µ = 0.99 (e) FSCG, µ = 0.995 (f) FSCG, µ = 0.999
Figure 4.31: Average Q-Values for LMRL2 within the low-penalty (p = −10)
two-player Partially and Fully Stochastic Climb Games (PSCG and FSCG
respectively) using temperature decay rates µ = {0.99, 0.995, 0.999}.
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However, the compromise setting identified above does not scale with regards to the
number of agents and the size of the penalty values. In the four-agent Penalty Game
for instance we observe that as the scale of the penalty increases, LMRL2 is more likely
to converge upon the optimal joint-policy using a large leniency moderation factors
k = {106, 107} and a slow temperature decay ν = 0.999 (Figure 4.32). Interestingly the
learners also achieve high convergence rates using the fastest temperature decay rate
ν = 0.99. In contrast learners using the medium temperature decay rate ν = 0.995
increasingly fail to converge with larger penalty values p.
(a) p = −10 (b) p = −100 (c) p = −1000
Figure 4.32: Performance of LMRL2 within the four-agent Penalty Game.
We also observe an interesting anomaly for LMRL2 within the four-agent Fully
Stochastic Climb Game. Despite a high penalty the learners converge upon a correct
joint-policy in 90.94% of the runs conducted when using k = 107 and a decay rate of
0.995. In contrast LMRL2 only converges on 56.8% of runs in the equivalent two-agent
setting. A closer look at the Q-values provides answers as to why this is the case (Figure
4.33). In both the two and four agent scenarios the agents initially overestimate the
Q-values for the misleading action B. However, upon sufficiently decaying the tempera-
ture value for action B we observe a rapid decay in the corresponding Q-value. In both
cases the agents subsequently converge upon the optimal action A. However, this also
leads to decay in the temperature value for A, thereby making the learners vulnerable
towards noise introduced through miscoordination. However, the average reward for
the joint-action computed using Equation (4.4) is larger for 〈A,A,A,A〉 than 〈A,A〉, as
evident from the increased separation between the Q-values for A and C in the four-
agent case. Therefore, due to using a modified Boltzmann exploration lenient learners
are more likely to maintain the optimal joint-policy within the four-agent reward space
compared to the two-agent setting.
In summary, we find that with sufficient hyperparameter tuning LMRL2 can achieve
a high convergence rate within the majority of settings used in our evaluation. How-
ever, we are unable to identify a single hyperparameter configuration that results in a
high convergence rate across settings. Furthermore, in Figure 4.33 we observe the de-
terioration of Q-values belonging to actions with insufficient leniency. We hypothesize
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(a) Two Agent Q-values (Correct Runs) (b) Four Agent Q-values (Correct Runs)
(c) Two Agent Q-values (Incorrect Runs) (d) Four Agent Q-values (Incorrect Runs)
Figure 4.33: LMRL2 Q-values within the two and four agent high-penalty Fully
Stochastic Climb Game. Due to the reward function we observe a larger separation
between Q-values for actions A and C for correct runs in the four agent setting.
that this deterioration is caused by the moving target problem. This finding is wor-
rying, as the deterioration of Q-values eliminates the possibility of learners returning
to a previous joint-action, should the current one prove sub-optimal. In Chapter 5 we
shall consider approaches towards reducing the likelihood of miscoordination occurring
as lenient learners transition between incompatible joint-actions.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we evaluate to what extent existing independent learning approaches
can mitigate the multi-agent learning pathologies outlined in Section 3.1 within four
challenging n-player strategic-form games. More specifically we evaluate decentralized
Q-learning [38], hysteretic Q-learning [130], Frequency Maximum Q-value (FMQ) [99],
Recursive-FMQ [131] and LMRL2 [223] in extended versions of the well studied Climb
and Penalty games [38, 99]. Below we provide a brief recap of our findings for each
approach, and discuss whether they confirm or rebuke the findings from previous eval-
uations:
• Decentralized Q-learning: In the past decentralized Q-learning has typically
been found to struggle within domains where agents can succumb to the miscoor-
dination pathology, e.g., the Penalty Game. However, we find that through careful
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hyperparameter tuning decentralized Q-learners implemented with Boltzmann ex-
ploration can deliver competitive convergence rates within the Penalty Game when
the penalty p = −100. We identify a number of configurations which enable a con-
vergence upon a correct joint-policy on 99.9% of the 1’000 training runs conducted,
exceeding convergence rates reported in previous literature [99, 130], and provid-
ing further evidence that baseline methods against which novel approaches are
benchmarked can be tuned insufficiently [89, 134]. We also provide evidence that
decentralized Q-learners implemented with low exploration and learning rates can
maintain an optimal joint-policy in the Penalty Game when given a supervised
start during the first iteration. However, as mentioned in Section 4.1, hyper-
parameter tuning is considerably more expensive within domains that require a
multi-agent deep reinforcement learning approach [89]. In contrast the relative
simplicity of the domains within which evaluations are conducted in this chapter
enabled an extensive hyperparameter sweep for each approach. Furthermore, while
we do find hyperparameter configurations for the Climb Game variations that ex-
ceed those reported from previous evaluations, decentralized Q-learners without
supervised starts are unable to prevent relative overgeneralization from occurring
for the majority of the runs conducted.
• FMQ: We find interesting interdependencies between the reward space and the
FMQ Boltzmann exploration method. FMQ requires less iterations to converge
within a four-player penalty game when receiving larger penalty values for mis-
coordination. This is due to the ratio of probabilities produced by Boltzmann
exploration depending on the difference between Q-values. Our finding reiter-
ates the difficulties involved with tuning the Boltzmann exploration method [208].
However, while FMQ can overcome miscoordination in the six variations of the
Penalty Game used during our evaluation, the approach does not scale well with
regards to the number of agents and the size of penalty values within the Climb
Game variations.
• RFMQ: For RFMQ we are unable to replicate the results reported by Wei and
Luke [223], achieving a significantly lower convergence rate within the Full Stochas-
tic Climb Game. We empirically establish that this low convergence rate is due to
a large frequency learning rate αf leaving the learners vulnerable towards miscoor-
dination. We do, however, achieve convergence rates in-line with those reported by
Matignon et al. [131] when using a lower frequency learning rate αf , and identify a
number of hyperparameter configurations which improve upon the authors’ results.
Finally, RFMQ attempts to mitigate the alter-exploration problem via choosing
a constant low exploration rate ε. However, we find that for the n-player Climb
Game this approach requires an exponential increase in the number of iterations
until the optimal reward is observed as the number of learners is increased. Nev-
ertheless, we shall come back to Matignon et al.’s [131] considerations regarding
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limiting miscoordination in Chapter 5, where we propose a number of extensions
for improving lenient learners.
• Hysteretic Q-learning: In contrast to Wei and Luke [223], and in-line with
Matignon et al. [130], we find that hysteretic Q-learning can benefit from using
Boltzmann exploration strategy. We furthermore identify hyperparameter con-
figurations that improve on the previously reported benchmarks for hysteretic
Q-learning within the Partially Stochastic Climb Game [130, 223]. However, we
are unable to identify a configuration that enables a high convergence rate within
the Fully Stochastic Climb Game. This finding is concerning. As discussed in
Section 3.3, hysteretic Q-learning has recently been scaled to multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning. However, given that hysteretic Q-learning fails to con-
sistently mitigate the pathologies of relative overgeneralization and stochasticity
within stateless games, we hypothesize that the hysteretic Q-learners will encounter
the same problems within complex domains that warrant a multi-agent deep rein-
forcement learning approach.
• LMRL2: We find that out of the approaches evaluated LMRL2 is capable of
delivering the highest convergence rates across domain configurations. However,
hyperparameter configurations that perform well in the deterministic and partially
stochastic Climb Games lead to a poor convergence rate within the Fully Stochastic
Climb Game. Furthermore, we observe that the Q-values belonging to actions
with temperature values that have been cooled down are vulnerable towards the
alter-exploration and moving target problems, especially during periods where the
agents are transitioning between equilibria.
Therefore, we find that LMRL2 remains the most robust out of the independent
learning methods evaluated towards addressing the pathologies outlined in Section 3.1,
in particular relative overgeneralization and stochasticity. However, we observe that
LMRL2 is vulnerable towards the moving-target and alter-exploration problem following
the cooling of temperature values, leading to the deterioration of Q-values. Furthermore,
LMRL2 requires a significant amount of hyperparameter tuning, and considerations
regarding the impact of temperature values on the Boltzmann exploration. In Chapter
5 we shall consider approaches toward mitigating the consequent destruction of Q-values,
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In the previous chapter we find that to enable a high convergence rate upon correct
(optimal) joint-policies within repeated n-player strategic-form games, Lenient Multi-
Agent Reinforcement Learning 2 (LMRL2) [223] requires a significant amount of domain
specific hyperparameter tuning. We observe that tuning the decay rate of temperature
values that are used for both lenient Q-value updates and Boltzmann exploration, while
minimizing the impact of the alter-exploration problem, is far from trivial. Further-
more, we hypothesize that for LMRL2 the moving target problem is aggravated by
asynchronous lenient Q-value updates, resulting in lenient learners switching between
incompatible joint-actions during different time-steps. This leaves lenient learners vul-
nerable towards miscoordination, resulting in the destruction of utility values belonging
to actions with insufficient leniency. We hypothesize that lenient learners can benefit
from returning to a previous policy, should the new join-action(s) also prove misleading.
In this chapter we introduce Distributed-Lenient Q-learning (DLQ), a novel leniency
algorithm designed to mitigate the moving-target and alter-exploration problems.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We introduce Distributed-Lenient Q-learning (DLQ), a novel variation of leniency,
which splits learning into two distinct phases: (i) An initial maximum reward
learner phase with a uniform action selection policy, during which peaks in the
reward space are discovered; (ii) A greedy action selection phase combined with
lenient Q-value updates. Using a greedy action selection policy during the later
training phase mitigates the alter-exploration problem.
2. We introduce synchronized leniency updates, designed to increase the likelihood
of lenient learners switching between incompatible joint-actions during the same
time-steps.
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3. We empirically show that synchronized leniency updates can reduce the likelihood
of miscoordination during phases where lenient learners frequently change their
policy within the repeated n-player strategic-form games used for the empirical
evaluation of existing approaches in Chapter 4. Our empirical evaluation finds
that Synchronized DLQ can deliver state of the art convergence rates in the re-
peated n-player strategic-form games used for our empirical evaluation of existing
approaches in Chapter 4.
4. We scale DLQ to Markov games, and show that the scaled variation can deliver
state of the art performances in two challenging domains proposed by Wei and
Luke [223]: the Gradient 2 and Relative Overgeneralization 3 games.
5.1 Algorithmic Definition
In Chapter 4 we provide an extensive evaluation of LMRL2 and other independent
learning approaches. We observe that the following weaknesses of LMRL2 must be
addressed to further reduce the likelihood of relative overgeneralization occurring in
domains with a stochastic reward space:
1. Decaying the leniency related temperature values leaves LMRL2 vulnerable to-
wards the alter-exploration problem. As a result utility value estimates for an
optimal action can be significantly underestimated following only a few iterations
of agents performing sub-optimal joint-actions.
2. Even if lenient learners utilize a greedy action selection strategy to mitigate the
alter exploration problem, lenient utility value updates that result in lowering a
utility estimate are conducted asynchronously with a probability z ∈ [0, 1] (See
Equation (3.19)). Therefore we have no guarantee that agents will establish that a
joint-action is suboptimal during the same time-step t. Using the two-agent Fully
Stochastic Climb Game as an example: we shall assume that at time step t for both
agents i: ∀iQi(B) > Qi(A). However, if agent 1 estimates that Q1(A) > Q1(B)
following the subsequent Q-value update, then there is no guarantee that this will
also be the case for agent 2. This can result in a number of iterations where
the joint-action is 〈A,B〉. For actions with insufficient leniency the utility value
estimates will subsequently be destroyed.
DLQ addresses both of these weaknesses. The intuition behind our approach is as
follows: upon conducting an extensive random exploration phase (learning phase 1 ) to
establish the maximum utility for each action, we employ a greedy exploration method
to address the alter-exploration problem (learning phase 2 ). Secondly, we introduce
synchronized leniency updates to enable the learners to switch between incompatible
joint-actions during the same time-step, where the random variable z ∈ [0, 1] from
Equation (3.19) – a Q-value update Q(a) +αδ only takes place if δ > 0 or z > L(a) – is
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identical for each agent. Therefore, our approach reduces stochasticity with regards to
exploration and the lowering of Q-values.
Temperature values T are not decayed until the random exploration phase is com-
plete, thereby preventing global-exploration from impacting the utility values. There-
fore, DLQ learners must discover the maximum reward for each action during random
exploration. To maximize the likelihood of the agents observing each joint-action com-
bination, DLQ uses a uniform action selection strategy during the random exploration
phase. Furthermore, a learning rate α = 1.0 ensures that Q-value estimates are set to
the maximum reward received for each action. During this random exploration phase
the learners are therefore maximum reward learners. Furthermore, to overcome mis-
coordination we adopt the policy table from distributed Q-learning [110]. Policy table
updates only occur when the current argmax action no longer has the highest utility
value (See Section 3.2.2). Therefore DLQ is equal to distributed Q-learning with ε = 1.0
during learning phase 1.
Following a predefined number of exploratory steps, DLQ switches to an argmax
action selection method using the policy table. During this phase the temperature values
are decayed and utilized by the leniency function to determine the frequency with which
utility values are lowered. However, the leniency function can be synchronised, with
each learner using a random value function with an identical seed value. Furthermore,
during the second learning phase Q-value updates are performed with a more cautious
learning rate α 1.
Bounded Policy Table Updates: In stochastic domains a sub-optimal joint-action
can yield an identical max reward as an optimal joint-action. We will encounter two
domains with this property in Section 5.4. As a consequence learning phase 1 can yield
a joint-policy consisting of incompatible actions. If a utility value update subsequently
requires a change to the policy table during learning phase 2, then, due to the update
only considering maxa∈AQ(a), potentially optimal actions may no longer be considered,
reducing the likelihood of convergence upon the optimal joint-policy. To increase the
likelihood of the learners selecting optimal joint-actions we derestrict the policy updates
to actions with the highest utility estimates within a boundary ε (see Alg. 4, line 17).
5.2 Strategic-Form Game Evaluation
We compare the performance of Synchronized DLQ (SDLQ) against Asynchronous DLQ
(ADLQ) for which the synchronized leniency updates are disabled. Therefore, for each
agent the random value z, which determines whether a negative update using δ < 0 takes
place (See Equation (3.19) in Chapter 3), is drawn from random number generators
using distinct seed values. During preliminary trials SDLQ proved robust in each of
the repeated n-player strategic-form games used for the empirical evaluation of existing
approaches in Chapter 4, irrespective of the choice of leniency moderation factor k and
1From this point forward α refers to the learning rate used during learning phase 2.
Chapter 5. Towards Improved Lenient Learners 86
Algorithm 4 Synchronized DLQ for Strategic-Form Games
1: Input: Max steps T , MaxTemp, learning rate α, leniency moderation factor k,
temperature decay rate ν, ExplorationSteps
2: for all a ∈ A do
3: Q(a)← initialize(a), T (a)←MaxTemp, π(a) arbitrarily
4: for t = 0 to T do
5: if t < ExplorationSteps then
6: Choose a using a uniform probability distribution
7: Execute action a and observe r
8: if r > Q(a) then
9: Q(a)← r
10: else
11: Choose argmaxa∈A fromtheone− hotpolicyvectorπ(a)
12: Execute action a and observe r
13: δ ← r −Q(a)







Q(a) + αδ, if δ ≥ 0 or synchronized random variable z > L(a)
Q(a), otherwise
16: T (a)← νT (a)
17: if |Q(argmaxo∈A π(o))−maxo∈AQ(o)| > ε then
18: Select a random action amax ∈ argmaxo∈AQ(o) within bounds ε
19: ∀b ∈ A π(b)←
{
1, if b = amax
0, otherwise
the learning rate α (as we shall discuss below). In contrast, the success of ADLQ
depends on the leniency moderation factor k and the learning rate α. Therefore, we
evaluate DLQ using the following hyperparameter configurations with a temperature
decay rate ν = 0.995 and 500/1000 exploration steps for two and four agent experiments
respectively:
• k = {100, ..., 103};
• α = {0.1, 0.01, 0.001}.
As in previous experiments we gather 1,000 training runs for each hyperparameter
configuration. We illustrate the ADLQ convergence rates for each game in Figure 5.1.
In Section 4.4.5 we observed that even in the low-penalty bimatrix game version of
the Fully-Stochastic Climb Game, LMRL2 converges upon an optimal joint policy on
90.2% of the runs conducted. In contrast, even with the synchronized property disabled,
ADLQ achieves a 100% convergence rate for a number of settings within the two-agent
low penalty Fully Stochastic Climb Game. However, this result only occurs for the
lowest learning rate α = 0.001 (See Sub-Figure 5.1(c)). Furthermore, while we observe a
100% convergence rate for ADLQ in each variation of the remaining games, only SDLQ
is able to overcome scaled penalty values and an increase in the number of agents in
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the Fully Stochastic Climb Game2. In both the two and four-agent variation of the
Fully Stochastic Climb Game we observe a further interesting interdependency between
the learning rate α and the scale of the penalty values for ADLQ. For medium penalty
values learners using α = 0.01 achieve the highest convergence rates across each of the
leniency moderation factor k settings. However, upon increasing the penalty values the
learners prefer α = 0.001 (see Figure 5.2).
(a) Climb Game (b) Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(c) Fully Stochastic Climb Game (d) The Penalty Game
Figure 5.1: Convergence rates from ADLQ runs within the two-player low-penalty
Climb and Penalty Games.
In contrast, we observe no significant difference between the results gathered for
SDLQ using α = 0.01 and α = 0.1 across leniency moderation factors k. SDLQ con-
verged on the correct policy on 100% of the runs gathered within each version of the
(deterministic) Climb Game, Partially Stochastic Climb Games and the Penalty Game,
irrespective of the scale of the penalty values and the number of agents. Within the Fully
Stochastic Climb Game meanwhile SDLQ hyperparameter configurations exist for each
domain configuration that result in a 100% convergence rate, with the worst performing
configurations being 99.9%.
To evaluate the extent to which using synchronized updates help when using a larger
learning rate α = 0.01, we gather an additional 100 runs for SDLQ and ADLQ within the
two-agent low-penalty Fully Stochastic Climb Game. We evaluate the actions performed,
Q-values and leniency temperature values T for every episode during each training run.
We observe interesting differences between the Q-values learned by each algorithm in
2See heat-maps in Sections A.6 and A.5.
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(a) Penalty: Low, Agents: 2 (b) Penalty: Low, Agents: 4
(c) Penalty: Medium, Agents: 2 (d) Penalty: Medium, Agents: 4
(e) Penalty: High, Agents: 2 (f) Penalty: High, Agents: 4
Figure 5.2: Heat-maps illustrating the convergence rates of ADLQ within the six
Fully Stochastic Climb Game variations.
Figure 5.3. Sub-Figure 5.3(a) illustrates the Q-values resulting from synchronous up-
dates, while Sub-Figures 5.3(b) and 5.3(c) illustrate the Q-values for ADLQ runs that
resulted in optimal and suboptimal policies respectively. For both approaches we ob-
serve that the initial utility value estimates for each action are based on the respective
Rmax. For SDLQ (Sub-Figure 5.3(a)) we observe that following the random exploration
phase (500 iterations) the utility values estimate for action B decreases rapidly until
being on par with the utility estimate for action A. From around episodes 2000 to 5000
the Q-values for A and B are closely aligned, with agents switching between the two
equilibria as the temperature values are decayed. Around the 4000 episode mark action
A emerges with a slightly higher average utility estimate. At this point the Q-value for
action B is no longer modified, as the learners have no reason to deviate from action
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A. The Q-value and temperature value (Figure 5.4) for action C meanwhile remain
unchanged following the exploration phase.
(a) SDLQ (b) ADLQ: Optimal Runs (c) ADLQ: Sub-Optimal Runs
Figure 5.3: Average Q-value comparison for the two-player low-penalty Fully
Stochastic Climb Game. For SDLQ and ADLQ 100 runs were gathered. For ADLQ
we separate optimal and sub-optimal runs prior to plotting the Q-values. We observe
that for SDLQ Q(A) and Q(B) are closely aligned between episodes 2000 and 5000,
before action A emerges with the highest Q-value. For ADLQ the Q-value for action B
is vulnerable towards instances of miscoordination. Furthermore, while Q(C) remains
unchanged for SDLQ following learning phase 1, this is not the case for ADLQ.
(a) SDLQ (b) ADLQ: Optimal Runs (c) ADLQ: Sub-Optimal Runs
Figure 5.4: Average leniency temperature value comparison within the two-player
low-penalty Fully Stochastic Climb Game. For both SDLQ and ADLQ 100 runs were
gathered. For ADLQ we separate optimal and sub-optimal runs. We observe that the
temperature value for action C remains unchanged for SDLQ. For optimal ADLQ
runs meanwhile T (C) approaches 0 for sub-optimal runs, while also being decayed
during optimal runs.
In contrast, even during successful ADLQ runs, the Q-values for actions A and B are
not as closely aligned. We hypothesize that this is due to miscoordination transitions
where one of the agents changes policy before the other. For ADLQ runs we observe that
0.8525% of transitions result in miscoordination between iterations 2000 and 5000. In
contrast, for SDLQ we do not observe any miscoordination. The barcode plots in Figure
5.5 illustrate instances of the joint-actions 〈A,B〉 and 〈B,A〉 over 100 training runs for
SDLQ and ADLQ within the two agent low-penalty Fully Stochastic Climb Game. We
observe that while for SDLQ miscoordination only occurs during the 500 exploration
iterations (learning phase 1 ), agents using ADLQ often receive penalty values between
iterations 2,000 and 6,000. Furthermore, ADLQ overshoots the average reward for the
joint-action 〈A,A〉, reaching an average utility estimate of 10.0. This explains why
ADLQ benefits from using lower learning rates. Action A emerges as the optimal action
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on 90% of runs (Sub-Figures 5.3(b)), while being significantly underestimated in the
remaining 10% (Sub-Figures 5.3(c)).
(a) Synchronized-DLQ (b) Aynchronized-DLQ
Figure 5.5: Histograms illustrating the number of occurrences of joint-actions 〈A,B〉
and 〈B,A〉 during 100 SDLQ and ADLQ training runs conducted in the low-penalty
Fully Stochastic Climb Game. For both approaches miscoordination occurs during
Learning Phase 1 (the initial 500 iterations) where random exploration is combined
with maximum reward updates. During Learning Phase 2 we initially observe a
reduction in miscoordination due to learners overestimating the utility of action B
(see Figure 5.3). However, upon learners applying less leniency towards updates
involving B we observe frequent miscoordination for ADLQ. For SDLQ meanwhile we
observe no miscoordination occurrences during Learning Phase 2.
The results for ADLQ can be improved by lowering the learning rate for each agent
to α = 0.001. However, we still observe a significant amount of miscoordination, as the
time-series plot depicting the average rewards for runs conducted with SDLQ (α = 0.1)
and ADLQ (α = 0.001) in Figure 5.6 illustrates. Furthermore, we observe that due to
being able to use a larger learning rate, SDLQ requires fewer iterations to converge on a
joint-policy with an optimal average reward (while achieving the same convergence rate).
Therefore, both asynchronous and synchronized DLQ improve upon the performance of
the existing methods evaluated in Chapter 4 within the n-player repeated strategic-
form games. Furthermore, synchronized leniency updates enable consistent convergence
across evaluation settings, even within the challenging Fully Stochastic Climb Game
variations. Next we scale DLQ to Markov games, and evaluate our approach within two
challenging domains from the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature.
5.3 Learning Complete Policies in Markov Games
The stateless version of DLQ discussed in the previous section is limited to n-player
strategic-form games. In this section we extend DLQ to Markov games with |X | > 1,
where independent learners may encounter an additional pathology: deception. LMRL2
addresses deception by using Average Temperature Folding to prevent a premature tem-
perature decay for actions belonging to frequently visited early transitions in episodic
tasks (see Section 3.2.6). Wei and Luke [223] hypothesize that average temperature
folding allows the learners to remain lenient long enough to allow the average rewards
Chapter 5. Towards Improved Lenient Learners 91
Figure 5.6: Running average reward comparison (window=1000 iterations) for the
two-player, low-penalty Fully Stochastic Climb Game. We compare SDLQ with
α = 0.1 against ADLQ with α = 0.001. We observe that due to ADLQ using the lower
learning rate there is a significant delay in convergence. Furthermore, we observe a
dip in the average reward due to miscoordination frequently occurring between
iterations 2000 and 5000.
from follow-on states to be back-propagated. Given that LMRL2 also uses the tempera-
ture value to control the exploration-exploitation trade-off, average temperature folding
should result in the learners remaining exploratory in early states while the optimal
joint-policy in each of the follow-on states is established. Indeed, enabling learners to
converge on policies that behave correctly within any state x ∈ X of a repeated Markov
game is one of the goals of independent learning, offering advantages such as being de-
ployable from any given initial state within the environment. As a result Wei and Luke
[223] introduce two measures of successful convergence within Markov games:
1. Correct Policies: Agents perform optimally when following the learned policy
from the initial state onwards;
2. Complete Policies: Agents behave optimally within all states x ∈ X .
Therefore, while every complete policy is also a correct policy, a correct policy that
behaves optimally when starting from an initial state x, may behave incorrectly if an
alternative state x′ is designated as the initial state. It is worth noting that for Markov
games with stochastic transitions every correct policy is also a complete policy.
To enable independent learners to converge upon a complete joint-policy, sufficient
exploration is necessary to allow the learners to discover the optimal action for each
state x ∈ X . In this section we shall observe that even domains with a relatively small
state-action space can require a considerable amount of exploration, in order for inde-
pendent learners to consistently converge upon complete policies. However, a misguided
random exploration strategy is likely to result in frequent miscoordination. In contrast,
for repeated Markov games with a significant amount of branching in the state-action
space, a more robust approach towards exploration is to initially remain exploratory in
early states, while acting greedy in follow-on states that lead to absorbing (terminal)
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states [223]. Acting greedy in follow-on states allows the learners to limit the noise in-
troduced by miscoordination. Meanwhile, by remaining exploratory in earlier states the
learners are more likely to explore different paths in the state-space. Using a staggered
approach the learners can increasingly apply less exploration from the penultimate states
backwards, until finally acting greedy in the initial state(s).
LMRL2 uses the average temperature values within each state to enable a staggered
exploration of the state-space. However, in the previous chapter we observed that tuning
the leniency related hyperparameters to enable the temperature values to correctly bal-
ance the exploration-exploitation trade-off is non-trivial. Furthermore, if we consider the
temperature value for action C in Sub-Figure 5.4(b), then we observe that remaining ex-
ploratory to sufficiently decay each of the actions’ values may introduce additional noise
through increased global exploration. However, we consider that a state’s temperature
values can provide valuable information regarding whether the agents have converged
within a given state. Instead of using the average temperature for guidance, we can use
the discrete derivative obtained during the temperature updates T (x, u)← νT (x, u) to
estimate if a learner’s policy has converged for a state x. More formally, we assume that
learners have converged in a state x if the exponentially weighted moving average of the
discrete derivate d← T (x, u)t − T (x, u)t+1 following a temperature value update,
d(x) = (1.0− τ)× d(x) + τ × d, (5.1)
is below a threshold %. We assume that if d(x) < %, then the learner has either:
i Decayed the temperature values for all actions to the point where the agent has
become an average reward learner;
ii Identified an optimal action, meaning the temperature values for all other actions
are no longer being decayed.
We assume that the learner has converged in state x iff d(x) < %. We use a vector
C(x) = {1, 0} for each x ∈ X to indicate whether a state x has converged, where
C(x) ← 1 if d(x) < %. Therefore, while the stateless version of DLQ switches from
learning phase 1 to phase 2 after a specified number of iterations, in the full version of
DLQ we use C(x′) from each follow-on state x′ to control this transition. However, as |X |
increases so will the memory requirements for each state x maintaining the respective set
of follow-on states x′. To reduce the memory requirements we resort to bootstrapping:
C(x) = (1.0− τ)× C(x) + τ × C(xt+1). (5.2)
We switch from explore to exploit, and max reward to lenient learning, if C(x) > 1.0−ε,
for some small ε > 0. We set C(x) ← 1 for absorbing (terminal) states by default.
Furthermore, we keep the n exploration steps, allowing agents to establish the max
rewards for non-absorbing states. To mitigate deception DLQ learners continue to use
a uniform action selection strategy combined with maximum reward learner updates
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Algorithm 5 Synchronized DLQ for Markov Games
1: Input: Max steps T , MaxTemp, learning rate α, leniency moderation factor k,
temperature decay rate ν, ExplorationSteps, temperature threshold %, τ .
2: for all x ∈ X and u ∈ U do
3: Q(x, u)← initialize(x, u), T (x, u)←MaxTemp, π(x, u) arbitrarily.
4: d(x)← 0, C(x)← 0.
5: For all non-absorbing states x ∈ X : C(x)← 0.
6: For all absorbing states x ∈ X : C(x)← 1.0.
7: x← initial state
8: for t = 0 to T do
9: if t < ExplorationSteps or C(xt) < 1.0− ε then
10: Choose ut using a uniform probability distribution
11: Execute action ut and observe r and xt+1
12: δ = r + γmaxu∈U Q(xt+1, u)−Q(xt, ut)
13: if δ > 0 then
14: Q(xt, ut)← Q(xt, ut) + δ
15: else
16: Choose argmaxu∈U π(xt, u)
17: Execute action ut and observe r and xt+1
18: δ = r + γmaxu∈U Q(xt+1, u)−Q(xt, ut)







Q(xt, ut) + αδ, if δ ≥ 0 or synchronized z > L(xt, ut)
Q(xt, ut), otherwise
21: d← T (xt, ut)− νT (xt, ut)
22: T (xt, ut)← νT (xt, ut)
23: d(xt) = (1.0− τ)× d(xt) + τ × d
24: if d(xt) < % then
25: C(xt+1)← 1.0
26: C(xt) = (1.0− τ)× C(xt) + τ × C(xt+1)
27: if |Q(x, argmaxo∈U π(o))−maxo∈U Q(xt, o)| > ε then
28: Select a random action umax ∈ argmaxo∈U Q(xt, o) within bounds ε
29: ∀b ∈ U π(xt, b)←
{
1, if b = umax.
0, otherwise.
in frequently visited early transitions until the agents have converged upon a joint-
policy in the direct follow-on states. This process begins in the penultimate states
where actions result in a transition into an absorbing state. However, we consider that
the number of steps required to reach convergence in each of the follow-on states will
increase exponentially with the size of the state space |X |. Therefore a compromise has
to be made with % as the size of the state space increases, where sufficiently decaying
the temperature value for all follow-on states is infeasible. However, as we shall see in
the next section, the full version of DLQ delivers state-of-the art performances in two
challenging Markov games from the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. We
outline the full DLQ algorithm (using synchronized updates) in Algorithm 5.
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5.4 Addressing Deception in Markov Games
We evaluate the full synchronized and asynchronous versions of DLQ using two Markov
games from Wei and Luke’s [223] empirical evaluation, namely the Relative Overgen-
eralization 3 (RO3) and Gradient 2 games. Both domains, which are outlined below,
proved challenging for LMRL2 (and all other approaches). We choose to conduct our
evaluation using these two games because:
i Despite being designed to address the relative overgeneralization pathology, LMRL2
only converged upon correct and complete joint policies in 73.32% of RO3 runs;
ii While converging upon correct joint-policies in 99.97% of runs conducted for Gra-
dient 2, the percentage of complete policies for LMRL2 was only 5.48%.
We hypothesize that DLQ’s ability to minimize the impact of the alter-exploration
problem, combined with a staggered temperature decay, will result in a higher percentage
of complete and correct joint-policies compared to the results reported for LMRL2.
5.4.1 The Relative Overgeneralization Game
Wei and Luke [223] introduced three games to evaluate the impact of confronting in-
dependent learners with relative overgeneralization and miscoordination pathologies in
domains with multiple states: Relative Overgeneralization 1 – 3 (RO1, RO2 and RO3).
Given that LMRL2, distributed Q-learning, hysteretic Q-learning and SOoN are capa-
ble of delivering high convergence rates on complete policies in RO1 and RO2, we focus
on arguably the most challenging of the three relative overgeneralization games, RO3,
where the learners are confronted with relative overgeneralization through stochastic
state transitions. Figure 5.7 provides a state-transition diagram for RO3. The game
consists of three states. Taking actions in state State 1 yields rewards of 0. However,
the joint-action 〈A,A〉 is most likely to result in the learners progressing to the optimal
State 2, from where coordinated actions 〈A,A〉 and 〈B,B〉 can result in a reward of 10.
However, pairing action A with B or C in State 1 has an increased likelihood of the
learners transitioning into State 3, which yields a reward of 0 for each action combi-
nation. Joint-actions including C are more likely to transition to State 2, but still less
likely than when the agents choose 〈A,A〉. All actions taken in State 2 and State 3
result in a transition into an absorbing state. We note that in this game every correct
solution is a complete solution.
We first attempt to replicate the results reported for LMRL2 in RO3 using the
following hyperparameter configuration [223]:
• α = 0.1;
• γ = 0.9;
• τ = 0.1;
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Figure 5.7: Relative Overgeneralization 3 State Transition Diagram (Illustration is
adapted from Wei and Luke [223]).
• ν = 0.995;
• MaxTemp = 50.0;
• ω = 0.3;
• k = 1.0;
• Q(x, u)← 0 (the lowest reward in the game);
Interestingly we are unable to replicate the 73.32% convergence rate using this set-
ting, We find that due to the low Q-value initialization and insufficient learning rate α
the learners underestimate the utility of optimal actions, even during the initial lenient
iterations. However, upon experimenting with the Q-value initialization we do converge
on 70.5% using the authors’ configuration with an initialization of Q(x, u) ← 10, the
maximum reward available in the game. Furthermore, we can improve upon the bench-
mark reported by Wei and Luke [223] via reducing the size of the learning rate α. In
Figure 5.8 we illustrate the correct run percentages for the following hyperparameter
combinations:
• Qinit = {0, 10};
• α = {0.001, 0.01, 0.1}.
As in previous evaluation we conduct 1,000 training runs per hyperparameter config-
uration. Each training run consists of 30,000 iterations [223]. We observe a significant
increase in the number of optimal (correct) joint-policies upon initializing the Q-values
with 10.0. Furthermore, we observe an increase in the percentage of correct runs for
Qinit = 10 upon lowering α. Interestingly lowering the α-values proves detrimental
when Qinit = 0. A closer look at the average Q-values helps shed light on why this is
the case. We conduct 100 additional training runs for each of the following learning
rate configurations, storing the Q-values for each iteration: α = {0.1, 0.01, 0.001}. In
Figure 5.9 we plot the average Q-values. We observe that when starting with the Q-
values at 0, the learners require multiple iterations for the utility value estimates for
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Figure 5.8: Correct run percentage for LMRL2 hyperparameter configurations
within RO3. We compare Q-value initialization and learning rate α.
each action in State 1 to increase. Using a low leniency moderation factor k = 1.0 the
learners’ leniency decreases rapidly, explaining why the Q-value for action C frequently
emerges as the highest utility value estimate. In Figure 5.10 meanwhile we observe that
agents using a Q-value initialization of 10.0 benefit from a low learning rate α, with the
Q-values from each action being more closely aligned during the initial learning phase
of each training run. Due to using a lower learning rate miscoordination has less of
an impact, meaning the Q-values for each action remain closely aligned until action A
emerges as the optimal action (Sub-Figure 5.10(c)).
(a) α = 0.1 (b) α = 0.01 (c) α = 0.001
Figure 5.9: Q-value comparison for RO3 State 1 using LMRL2 with Qinit = 0.
We conduct a second hyperparameter sweep with α = 0.001 to evaluate the impact of
using a different leniency moderation factors k = {1, 10, 100, 1000}, while also gathering
Synchronized DLQ (DLQ) and Asynchronous DLQ (ADLQ) runs. For DLQ we use
the following hyperparameters: ε ← 0.001, ExplorationSteps ← 500, τ = 0.1 and
%← 0.0001. We illustrate the results from our runs in 5.11. We find for all approaches
the highest convergences rates are achieved when using a low leniency moderation factor
k = 1, although the drop off in convergence rate is less noticeable for SDLQ and ADLQ.
Furthermore, there appears to be no significant difference between the convergence rates
of ADLQ and SDLQ across settings. Nevertheless, both approaches outperform LMRL2
for each hyperparameter configuration.
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(a) Correct α = 0.1 (b) Correct α = 0.01 (c) Correct α = 0.001
(d) Incorrect α = 0.1 (e) Incorrect α = 0.01 (f) Incorrect α = 0.001
Figure 5.10: Q-value comparison for RO3 State 1 using LMRL2 with Qinit = 10.
Figure 5.11: Hyperparameter sweep for LMRL2, SDLQ and ADLQ within RO3.
For LMRL2 Q-values are initialized to 10. The learning rate α = 0.001.
To summarize, we identify a number of hyperparameter configurations for LMRL2
that improve upon the 73.32% convergence rate reported by Wei and Luke [223] for
RO3, while observing even higher convergence rates for SDLQ and ADLQ.
5.4.2 The Gradient Game
We now move on to the more challenging Gradient 2 game, where, due to an increase in
the number of states, considerations are required regarding the number of iterations that
learners should be given in order to maximize the likelihood of converging upon a com-
plete joint policy. Wei and Luke [223] introduced two variations of the gradient game.
Given that Gradient 1 can be mastered by maximum based learners (e.g., distributed
Q-learning) [223], we focus on the more challenging version, Gradient 2, which confronts
learners with the deception, stochastic reward and miscoordination pathologies. In Fig-
ure 5.12 we provide a state-transition diagram of Gradient 2. The game is deceptive in
that State 3 and State 4 have higher local rewards compared to State 2, but ultimately
lead to poor future rewards, when compared against the optimal average reward of 30
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that can be obtained in State 5. Furthermore, the learners are also confronted with mis-
coordination in states 5 through 13. All approaches from Wei and Luke’s [223] empirical
evaluation, with the exception of LMRL2, struggled to converge upon correct solutions
in Gradient 2. However, while 99.97% of the LMRL2 runs converged on correct joint-
policies, only 5.48% of runs were complete [223]. One potential explanation for the low
percentage of complete runs is that Gradient 2 has a larger state-action space compared
to the other games used during the authors’ empirical evaluation. Therefore, adequately
decaying the temperature values to obtain average utility estimates within each state
necessitates that each state-action pair is visited a sufficient number of times. However,
if the learners converge before this can happen, then the average utility values will never
be computed for the less optimal paths, preventing a complete joint-policy from being
learnt.
Figure 5.12: State transition diagram for the Gradient 2 game (Illustration is
adapted from Wei and Luke [223]).
We hypothesize that applying DLQ with a sufficiently small % to Gradient 2 will
result in an increase of the number of complete runs compared to the 5.48% achieved
Chapter 5. Towards Improved Lenient Learners 99
by LMRL2. However, during preliminary trials we observed that an excessive number
of iterations are required in order to obtain C(x) > 1 − ε for all x ∈ X . Increasing %
meanwhile comes at the cost of a decrease in the number of complete solutions. We con-
sequently evaluate SDLQ and ADLQ using the following hyperparameter configuration,
with each training run consisting of 240,000 iterations:
• k ← 1.0;
• α← 0.01;
• δ ← 0.995;
• τ ← 0.1;
• γ ← 0.9;
• MaxTemp← 50;
• ExplorationSteps← 1, 000;
• ε← 0.001;
• %← 0.0001.
We gather 1,000 training runs for each SDLQ and ADLQ hyperparameter configu-
ration, resulting in the following convergence rates:
Approach Complete Run % Correct Run %
ADLQ 83.7% 99.6%
SDLQ 48.3% 49.3%
Table 5.1: Asynchronous DLQ (ADLQ) and Synchronized DLQ (SDLQ) complete
and correct run percentages in the Gradient 2 game.
Upon investigating why SDLQ is outperformed by ADLQ, we find that reward spaces
exist where the stochasticity introduced by asynchronous updates is beneficial. We
observe that State 5 in particular represents a challenge for SDLQ, due to the maximum
reward for each of the four joint-actions being 32. Each learner’s policy table will be
set to the first action executed that results in the max reward in State 5 during the
random exploration phase. Due to the action space only consisting of two actions, if
the agents happen to lock onto one of the sub-optimal joint-actions 〈A,B〉 or 〈B,A〉,
then they enter a cycle of switching between incompatible-actions once synchronized
leniency updates are enabled. As a result SDLQ learners begin alternating between
sub-optimal joint-actions 〈A,B〉 and 〈B,A〉. Upon subsequently repeatedly receiving a
miscoordination penalty the learners significantly underestimate the utility available for
each action in State 5.
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The barcode plot in Sub-Figure 5.13(a) illustrates the consequences of agents locking
onto sub-optimal joint-actions in State 5. The plot depicts occurrences of miscoordina-
tion in State 5 for 100 training runs, with dark red lines indicating that the learners’
joint-policy is set to either 〈A,B〉 or 〈B,A〉. We observe that the behaviour remains
consistent throughout each training run following the initial exploration phase. In Sub-
Figure 5.13(b) we illustrate the joint-actions in State 5 for an incorrect SDLQ run,
depicting π1(5, A) and π2(5, B), the policy table entries for State 5 and actions A and
B for Agent 1 and Agent 2 respectively. We observe that the changes to π1(5, A) and
π2(5, B) are synchronized following an initial exploration phase. In Figure 5.14 we illus-
trate the Q-values learned as a consequence of not being able to escape this sub-optimal
joint-action spiral. ADLQ meanwhile can escape this cycle through agents unilaterally
changing their policy table following an asynchronous leniency update. In theory the
bounded policy table updates using ε should allow SDLQ to escape this cycle. The
use of policy table updates conditioned on ε allowed DLQ learners to master a similar
dilemma in State 1 of RO3, where following learning phase 1 ∀x ∈ X and ∀u ∈ U
Q(x, u) = 10.0. In RO3 we observe a gradual decrease in the convergence rate upon
lowering ε. However, we have been unable to identify an ε setting that improves the
convergence rate for SDLQ in Gradient 2. We therefore leave this for future work.
(a) Miscoordination Iterations (b) Policy Plot
Figure 5.13: Sub-Figure (a) illustrates instances of miscoordination (dark red)
within 100 runs gathered for SDLQ within State 5 of Gradient 2. We observe that
learners who end up with a sub-optimal joint-policy during the initial exploration
phase often fail to escape the miscoordination cycle. Sub-Figure (b) depicts π1(5, A)
and π2(5, B), the policy table entries for State 5 and actions A and B for Agent 1 and
Agent 2 respectively, from a failed SDLQ Gradient 2 run.
To summarize, while the percentage of correct joint-policies for ADLQ of 99.6% is
below the 99.97% achieved by LMRL2, the 83.7% complete policies represents a signif-
icant improvement. We hypothesize that these results could be further improved upon
through additional hyperparameter tuning.
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(a) Correct Runs (b) Incorrect Runs
Figure 5.14: SDLQ Q-values from Gradient 2 State 5 for actions A and B averaged
over 59 and 41 correct and incorrect runs respectively. Note: the Q-values for action
A are obscured by B due to the Q-values being averaged over multiple runs. For
correct runs we observe that SDLQ is able to estimate the average utility for
coordinated actions involving actions A and B. For incorrect runs meanwhile the
Q-value for each action is significantly underestimated.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we improve upon the current state of the art approaches towards over-
coming the six multi-agent learning pathologies outlined in Section 3.1. First, we identify
two key issues that lenient learners must address in order to consistently prevent relative
overgeneralization from occurring in domains that yield stochastic rewards: (i) agents
unilaterally deviating from the current joint-policy due to asynchronous lenient Q-value
updates; and (ii) the alter-exploration problem, which resurfaces as the amount of le-
niency is decreased over time. To address these weaknesses we introduce Distributed-
Lenient Q-learning, a novel independent learning algorithm. Our algorithm first es-
tablishes the maximum return available for each action by combining distributed Q-
learning [110] with a uniform exploration policy. Upon identifying the maximum return
available for each action lenient Q-value updates are performed to address stochasticity
(with regards to state transitions and rewards). Finally, we introduce synchronized le-
niency updates, which increase the likelihood of independent learners switching between
incompatible joint-policies at the same time step to prevent miscoordination.
We demonstrate that Distributed-Lenient Q-learning delivers state-of-the-art per-
formance within challenging team-games from the multi-agent reinforcement learning
literature, including four-agent, scaled penalty variations of the Fully Stochastic Climb
Game [99], a domain which has proven challenging for existing independent learning ap-
proaches [99, 130, 131, 156, 159, 160, 223]. In addition, we find that Distributed-Lenient
Q-learning similarly achieves state-of-the-art performance in two challenging Markov
games: Gradient 2 and Relative Overgeneralization 3 [223].
The most successful independent learning approaches to date towards mitigating rel-
ative overgeneralization within n-player strategic-form games with a stochastic reward
space either modify the exploration method, the value function update equation, or both
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(as discussed in Section 3.2). As we have seen in Chapter 4, approaches using a mod-
ified exploration strategy – e.g., LMRL2, FMQ and RFMQ – require a set of carefully
tuned hyperparameters for each game. In contrast Synchronized Distributed-Lenient
Q-learning performs consistently across games for each of the hyperparameter configu-
rations used in our evaluation while using a strict action selection strategy and relying
on minimizing the likelihood of agents learning incompatible joint-policies. However,
questions remain regarding scalability to more complex games. We leave this for future
work.
Due to the absence of standards for learning agents, the assumption of all algo-
rithms being implemented with the same hyperparameter configurations, or even using
the same algorithm, is unrealistic in many multi-agent systems [100]. Therefore, imple-
menting independent learners with synchronized leniency updates is not always feasi-
ble. Furthermore, in our evaluation of the Markov game Gradient 2 [223] we observe
that reward spaces exist where performing synchronized updates can actually reduce
the likelihood of independent learners converging on an optimal joint-policy. Synchro-
nized Distributed-Lenient Q-learning’s struggles within Gradient 2 serve as a reminder
that finding a silver bullet approach for independent learning is non-trivial, even for
Markov games with a small low-dimensional state-action space. While Asynchronous
Distributed-Lenient Q-learning achieves a higher percentage of compete runs, the large
number of iterations required to achieve the above result is concerning, especially given
that Gradient 2 only consists of 26 state-action pairs. Therefore, our findings reiterate
that independent learners currently require compromises. It should not come as a sur-
prise that similar compromises are required when scaling leniency to multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning, which is the focus of the next chapter. Finally, we hypothesize
that our approach is best suited for symmetric games. We leave a theoretical evaluation
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The field of deep reinforcement learning has seen a great number of successes in
recent years. Deep reinforcement learning agents have been shown to master numer-
ous complex problem domains, ranging from computer games [108, 139, 174, 217] to
robotics tasks [43, 70]. Much of this success can be attributed to using convolutional
neural network (ConvNet) architectures as function approximators, allowing reinforce-
ment learning agents to be applied to domains with large or continuous state and action
spaces [108, 139, 174, 217].
Recently the sub-field of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning has received an
increased amount of attention. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters,
multi-agent reinforcement learning is challenging even in stateless environments with
only two implicit learning agents, lacking the convergence guarantees present in most
single-agent learning algorithms [19, 111, 132, 148, 215]. One of the key challenges
faced within multi-agent reinforcement learning is the moving target problem: Given an
environment with multiple agents whose rewards depend on each others’ actions, the
difficulty of finding optimal policies for each agent is increased due to the policies of the
agents being non stationary [19, 21, 30, 74, 87, 99, 148, 169, 189, 197, 210, 213].
Due to the moving target problem reinforcement learning algorithms that converge
in a single agent setting (e.g., decentralized Q-learning) often fail in fully-cooperative
multi-agent systems with independent learning agents that require implicit coordination
strategies. For decentralized learning agents using deep Q-network architectures the
moving target problem represents a significant challenge [53, 74, 152]. ConvNets are
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often trained to approximate policy and value functions through sampling past state
transitions stored by the agent inside an experience replay memory D (See Chapter 2,
Section 2.6) [108, 139, 174, 217]. However, the use of an experience replay memory in
a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning context amplifies the moving target problem,
as a large proportion of the state transitions stored can become deprecated [53, 74, 152].
In Chapter 4 we evaluated a number of independent learning approaches designed
to overcome the moving target problem (among other multi-agent learning pathologies).
However, we observed that even for approaches designed to mitigate the moving target
problem, one learner unilaterally changing their policy can result in convergence upon
a sub-optimal joint-policy. We introduced Distributed-Lenient Q-learning (DLQ) and
synchronized leniency updates in Chapter 5 to mitigate the noise introduced by miscoor-
dination. However, many multi-agent systems lack standards for learning agents [100].
Therefore, we cannot assume that independent learners can operate on synchronized
discrete time-scales, which is the condition necessary for performing synchronized le-
niency updates. Furthermore, we have seen that reward spaces exist where performing
synchronized updates can actually reduce the likelihood of independent learning agents
converging upon an optimal joint-policy (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2). Nevertheless, in
our empirical evaluation lenient learners have proven more robust than other methods
towards multi-agent learning pathologies. This raises the question whether leniency can
be applied to domains with a high-dimensional state space.
In this chapter we show how lenient learning can be scaled to multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning via modifying the DQN [139] and Double-DQN (DDQN) [217]
architectures, introducing the Lenient (Double) Deep Q-Network (LDQN and LDDQN
respectively). To recap: lenient learners store temperature values that are associated
with state-action pairs [21, 22, 159, 160]. Each time a state-action pair is visited the
respective temperature value is decayed, thereby decreasing the amount of leniency
that the agent applies when performing a policy update for the state-action pair. The
stored temperatures enable the agents to gradually transition from optimists to average
reward learners for frequently encountered state-action pairs, allowing the agents to
outperform optimistic and maximum based learners in environments with misleading
stochastic rewards. In this chapter we extend this idea to multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning by storing leniency values in the experience replay memory D, and demonstrate
empirically that lenient multi-agent deep reinforcement learning agents learning implicit
coordination strategies in parallel are able to converge on the optimal joint policy in
difficult coordination tasks with stochastic rewards.
Omidshafiei et al. [152] recently applied concepts from hysteretic Q-learning to
multi-agent deep reinforcement learning. In Section 6.4 we empirically evaluate our
Lenient DDQN against Hysteretic Double Deep Q-Networks (HDDQNs). We find that
while HDDQNs and LDDQNs deliver comparable performances in deterministic reward
domains, HDDQNs struggle in fully cooperative domains that yield stochastic rewards.
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However, we demonstrate that the performance of HDDQNs within stochastic reward
environments can be improved with a scheduled approach.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We introduce Lenient (Double) Deep Q-Network, which includes two extensions to
leniency: a retroactive temperature decay schedule (TDS) that prevents premature
temperature cooling, and a T (o)-Greedy exploration strategy, where the proba-
bility of the optimal action being selected is based on the average temperature of
the current state. When combined, TDS and T (o)-Greedy exploration encourage
exploration until average rewards have been established for later transitions.
2. We show the benefits of using TDS over average temperature folding (ATF).
3. We provide an extensive analysis of leniency-related hyperparameters for LDDQN.
4. We propose a scheduled -H(D)DQN that applies less optimism towards state tran-
sitions near terminal states compared to earlier transitions within the episode.
5. We introduce two extensions to the Cooperative Multi-agent Object Transporta-
tion Problem (CMOTP) [31], including narrow passages that test the agents’ abil-
ity to master fully-cooperative sub-tasks and stochastic rewards.
6. We empirically evaluate our proposed LDDQN and SHDDQN against standard
HDDQNs using the extended versions of the CMOTP. We find that while HDDQNs
perform well in deterministic CMOTPs, they are significantly outperformed by
SHDDQNs in domains that yield a stochastic reward. Meanwhile LDDQNs com-
prehensively outperform both approaches within the stochastic reward CMOTP.
6.1 Independent Learner Baseline
As in the previous chapter our proposed algorithms are based upon Q-learning, a form
of temporal difference reinforcement learning that is well suited for solving sequential
decision making problems that yield stochastic and delayed rewards [15, 221]. Since
interesting sequential decision problems frequently have a large state-action space, Q-
values are often approximated using function approximators such as tile coding [15]
or neural networks [217] (see Section 2.6). Furthermore, learners in this context are
frequently confronted with partial observability, where Q-values are computed for ob-
servations o ∈ O rather than states x ∈ X . The algorithms evaluated in this chapter
are extensions of the Double-DQN (DDQN) introduced by Van Hasselt et al. [217]
(see Section 2.6). Each agent i is implemented with a ConvNet trained to approximate
Q-values for observation-action pairs: Qi : Oi × Ui → R [114]. The learning agents i
are also each implemented with a separate experience replay memory Di used to store
state transitions as tuples (oi, ui, ri, o
′
i), consisting of an observation oi, action ui, the
resulting observation o′i and the immediate reward ri. To ensure obsolete transitions are
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eventually discarded experience replay memories Di are implemented as First-In First-
Out (FIFO) queues [114]. The network parameters θi are trained using Adam [104] on
the mean squared Bellman residual with the expectation taken over state transitions
uniformly sampled from an experience replay memory Di [116, 139] (Eq. (2.10)) 1.
We now proceed to describe our main algorithmic contributions of this chapter. First
we detail our proposed Lenient (Double) Deep Q-Network, and thereafter we discuss our
extension to hysteretic deep multi-agent reinforcement learning, which we call Scheduled
Hysteretic (Double) Deep Q-Network.
6.2 Lenient Deep Q-Learning
In this section we outline how leniency can be scaled to multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning. Given that learners situated within environments with a high-dimensional
state-space will rarely receive identical observations, we shall first consider how the tem-
perature values required by lenient learners can be maintained for semantically similar
observations. We subsequently consider how the leniency function can be combined with
the (Double) DQN architecture, and propose two extensions to leniency: a retroactive
temperature decay schedule (TDS) designed to prevent premature temperature cooling,
and a T (o)-Greedy exploration strategy, where the probability of the optimal action
being selected is based on the average temperature of the current state. We find that
when these two extensions are combined, TDS and T (o)-Greedy exploration encourage
exploration until average rewards have been established for later transitions.
6.2.1 Clustering Observations using Autoencoders
In environments with a high-dimensional or continuous observation space, a tabular
approach for mapping each possible observation-action pair to the temperature values
required by lenient learners is no longer feasible. Binning can be used to discretize low-
dimensional continuous observation-spaces, however, further considerations are required
regarding mapping semantically similar observations to a decaying temperature value
used by lenient learners when dealing with high-dimensional domains, such as image
observations. Recently, researchers studying the application of count based exploration
to deep reinforcement learning have developed interesting solutions to this problem.
For example, Tang et al. [205] used autoencoders to automatically cluster states in a
meaningful way in challenging benchmark domains, including Montezuma’s Revenge.
An autoencoder is a neural network architecture frequently used to learn reduced
encodings for high-dimensional data [143, 218]. Architectures used to learn encodings
for images typically consist of convolutional, dense, and transposed convolutional layers,
which are trained to minimize the expected reconstruction error [143]. For instance, in
a deep reinforcement learning context an autoencoder can be trained to compress and
reconstruct the observations stored in the agent’s experience replay memory D [205].
1For simplicity we drop the subscript i denoting an individual agent going forward.
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The autoencoder subsequently serves as a pre-processing function g : O → RD, with a
dense layer consisting of D neurons with a saturating activation function (e.g. a Sigmoid
function) at the centre. SimHash [35], a locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) function, can
be applied to the rounded output of the dense layer to generate a hash-key φ for an
observation o. This hash-key is computed using a constant n ×D matrix A with i.i.d.
entries drawn from a standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) as




∈ {−1, 1}n, (6.1)
where g (o) is the autoencoder pre-processing function, and n controls the granularity
such that higher values yield a more fine-grained clustering [205].
We use a dictionary to map each 〈φ (o) , u〉 pair encountered to a temperature value,
where the hash-keys are computed using Tang et al.’s [205] approach described above.
If a temperature value does not yet exist for 〈φ (o) , u〉 within the dictionary, then an
entry is created, setting the temperature value equal to MaxTemperature. Otherwise
the current temperature value is used and subsequently decayed, to ensure the agent
will be less lenient when encountering a semantically similar observation in the future.
6.2.2 Combining Leniency with Deep Q-Network Architectures
Combining leniency with (D)DQNs requires careful considerations regarding the use of
the temperature values, in particular when to compute the amount of leniency that
should be applied to a state transition that is sampled from the replay memory. In our
initial trials we used leniency as a mechanism to determine which transitions should
be allowed to enter the replay memory D. However, this approach led to poor results,
presumably due to the agents developing a bias during the initial random exploration
phase where transitions were stored indiscriminately. To prevent this bias we use an
alternative approach where we compute and store the amount of leniency L(ot, ut) at
time t within the transition tuple stored in D: (ot, ut, rt+1, ot+1, L (ot, ut)t). The amount
of leniency that is stored is determined by the current temperature value T associated
with the hash-key φ (o) for observation o and the selected action u:
L (o, u) = 1− exp
(
− k × T (φ (o) , u)
)
. (6.2)
We note that the leniency function in Equation (6.2) differs from the one used by LMRL2
(Equation (3.18) in Chapter 3). While the equation used by LMRL2 requires large
temperature values for learners to maintain a lenient disposition, e.g., using an initial
MaxTemp = 50, Equation (6.2) is sensitive towards temperature values within the
range [0, 1], a property that will prove valuable for our T (o)-Greedy exploration strategy,
which we outline in Sub-Section 6.2.4 below. As in standard deep Q-learning the aim is to
minimize the loss function of Equation (2.10), with the modification that for each sample
j chosen from the replay memory for which the leniency conditions using Equation (6.2)
are not met, are ignored.
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Algorithm 6 Application of temperature decay schedule (TDS)
1: Upon reaching a terminal state do
2: n← 0, steps← steps taken during the episode
3: for j = steps to 0 do
4: if βnTt (φ (oj) , uj) < νt then
5: Tt+1 (φ (oj) , uj)← βnTt (φ (oj) , uj)
6: else
7: Tt+1 (φ (oj) , uj)← νt
8: n← n+ 1
9: ν ← µ ν
6.2.3 Retroactive Temperature Decay Schedule
Throughout initial trials we found that temperatures decay rapidly for state-action pairs
belonging to challenging sub-tasks in the environment, even when using Average Tem-
perature Folding (ATF) (See Equation (3.27) in Chapter 3). In order to prevent this
premature cooling of temperatures we developed an alternative approach using a pre-
computed temperature decay schedule (TDS) β0, . . . , βn with a step limit n. The values
for β are computed using an exponent ρ which is decayed using a decay rate d:
βn = exp (ρ× dt) (6.3)
for each t, 0 ≤ t < n.
Upon reaching a terminal state the temperature decay schedule is applied to sam-
ples j as outlined in Algorithm 6. The aim is to ensure that temperature values of
observation-action pairs encountered during the early phase of an episode are decayed
at a slower rate than those close to the terminal state transition (line 4). We find that
maintaining a slow-decaying maximum temperature ν (lines 5-7) that is decayed using
a decay rate µ helps stabilize the learning process when ε-Greedy exploration is used.
Without the decaying maximum temperature the disparity between the low tempera-
tures in well explored areas and the high temperatures in relatively unexplored areas has
a destabilizing effect during the later stages of the learning process. Furthermore, for
agents also using the temperature values to guide their exploration strategy (see below),
ν can help ensure that the agents transition from exploring to exploiting within reason-
able time. The decaying maximum temperature ν is used whenever T (φ (oj) , uj) > νt,
or when agents fail at their task in environments where a clear distinction can be made
between success and failure. Therefore TDS is best suited for domains that yield sparse
large rewards.
Applying the TDS after the agents fail at a task could result in the repeated decay
of temperature values for state-action pairs leading up to a sub-task. For instance, the
sub-task of transporting a heavy item of goods through a doorway may only require a
couple of steps for trained agents who have learned to coordinate. However, untrained
agents may require thousands of steps to complete the task. If a time-limit is imposed
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Figure 6.1: Lenient-DQN Architecture. We build on the standard DQN architec-
ture [217] by adding a lenient loss function (top right, see Section 6.2.2). Leniency
values are stored in the replay memory along with the state transitions; we cluster se-
mantically similar states using an autoencoder and SimHash (bottom left), and apply
our retroactive temperature decay schedule (TDS, Algorithm 6). Actions are selected
using the T (o)-Greedy exploration method.
for the agents to deliver the goods, and the episode ends prematurely while an attempt
is made to solve the sub-task, then the application of the TDS will result in the rapid
decay of the temperature values associated with the frequently encountered state-action
pairs. We resolve this problem by setting the temperature values Tt (φ (oj) , uj) > ν to
ν at the end of incomplete runs instead of repeatedly decaying them, thereby ensuring
that the agents maintain a lenient disposition towards one another.
6.2.4 T (o)-Greedy Exploration
During initial trials we encountered the same problems discussed by Wei and Luke [223]
regarding the selection of the temperature moderation factor for the Boltzmann action
selection strategy. This led to the development of a more intuitive T (o)-Greedy explo-
ration method where the average temperature value T (ot) ∈ (0, 1] for a state ot replaces
the ε in the ε-Greedy exploration method. An exponent ξ is used to control the pace
at which the agents transition from explorers to exploiters. The agent therefore selects
action u = argmaxu∈U Q (ot, u) with a probability 1−T (ot)
ξ and a random action with
probability T (ot)ξ. We outline our lenient deep Q-learning architecture in Figure 6.1.
6.3 Scheduled Hysteretic Deep Q-Learning
In Section 4.4.4, we observe that hysteretic learners are vulnerable towards stochastic
rewards. Similarly we find that hysteretic deep Q-learning architectures can be lead
astray in deceptive domains with with stochastic rewards. To address this weakness
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in domains where agents receive sparse stochastic terminal rewards we introduce the
Scheduled Hysteretic (Double) Deep Q-Network, which we outline below.
To recap, hysteretic Q-learning [130] is an algorithm designed for decentralised learn-
ing in deterministic multi-agent environments, and which has recently been applied to
multi-agent deep reinforcement learning as well [152]. Two learning rates are used, α
and β, with β < α. The smaller learning rate β is used whenever an update would
reduce a Q-value. This results in an optimistic update function which puts more weight
on positive experiences, which is shown to be beneficial in cooperative multi-agent set-
tings. As we have observed in our experiments in Section 4.4.4, given a spectrum with
traditional Q-learning at one end and maximum-based learning, where negative experi-
ences are completely ignored, at the other, then hysteretic Q-learning lies somewhere in
between depending on the value chosen for β.
Hysteretic deep Q-learning architectures compute the error δj for each (o, u, o
′, r)
sample j within the batch drawn from D:
δj ≡
(
r + γQ(o′j , argmax
u∈U
Q(o′j , u; θt); θ
′
t)−Q (oj , uj ; θt)
)
, (6.4)
and subsequently, scale each δj < 0 using learning rate β:
δ′j ≡
δj , if δ ≥ 0.βδj , otherwise. (6.5)
before computing the loss:





For hysteretic deep Q-learning we therefore define β as the percentage of the learning
rate α. Hysteretic Q-learners are known to converge towards sub-optimal joint poli-
cies in environments that yield stochastic rewards [130]. However, drawing parallels
to lenient learning, where it is desirable to decay state-action pairs encountered at the
beginning of an episode at a slower rate compared to those close to a terminal state, we
consider that the same principle can be applied to hysteretic Q-learning. Subsequently
we implemented Scheduled Hysteretic (Double) Deep Q-Network (Scheduled-HDDQN)
with a pre-computed learning rate schedule β0, . . . , βn where βn is set to a value ap-
proaching α, and for each βt, 0 ≤ t < n, we have βt = dn−tβn using a decay coefficient
d ∈ (0, 1]. The state transitions encountered throughout each episode are initially stored
within a queue data-structure. Upon reaching a terminal state the n state-transitions
are transferred to D as (ot, ot+1, rt+1, ut, βt) for t ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Our hypothesis is that
storing β values that approach α for state-transitions leading to the terminal state will
help agents converge towards optimal joint policies in environments that yield sparse
stochastic rewards.
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Figure 6.2: CMOTP Layouts
6.4 Empirical Evaluation
6.4.1 CMOTP Extensions
We subjected our agents to a range of Coordinated Multi-Agent Object Transportation
Problems (CMOTPs) inspired by the scenario discussed in Buşoniu et al. [31], in which
two agents are tasked with delivering one item of goods to a drop-zone within a grid-
world. The agents must first exit a room one by one before locating and picking up the
goods by standing in the grid cells on the left and right hand side. The task is fully
cooperative, meaning the goods can only be transported upon both agents grasping the
item and choosing to move in the same direction. Both agents receive a positive reward
after placing the goods inside the drop-zone. The actions available to each agent are
to either stay in place or move left, right, up or down. We subjected our agents to
three variations of the CMOTP, depicted in Figure 6.2, where each A represents one
of the agents, G the goods, and DZONE / DZ mark the drop-zone(s). The layout
in sub-figure 6.2(a) is a larger version of the original CMOTP [31], while the layout
in sub-figure 6.2(b) introduces narrow-passages between the goods and the drop-zone,
testing whether the agents can learn to coordinate in order to overcome challenging
areas within the environment. The layout in sub-figure 6.2(c) tests the agents’ response
to stochastic rewards. Drop-zone 1 (DZ1) yields a reward of 0.8, whereas drop-zone 2
(DZ2) returns a reward of 1 on 60% of occasions and only 0.4 on the other 40%. DZ1
therefore returns a higher reward on average, 0.8 compared to the 0.76 returned by DZ2.
A slippery surface can be added to introduce stochastic state transitions to the CMOTP,
a common practice within grid-world domains where the agents move in an unintended
direction with a predefined probability at each time-step.
6.4.2 Setup
We conduct evaluations using a Double-DQN architecture [217] as basis for the algo-
rithms. The Q-network consists of 2 convolutional layers with 32 and 64 kernels respec-
tively, a fully connected layer with 1024 neurons and an output neuron for each action.
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The agents are fed a 16 × 16 tensor representing a gray-scale version of the grid-world
as input. We use the following pixel values to represent the entities in our grid-world:
Agent1 = 250, Agent2 = 200, Goods = 150 and Obstacles = 50. Adam [104] is used
to optimize the networks. Our initial experiments are conducted within a noise free
environment, enabling us to speed up the testing of our LDDQN architecture without
having to use an autoencoder for hashing; instead we apply python’s xxhash. We sub-
sequently test the LDDQN with the autoencoder for hashing in a noisy version of the
stochastic reward CMOTP. The autoencoder consists of 2 convolutional Layers with 32
and 64 kernels respectively, 3 fully connected layers with 1024, 512, and 1024 neurons
followed by 2 transposed convolutional layers. For our Scheduled-HDDQN agents we
pre-compute β0 to n by setting βn = 0.9 and applying a decay coefficient of d = 0.99
at each step t = 1 to n, i.e. βn−t = 0.99
tβn, with βn−t being bounded below at 0.4.
We summarize the remaining hyper-parameters in Table 6.1. In Section 6.6 we include
an extensive analysis of tuning the leniency related hyper-parameters. We note at this
point that each algorithm used the same learning rate α specified in Table 6.1.
Component Hyper-parameter Setting
DDQN-Optimization
Learning rate α 0.0001
Discount rate γ 0.95
Target network sync. steps 5000
Experience Replay Memory D Size 250,000
ε-Greedy Exploration
Initial ε value 1.0
ε Decay factor 0.999
Minimum ε Value 0.05
Leniency
MaxTemperature 1.0
Leniency Modification Coefficient k 2.0
TDS Exponent ρ -0.01
TDS Exponent Decay Rate d 0.95
Initial Max Temperature Value ν 1.0
Max Temperature Decay Coefficient µ 0.999
ATF Fold-in Constant τ 0.2
Autoencoder
HashKey Dimensions n 64
Sigmoidal units in the dense layer D 512
Table 6.1: Hyper-parameters
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Original CMOTP Results
Hyst. β = 0.5 Hyst. β = 0.6 Hyst. β = 0.7 Hyst.β = 0.8 LDDQN ATF LDDQN TDS
SPE 36.4 36.1 36.8 528.9 36.9 36.8
CSP 92% 92% 92% 91% 92% 92%
SPR 1,085,982 1,148,652 1,408,690 3,495,657 1,409,720 1,364,029
Table 6.2: Original CMOTP Results, including average steps per episode (SPE)
over the final 100 episodes, coordinated steps percentages (CSP) over the final 100
episodes, and the average steps per training run (SPR).
6.5 Deterministic CMOTP Results
6.5.1 Original CMOTP
The CMOTP represents a challenging fully cooperative task for parallel learners. Past
research has shown that deep reinforcement learning agents can converge towards coop-
erative policies in domains where the agents receive feedback for their individual actions,
such as when learning to play pong with the goal of keeping the ball in play for as long
as possible [203]. However, in the CMOTP feedback is only received upon delivering
the goods after a long series of coordinated actions. No immediate feedback is available
upon miscoordination. When using uniform action selection the agents only have a 20%
chance of choosing identical actions per state transition. As a result thousands of state
transitions are often required to deliver the goods and receive a reward while the agents
explore the environment, preventing the use of a small replay memory where outdated
transitions would be overwritten within reasonable time. As a result standard Double-
DQN architectures struggle to master the CMOTP, failing to coordinate on a significant
number of runs, even when confronted with the relatively simple original CMOTP.
We conduct 30 training runs of 5000 episodes per run for each LDDQN and HDDQN
configuration. Lenient and hysteretic agents with β < 0.8 fare significantly better than
the standard Double-DQN, converging towards joint policies that were only a few steps
shy of the optimal 33 steps required to solve the task. Lenient agents implemented with
both ATF and TDS deliver a comparable performance to the hysteretic agents with
regards to the average steps per episode and the coordinated steps percentage measured
over the final 100 steps of each episode (Table 6.2, left). However, both LDDQN-ATF
and LDDQN-TDS average a statistically significant higher number of steps per training
run compared to hysteretic agents with β < 0.7. For the hysteretic agents we observe a
statistically significant increase in the average steps per run as the values for β increase,
while the average steps and coordinated steps percentage over the final 100 episodes
remain comparable.
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6.5.2 Narrow Passage CMOTP
Lenient agents using ATF struggle significantly within the narrow passage CMOTP, as
evident from the results listed in Table 6.3. We find that the average temperature values
cool off rapidly over the first 100 episodes within the Pickup and Middle compartments,
as illustrated in Figure 6.3. Meanwhile agents using TDS manage to maintain sufficient
leniency over the first 1000 episodes to allow rewards to propagate backwards from the
terminal state. We conduct ATF experiments with a range of values for the fold-in
constant τ = {0.2, 0.4, 0.8}, but always witness the same outcome. Slowing down the
temperature decay would help agents using ATF remain lenient for longer, with the side-
effects of an overoptimistic disposition in stochastic environments, and an increase in
the number of steps required for convergence if the temperatures are tied to the action
selection policy. Using TDS meanwhile allows agents to maintain sufficient leniency
around difficult sub-tasks within the environment while being able to decay temperatures
belonging to later transitions at a faster rate. As a result agents using TDS can learn
the average rewards for state transitions close to the terminal state while remaining
optimistic for updates to earlier transitions.
Figure 6.3: Average temperature per compartment
The success of HDDQN agents within the narrow-passage CMOTP depends on the
value chosen for β. Agents with β > 0.5 struggle to coordinate, as we observed over a
range of β values (exemplar given in Table 6.3). The only agents that converge upon
a near optimal joint-policy are those using LDDQN-TDS and HDDQN (β = 0.5). We
perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a null hypothesis that there is no significant
difference between the performance metrics for agents using LDDQN-TDS and HDDQN
(β = 0.5). We fail to reject the null hypothesis for average steps per episode and
percentage of coordinated steps for the final 100 episodes. However, HDDQN (β =
0.5) average significantly less steps per run while maintaining less overhead, replicating
previous observations regarding the strengths of hysteretic agents within deterministic
environments.
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Narrow-Passage CMOTP Results
Hyst. β = 0.5 Hyst. β = 0.6 LDDQN ATF LDDQN TDS
SPE 45.25 704.9 376.2 45.7
CSP 92% 89% 90% 92%
SPR 1,594,968 4,736,936 3,950,670 2,104,637
Table 6.3: Narrow-Passage CMOTP Results, including average steps per episode
(SPE) over the final 100 episodes, coordinated steps percentages (CSP) over the final
100 episodes, and the average steps per training run (SPR).
6.6 Stochastic CMOTP Results
In the stochastic setting we are interested in the percentage of runs for each algorithm
that converge upon the optimal joint policy, which is for the agents to deliver the goods
to dropzone 1, yielding a reward of 0.8, as opposed to dropzone 2 which only returns an
average reward of 0.76. We conduct 40 runs of 5000 episodes for each algorithm.
As discussed in Section 6.5, HDDQN agents using β > 0.7 frequently fail to co-
ordinate in the deterministic CMOTP. Therefore, setting β = 0.7 is the most likely
candidate to succeed at solving the stochastic reward CMOTP for standard HDDQN
architectures. However, agents using HDDQN (β = 0.7) only converge towards the
optimal policy on 42.5% of runs. The scheduled -HDDQN perform significantly better
achieving a 77.5% optimal policy rate. Furthermore, the SHDDQN performs well when
an additional funnel-like narrow-passage is inserted close to the dropzones, with 93% suc-
cess rate. The drop in performance upon removing the funnel suggests that the agents
are led astray by the optimism applied to earlier transitions within each episode, pre-
sumably around the pickup area where a crucial decision is made regarding the direction
in which the goods should be transported.
LDDQN using ε-Greedy exploration perform similar to SHDDQN, converging to-
wards the optimal joint policy on 75% of runs. Meanwhile LDDQNs using T (o)-Greedy
exploration achieve the highest percentages of optimal joint-policies, with agents con-
verging on 100% of runs for the following configuration: k = 3.0, d = 0.9, ξ = 0.25
and µ = 0.9995, which will be discussed in more detail below. However, the percentage
of successful runs is related to the choice of hyperparameters. We therefore include an
analysis of three critical hyperparameters:
• The leniency modification coefficient k, that determines the speed at which agents
transition from optimist to average reward learner (sub-figure 6.4(a)). Values: 1,
2 and 3;
• The TDS decay-rate d which controls the rate at which temperatures are decayed
n-steps prior to the terminal state (sub-figure 6.4(b)). Values: 0.9, 0.95 and
0.99;
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(a) Leniency Schedules (b) Temperature Decay Schedules
Figure 6.4: TMC and TDS schedules used during analysis.
• T (o)-Greedy exploration exponent ξ, controlling the agent’s transition from ex-
plorer to exploiter, with lower values for ξ encouraging exploration. Values: 0.25,
0.5 and 1.0.
We conduct 40 simulation runs for each combination of the three variables. To
determine how well agents using LDDQN can cope with stochastic state transitions
we add a slippery surface where each action results in a random transition with 10%
probability. The highest performing agents use a steep temperature decay schedule
that maintains high temperatures for early transitions (d = 0.9 or d = 0.95) with
temperature modification coefficients that slow down the transition from optimist to
average reward learner (k = 2 or k = 3), and exploration exponents that delay the
transition from explorer to exploiter (ξ = 0.25 or ξ = 0.5). This is illustrated in the
heat-maps in Figure 6.5. When using a TDS with a more gradual incline (d = 0.99)
the temperature values from earlier state transitions decay at a similar rate to those
near terminal states. In this setting choosing larger values for k increases the likelihood
of the agents converging upon a sub-optimal policy prior to having established the
average rewards available in later states, as evident from the results plotted in sub-figure
6.5(c). Even when setting the exploration exponent ξ to 0.25 the agents prematurely
transition to exploiter while holding an overoptimistic disposition towards follow-on
states. Interestingly, when k < 3 agents often converge towards the optimal joint-policy
despite setting d = 0.99. However, the highest percentages of optimal runs (97.5%)
are achieved through combining a steep TDS (d = 0.9 or d = 0.95) with the slow
transition to average reward learner (k = 3) and exploiter (ξ = 0.25). Meanwhile, the
lowest percentages for all TDSs result from insufficient leniency (k = 1) and exploration
(ξ = 1.0).
Using one of the best-performing configurations (k = 3.0, d = 0.9 and ξ = 0.25)
we conduct further trials analyzing the agents’ sensitivity to the maximum temperature
decay coefficient µ. We conduct an additional set of 40 runs 2 where µ was increased from
0.999 to 0.9995. Combining T (o)-Greedy with the slow decaying µ = 0.9995 results in
the agents spending more time exploring the environment at the cost of requiring longer
2The runs were conducted without the slippery surface.
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(a) d = 0.9 (b) d = 0.95 (c) d = 0.99
Figure 6.5: Analysis of the LDDQN hyperparameters. The heat-maps show the
percentage of runs that converged to the optimal joint-policy (darker is better).
to converge, resulting in an additional 1,674,106 steps on average per run. However, the
agents delivered the best performance, converging towards the optimal policy on 100%
runs conduct.
Continuous State Space Analysis: Finally, we show that semantically similar state-
action pairs can be mapped to temperature values using SimHash in conjunction with
an autoencoder. We conduct experiments in a noisy version of the stochastic CMOTP,
where at each time step every pixel value is multiplied by a unique coefficient drawn
from a Gaussian distribution X ∼ N (1.0, 0.01). A non-sparse tensor is used to represent
the environment, with background cells set to 1.0 prior to noise being applied.
Agents using LDDQNs with xxhash converge towards the sub-optimal joint policy
after the addition of noise as illustrated in Figure 6.6, with the temperature values de-
caying uniformly in tune with ν. LDDQN-TDS agents using an autoencoder meanwhile
converged towards the optimal policy on 97.5% of runs. It is worth pointing out that
the autoencoder introduces a new set of hyperparameters that require consideration,
including the size D of the dense layer at the centre of the autoencoder and the dimen-
sions k of the hash-key, raising questions regarding the influence of the granularity on
the convergence. We leave this for future work.
Figure 6.6: Noisy Stochastic CMOTP Average Reward
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6.7 Summary
In this Chapter we demonstrate that leniency can be scaled to multi-agent deep re-
inforcement learning. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, a number of methods have been
proposed to help deep reinforcement learning agents converge towards an optimal joint
policy in cooperative multi-agent tasks. Gupta et al. Gupta et al. [74] evaluated policy
gradient, temporal difference error, and actor critic methods on cooperative control tasks
that included discrete and continuous state and action spaces, using a decentralized pa-
rameter sharing approach with centralized learning. More recent successful approaches
have focused on centralized training for decentralized execution (CTDE) [169, 189, 197],
e.g., decomposing a team value function into agent-wise value functions through the use
of a value decomposition network architecture [197]. Meanwhile, Foerster et al. [54],
used a centralized critic to train actors using Counterfactual Multi-Agent Policy Gra-
dients (COMA). In contrast to the above approaches, the methods presented in this
chapter focus on independent learning using optimistic agents within environments that
require implicit coordination. This decentralized approach to multi-agent systems offers
advantages such as speed, scalability and robustness [132]. The motivation for using
implicit coordination is that communication can be expensive in practical applications,
and requires efficient protocols [11, 132, 204]. Furthermore, our approach is suitable for
domains where computing a counterfactual baseline by sidelining an agent or conducting
simulation re-runs are infeasible.
With regards to related deep independent learning approaches, the work most com-
parable to ours is the scaling of hysteretic Q-learning to multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning by Omidshafiei et al. [152]. However, leniency has empirically been shown
to converge towards superior policies in team games with a stochastic reward space
compared to the hysteretic approach.
A further approach is to enable convergence through identifying and deleting obso-
lete state transitions stored in the replay memory. For instance, Foerster et al. [53]
used importance sampling as a means to identify outdated transitions while maintaining
an action observation history of the other agents. In contrast, the methods presented
in this chapter do not require the agents to maintain an action observation history for
other agents. The authors also propose to disambiguate the age of the sampled data
using fingerprints. However, with the exception of the work conducted by Omidshafiei
et al. [152], none of aforementioned approaches are designed to address relative overgen-
eralization. Meanwhile, our work demonstrates that leniency can help multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning agents solve a challenging fully cooperative multi-agent object
transportation problem using noisy and high-dimensional images as observations. How-
ever, relative overgeneralization is not one of the pathologies that must be mitigated in
the CMOTP. Therefore, given the fact that leniency was originally proposed to prevent
relative overgeneralization from occurring raises the research question to what extent
LDDQN can mitigate this pathology within a high-dimensional temporally extended
environments. We shall answer this question in the next chapter.
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To summarize the contributions discussed in the current chapter:
1. We have shown how leniency can be applied to multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning, enabling agents to converge upon optimal joint policies within fully-
cooperative environments that require implicit coordination strategies and yield
stochastic rewards.
2. We find that LDDQNs significantly outperform standard and scheduled-HDDQNs
within environments that yield stochastic rewards, replicating findings from tabu-
lar settings.
3. We introduced two extensions to leniency, including a retroactive temperature
decay schedule that prevents the premature decay of temperatures for state-action
pairs and a T (o)-Greedy exploration strategy that encourages agents to remain
exploratory in states with a high average temperature value.
4. Our LDDQN hyperparameter analysis revealed that the highest performing agents
within stochastic reward domains use a steep temperature decay schedule that
maintains high temperatures for early transitions combined with a temperature
modification coefficient that slows down the transition from optimist to average
reward learner, and an exploration exponent that delays the transition from ex-
plorer to exploiter.
5. We demonstrate that CMOTP [31] can be used as a benchmarking environment for
multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, requiring reinforcement learning agents
to learn fully-cooperative joint-policies from processing high-dimensional and noisy
image observations.
6. Finally, we introduce two extensions to the CMOTP. First, we include narrow
passages, allowing us to test lenient agents’ ability to prevent the premature decay
of temperature values. Our second extension introduces two dropzones that yield
stochastic rewards, testing the agents’ ability to converge towards an optimal joint-
policy while receiving misleading rewards.

Chapter 7
Q-learning with Negative Update
Intervals
The work presented in the first half of this chapter is in preparation for a submission
to the Journal of Machine Learning Research, while the second half is based on the
following publication:
Gregory Palmer, Rahul Savani, and Karl Tuyls, Negative Update Intervals in Deep
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, In Proceedings of the 18th International Con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019, pp. 43–51.
In the previous chapter we evaluate the extent to which lenient (and modified hys-
teretic) deep Q-learners can overcome the moving target problem, stochasticity (with
regards to rewards and transitions) and deception within fully-cooperative multi-agent
object transportation problems. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1),
the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature provides a rich taxonomy of learning
pathologies that cooperative independent learners must overcome to converge upon an
optimal joint-policy [132]. In particular, while searching for an optimal joint-policy,
the actions of independent learners influence each others’ search space. This can lead
to action shadowing, where miscoordination due to sub-optimal joint-policies results in
utility values of optimal actions being underestimated [57, 158]. In Chapters 4 and 5
we study the above pathologies and a type of action shadowing called relative overgen-
eralization in n-player strategic form games and low-dimensional Markov games with
a small state space. Relative overgeneralization can occur when pairing an indepen-
dent learner’s available actions with arbitrary actions by the other agents results in a
sub-optimal action having the highest utility estimate [158]. As a result, independent
learners can be drawn to sub-optimal but wide peaks in the reward search space due to
a greater likelihood of achieving collaboration there [158].
In our Climb Game [38, 99] evaluations in Chapter 4 we observe that relative over-
generalization presents a challenge for independent learners, even in repeated n-player
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single-stage strategic-form games. We find that lenient and hysteretic Q-learners main-
taining an optimistic disposition can prevent relative overgeneralization within n-player
deterministic Climb Game variations [38]. However, a significant amount of hyper-
parameter tuning is required to increase convergence rates upon adding partially and
fully-stochastic rewards. In Chapter 5 we show that lenient learners can in-fact mas-
ter these domains, but only after further modifying the leniency algorithm to mitigate
the noise introduced by miscoordination, resulting in our Distributed-Lenient Q-learning
(DLQ).
However, while DLQ is well suited towards overcoming the above pathologies in
repeated n-player single-stage strategic-form games and low-dimensional Markov games
with a small state space, in Chapter 6 we observe that compromises are necessary to scale
leniency to high-dimensional domains with a large state-space, resulting in our Lenient
(Double) Deep Q-Network (LDDQN). Our evaluations in the previous chapter focus on
mitigating deep Q-learners’ amplified moving-target problem in domains with stochastic
rewards and transitions. Therefore, for both lenient and hysteretic deep Q-learners
questions remain regarding scalability, i.e. can they overcome the same pathologies (in
particular relative overgeneralization) in complex domains that suffer from the curse of
dimensionality and require reasoning over long time horizons?
To answer this question we evaluate the ability of leniency and hysteretic Q-Learning
to overcome the pathologies outlined in a temporally extended, partially observable
version of the Climb Game [38, 99]. We call this game the Apprentice Firemen Game
(AFG). Indeed, to date the majority of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning research
on independent learners focuses on stochasticity and mitigating an amplified moving
target problem resulting from obsolete state transitions being stored inside experience
replay memories D [53, 152, 155, 234]. The AFG, meanwhile, allows us to study the
robustness of independent learning algorithms simultaneously facing all of the above
pathologies in a system suffering from the curse of dimensionality.
Within the AFG agents must make an irrevocable decision that will determine the
outcome of an episode. We find that while hysteretic and lenient learners deliver promis-
ing performances in layouts where agents can observe each others’ irrevocable decision,
both algorithms converge upon sub-optimal joint policies when the same irrevocable
decision is made in seclusion.
To help independent learners overcome the outlined pathologies in this challeng-
ing setting, we introduce a novel approach where agents maintain expanding intervals
estimating the min and max of cumulative reward distributions for state-transition tra-
jectories ending without miscoordination. The intervals determine which trajectories
are stored and used for sampling, allowing independent learners to discard trajectories
resulting in miscoordination. This reduces the impact of noisy utility values occurring
in cooperative games with high punishment for uncoordinated behavior, increasing the
likelihood of average utility values being established for sequences of actions leading to
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coordinated outcomes. We call this approach NUI-DDQN (Negative Update Intervals
Double-DQN ).
Our main contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. We design a new environment that simultaneously confronts independent learners
with all four of the mentioned pathologies. The environment is based on the Climb
Game, which has been used to study relative overgeneralization and stochastic
rewards. We embed the Climb Game in a temporally-extended gridworld setting,
that we call the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG), in which two fireman need to
coordinate to extinguish a fire. Stochastic transitions can be added by introducing
randomly moving civilians who obstruct paths.
2. We empirically evaluate hysteretic and lenient approaches in two AFG layouts
(Figure 7.4). Layout 1 examines whether the pathologies can be overcome when
independent learners can observe each other while making an irrevocable choice
that determines the outcome of an episode. In contrast, layout 2 requires inde-
pendent learners to independently make the same irrevocable decision in seclusion.
We find that independent learners predominately converge upon superior joint-
policies in layout 1, providing evidence that independent learners can implicitly
learn to avoid miscoordination when able to observe each other during transitions
that determine an episode’s outcome. Layout 2 poses a challenge for existing ap-
proaches. Lenient learners in particular face the following dilemma: remain lenient
and be led astray by misleading stochastic rewards, or estimate average utility val-
ues and succumb to relative overgeneralization due oscillating utility values caused
by stochastic transitions.
3. We introduce Q-learning with Negative Update Intervals (Q-learning with NUI),
a novel independent learning approach capable of converging on optimal joint-
polices within the n-player repeated strategic-form games used for our empirical re-
evaluations in Chapter 4. Furthermore, we identify a hyperparameter configuration
for Q-learning with NUI that enables a high convergence rate across settings.
4. We introduce NUI-DDQN, a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning algorithm
which discards episodes yielding cumulative rewards outside the range of expand-
ing intervals. These intervals are maintained for sequences of transitions (tra-
jectories) equivalent to actions from cooperative games. NUI-DDQN reduces the
noise introduced by punishing values resulting from miscoordination to utility es-
timates, allowing independent learners to prevent relative overgeneralization and
the alter-exploration problem. NUI-DDQN consistently converges upon the opti-
mal joint-policy in both layouts for deterministic and stochastic rewards.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we outline and evaluate Q-learning with
Negative Update Intervals in Section 7.1 within the n-player strategic-form games used
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for our empirical evaluations conducted in Chapters 4 and 5. We identify hyperparam-
eter settings that enable Q-learning with NUI to deliver performances comparable with
Synchronized-DLQ within the Penalty Game and Climb Game variations. Following
our n-layer strategic-form game evaluation we scale Q-learning with NUI to NUI-DDQN
in Section 7.3. We subsequently outline our Apprentice Firemen Game in Section 7.4,
before evaluating the learning dynamics of NUI, lenient and hysteretic deep Q-learning
architectures in Section 7.5. Finally, under Future Work in Section 7.6 we propose ex-
tensions to NUI-DDQN, and discuss interesting preliminary findings regarding agents
learning nonverbal communication in the AFT, before concluding with our chapter sum-
mary.
7.1 Q-learning with Negative Update Intervals
We introduce Q-learning with Negative Update Intervals (Q-learning with NUI) within
the context of repeated n-agent single-stage strategic-form team-games. We define a
negative update as a Q-value update that lowers a utility value estimate, i.e. an update
performed using a temporal difference error (TD-Error) δ < 0. As evident from the util-
ity value update equations for the stateless versions of hysteretic Q-learning and leniency
(Equations (3.9) and (3.19) respectively in Chapter 3), both approaches reduce the ex-
tent to which negative updates lower utility value estimates over time. However, both
approaches apply their update rules to negative TD-Errors indiscriminately. Meanwhile,
for Q-learning with NUI we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Within a number of team-games independent learners may compute a
δ < 0 due to feedback received for joint-actions that resulted in:
i miscoordination (type 1);
ii coordinated behaviour where the utility is currently overestimated (type 2).
While this is a strong assumption, we can provide a number of examples from multi-
agent reinforcement learning literature where Assumption 1 holds, including the stochas-
tic Climb Game variations [99], as well as the Relative Overgeneralization 3 and Gra-
dient 2 [223] games used for our evaluations in Chapters 4 and 5. Neither leniency nor
hysteretic Q-learning attempt to distinguish between the two types of δ outlined above.
In Chapter 5 we proposed SDLQ as a method for reducing the likelihood of independent
learners performing updates using Type 1 TD-Errors. However, while SDLQ delivers
a robust performance across the various Climb Game variations in our empirical eval-
uation, we observe that reward spaces exist where DLQ performs sub-optimally with
synchronized updates (see Section 5.4.2 in Chapter 5). Maximum based learners, mean-
while, avoid negative updates altogether by maintaining utility values for each action
a ∈ A based on the highest observed reward rmaxa .
This raises the research question: to what extent can we implement an algorithm
where the independent learners can differentiate between the two types of TD-Errors
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outlined above. Our aim is to prevent updates using Type 1 TD-Errors from introducing
noise, without discarding updates using Type 2 TD-Errors, which allows us to estab-
lish an accurate average utility value estimate for coordinated behaviour involving each
action.
Our approach towards answering this question is to compute intervals for each action
a ∈ A, where the lower endpoint is approximately the min reward received for coordi-
nated behaviour involving a. Therefore, receiving a reward less than min on the interval
indicates miscoordination has occurred. For example, for the bimatrix game outlined
in Figure 7.1, due to relative over-generalization and stochastic rewards both maximum
and average reward learners will be drawn towards joint actions 〈C,C〉. Meanwhile, the
respective intervals for computing the average reward for coordinated behaviour involv-
ing each action would be [10, 12] for action A, [0, 15] for action B and [0, 16] for action C.
Having established such intervals we can prevent utility updates resulting from misco-
ordination behaviour, allowing us to compute noise free utility estimates for each action
a ∈ A, and thereby allow both independent learners to establish that 〈A,A〉 is the opti-
mal joint-action. Below we formally define negative update intervals, and describe how











12/10 0/− 30 5/− 5
12/10 0/− 30 5/− 5
0/− 30 14/0 15/0
0/− 30 14/0 15/0
5/− 5 15/0 16/0
5/− 5 15/0 16/0
Figure 7.1: Example of a stochastic reward game where agents are confronted with
relative overgeneralization. Each reward n/m is returned with equal probability.
7.1.1 Negative Update Intervals
While agents guided by rmaxa are vulnerable towards stochastic rewards, we consider
that for partially and fully stochastic reward spaces where rmina for coordinated out-
comes is greater than the punishment received for miscoordination, there exist intervals
[rmina , r
max
a ] within which negative updates to utility estimates can be performed while
mitigating the noise induced through punishment for miscoordination. We show that
maintaining negative update intervals for each action a ∈ A increases the likelihood of
agents within repeated games converging upon an optimal joint policy π̂∗.
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7.1.2 Maintaining Negative Update Intervals
We establish rmaxa for each action a ∈ A over n burn-in transitions, where the agents
use random exploration. Initially rmina = r
max
a . During training r
min
a is gradually de-
cayed by subtracting an amount χ. To prevent a premature decay during phases where
independent learners are confronted with the alter-exploration problem, we only decay
if the reward is large enough. That is, rmina is only decayed if rt ≥ rmaxa .
Given that rmina is monotonically decreased we consider that an interval maintained
for an action a will eventually over-expand, leaving learners vulnerable towards the
noise introduced by miscoordination rewards. However, assuming that each agent will
have a similar estimate regarding the desirability of actions, and therefore periods of
miscoordination where agents switch between most desirable actions should be kept to a
minimum, we consider that over time the learners should be capable of estimating rmina .
To accomplish this we maintain running mean and standard deviation estimates for the
rewards received for each action:
rmina ← µ× r + (1− µ)× rmina , (7.1)
σrmina ←
√




An update only takes place if reward r is greater than the max between rmina and the
rmina − σrmina − ε (Equation (7.3)), where ε is an additional small valued term used to
expand the interval. Therefore, while leniency is vulnerable towards miscoordination
upon cooling temperature values, Q-learning with NUI will continue to discard misco-
ordination rewards. We outline Q-learning with NUI in Algorithm 7.
Q(a)←
Q(a) + αδ, if r ≥ max(rmina , rmina − σrmina − ε).Q(a), otherwise. (7.3)
7.1.3 Strategic-Form Game Evaluation
As with the independent learning approaches evaluated in Chapters 4 and 5 we conduct
a hyperparameter sweep for NUI-DDQN, aiming to identify configurations that enable
a high convergence rate across settings. We evaluate all combinations of:
• χ = {0.01, 0.1, 1.0};
• ε decay rates {0.99, 0.995, 0.999}.
Learners use a burn-in period of 1,000 episodes where random exploration is con-
ducted. This value is excessive for the two-agent variations of each game, but ensures
the rmaxa is obtained for the four-agent variations. As in previous evaluations we conduct
1,000 training runs of 15,000 iterations per setting. We provide heat-maps to illustrate
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Algorithm 7 Q-learning with NUI
1: Input: Max steps T , learning rate α, BurnIn, decay step χ
2: Q(a)← initialize(a)
3: for t = 0 to T do
4: Select a according to the ε-greedy selection method based on π
5: Apply a and observe reward r
6: Update rmina and σrmina using equations 7.1 and 7.2
7: if r > rmaxa and t < BurnIn then
8: rmaxa ← r
9: rmina ← r
10: Q(a)← r
11: else if r ≥ rmaxa and t > BurnIn then
12: rmina ← rmina - χ
13: if r ≥ max(rmina , rmina − σrmina − ε) then
14: Q(a)← Q(a) + α(r −Q(a))
the correct run percentages for each setting in Appendix B. We identify two settings
where 100% of runs converged upon the optimal joint policy (across settings): χ = 0.01
combined with either an ε decay rate of 0.99 or 0.995. We observe a drop in the conver-
gence rate within the four-agent variations of the Partially and Fully Stochastic Climb
Game for agents using a slow ε decay rate of 0.999. Furthermore, we observe a decrease
in the correct run percentage across games for larger χ = {1.0, 0.1}. Therefore, similar
to DLQ, Q-learning with NUI benefits from mitigating the alter-exploration problem
through limiting the amount of global exploration. Meanwhile, Q-learning with NUI
being more likely to converge upon a correct joint policy when implemented with slowly
expanding reward intervals is somewhat equivalent to Asynchronous DLQ benefiting
from using a lower learning rate α during learning phase 2.
In Figure 7.2 we use scatter plots to illustrate the average Q-value for Q-learning
with NUI within the two-agent low-penalty version of the Deterministic and Partially
Stochastic Climb Games. We observe that Q-value estimates reflecting coordinated be-
haviour for each action are more likely to be established when using the lower two decay
values χ = 0.01 and χ = 0.1. Furthermore, for a large decay value χ = 1.0 we can
observe a deterioration in the Q-value estimates upon increasing the ε decay rate. For
the (deterministic) Climb Game we observe that when using one of the optimal hyper-
parameter configurations, e.g., ε decay rate 0.99 and χ = 0.01, Q-values for each action
approach the reward received for coordinated behaviour. For the Partially Stochas-
tic Climb Game, meanwhile, we observe that the utility for B is being overestimated.
However, this indicates that upon discovering that A has a higher utility estimate, the
interval for B is no longer expanded. This is desirable, enabling a switch back to B,
should A prove sub-optimal.
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(a) CG, χ = 0.01 (b) CG, χ = 0.1 (c) CG, χ = 1.0
(d) PSCG, χ = 0.01 (e) PSCG, χ = 0.1 (f) PSCG, χ = 1.0
Figure 7.2: Average Q-values for Q-learning with NUI in the two-agent low-penalty
Climb Game (CG) and Partially Stochastic Climb Game (PSCG).
7.1.4 Robustness Towards Noisy Transitions
Wei and Luke [223] observe that even after converging upon an optimal joint-policy,
only a small likelihood of global exploration can result in optimal policy destruction for
Lenient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning 2 (LMRL2). Therefore a small number of
iterations ending in miscoordination, due to one of the agents taking an exploratory step,
is sufficient to destabilize the learning process, and divert the learners towards a sub-
optimal joint-policy. For LMRL2 optimal policy destruction typically occurs when the
learners have insufficient leniency to recover from repeated miscoordination. The authors
demonstrate this property using LMRL2 with a Boltzmann exploration strategy that
remains exploratory. As a result a large proportion of iterations end in miscoordination,
lowering the Q-value estimates for optimal actions once the learners apply insufficient
leniency towards updates.
Throughout this thesis we have observed that LMRL2, SDLQ and Q-learning with
NUI are capable of achieving high convergence rates within the two-agent, low-penalty
versions of the Penalty Game and the three Climb Game variations. However, in domains
with a large state space utility values are frequently backed up from noisy state-transition
sequences. Furthermore, within real world domains learners must be robust towards
noisy actions, where upon attempting to perform an action, due to disturbances in
the environment and noisy observations, a different action is performed than the one
intended [207]. In this sub-section we evaluate the robustness of LMRL2, SDLQ and Q-
learning with NUI towards noisy actions. We pick the best hyperparameter configuration
for each domain based on the performance achieved in noise free evaluations. For SDLQ
and Q-learning with NUI this setting remains consistent across domains:
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Q-learning with NUI:
• An ε decay rate of 0.99,
• decay steps χ = 0.01,
• and 100 burn-in iterations;
Synchronized-DLQ:
• A leniency moderation factor k = 1.0,
• α = 0.001,
• and 100 burn-in iterations.
For LMRL2 we use k = 107 for the Climb Game, Partially Stochastic Climb Game
and Penalty Game. For the Fully Stochastic Climb Game we set k = 101. We gather
1,000 runs for different noisy action likelihoods, as illustrated in Figure 7.3. The x-
axis represents the likelihood of a noisy action occurring at each time-step. Therefore, a
likelihood of 0.1 means each learner is likely to produce a noisy action every ten episodes.
To provide the learners sufficient time to converge we only introduce the noisy actions
after 10,000 iterations.
Interestingly, we find that SDLQ outperforms LMRL2 and Q-learning with NUI in
all settings, with the exception of the Partially Stochastic Climb Game, and in the
Fully Stochastic Climb Game when there is a high likelihood of noisy actions. We
believe SDLQ’s strong performance during these trials can be attributed towards the
learners using a low-learning rate combined by synchronized jumps between equilibria,
protecting optimal actions from sequences of miscoordination. However, we observe
that even without synchronized updates Q-learning with NUI is robust towards low-
amounts of noise in the majority of settings. Furthermore, while scaling SDLQ may
prove challenging, we show the remainder of this chapter how Q-learning with NUI can
be scaled to help multi-agent deep reinforcement learning agents mitigate the impact of
noisy utility values.
7.2 Temporally-Extending Team Bimatrix Games
Negative Update Intervals DDQN (NUI-DDQN), the scaled version of Q-learning with
NUI, is designed for partially observable Markov games that are temporally-extended
versions of team bimatrix games. We call a particular roll-out of a policy πi for an agent i,
i.e. the sequence of resulting states, actions, and associated rewards, a trajectory and
denote it by τi [202]. The outcome of temporally-extended versions of team bimatrix
games is determined by joint-trajectories τ resulting from π. The reward function
has inequalities mirroring those of the corresponding bimatrix game. Therefore, each τi
belongs to a set of trajectories T a that implements an action a ∈ A. Independent learners
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(a) Penalty Game (b) Climb Game
(c) Partially Stochastic Climb Game (d) Fully Stochastic Climb Game
Figure 7.3: Correct run percentage for LMRL2, Synchronized-DLQ and Q-learning
with NUI within two-player low-penalty Penalty Game and Climb Game variations,
where the actions taken by learners are noisy after 10,000 episodes.
are tasked with learning a joint policy π that results in optimal joint trajectories τ .
Throughout this chapter τi refers to a trajectory that consists of all the state-transition
tuples (o, a, r, o′) of an individual episode for an agent. In Section 7.4, we introduce
a temporally-extended version of the Climb Game, which serves as the basis for our
experiments. First, we define negative update intervals within the context of temporally-
extended versions of team bimatrix games and describe how they help NUI-DDQN
prevent relative overgeneralization.
7.3 Deep Q-Learning with Negative Update Intervals
As in the previous chapter the algorithm which we outline in this section, NUI-DDQN, is
an extensions of the Double-DQN (DDQN) introduced by Van Hasselt et al. [217]. Each
agent i is implemented with a ConvNet trained to approximate Q-values for observation-
action pairs: Qi : Oi×Ui → R [114]. As in the stateless version of NUI-DDQN, outlined
in Section 7.1, our aim is to compute intervals for each action a ∈ A, where the lower end-
point is approximately the min reward received for coordinated behaviour involving a.
Therefore, receiving a reward less than min on the interval indicates miscoordination
has occurred. However, in contrast to the stateless version, an action a in this context
is implemented by a trajectory τ ∈ T a within temporally-extended versions of team
bimatrix games, as outlined above in Section 7.2.
Classifying Trajectories. The reward yielded by temporally-extended versions of
team bimatrix games is determined by joint-trajectories τ . Therefore, given an oracle
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ϑ : T → A capable of determining the set T a that trajectory τ belongs to, negative
update intervals [rmina , r
max
a ] can be stored for each action a ∈ A, thereby increasing the
likelihood of independent learners computing noise free average utility values for tran-
sitions belonging to coordinated joint-trajectories τ . For simplicity our evaluations use
temporally-extended versions of team bimatrix games with a predefined A. However, we
discuss the potential of using a theory of mind neural network [166] for ϑ under Future
Work (Section 7.6).
Maintaining Negative Update Intervals. We establish rmaxa for each action a dur-
ing an initial exploration phase used to fill the experience replay memories D. Initially
rmina = r
max
a . During training r
min
a is gradually decayed. To prevent a premature de-
cay during phases where independent learners are confronted with the alter-exploration
problem, we only decay if the cumulative reward for the trajectory (Rτ =
∑|τ |
t=0 rt) is
large enough. That is, rmina is only decayed if R
τ ≥ rmaxa −ε, where ε is a small constant.
We assume a reward space between 1.0 and -1.0, and therefore decay rmina + 1.0 and
subsequently subtract 1.0.
Addressing Catastrophic Forgetting. Catastrophic forgetting occurs when trained
networks forget how to perform previously learned tasks while learning to master a
new task [64]. To allow agents to maintain Q-values for transitions belonging to less
frequently observed actions a, without preventing outdated transitions from being dis-
carded, we implement a separate experience replay memory Da for each action a ∈ A.
Instead of storing n transitions each Da stores n episodes, since traditional experience
replay memories may store a significant number of obsolete transitions once independent
learners become efficient at solving a task and require less steps. Episodic experience
replay memories, meanwhile, are more likely to reflect the current search space. During
sampling the Da are concatenated.
Storing Trajectories. In addition to rmina we maintain vectors R
a, which store the
most recent n cumulative rewards for each action a. A trajectory is stored iff the
cumulative reward Rτ is greater than the max between rmina and the R
a’s mean Ra minus
the standard deviation SDRa (Equation (7.4)). Therefore, while leniency is vulnerable
towards miscoordination upon cooling temperature values, NUI-DDQN will continue to
discard miscoordination trajectories. We define NUI-DDQN in Algorithm 8.
Da =
Da ∪ τ if Rτ ≥ max(rmina , Ra − SDRa).Da Otherwise. (7.4)
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Algorithm 8 NUI-DDQN
1: Input: Number of episodes E, replay period K, max steps T
2: Random exploration phase (Init for Da, rmina and rmaxa )
3: for e = 1 to E do
4: τ = ∅
5: Observe o0 and choose a0 ∼ πθ(o0)
6: for t = 1 to T or until an absorbing state is encountered do
7: Observe ot, rt
8: Store transition (ot−1, ut−1, rt, ot) in τ
9: if t ≡ 0 mod K then
10: Optimise Network
11: Copy weights from time to time: θ′t ← θt
12: Choose at ∼ πθ(ot)
13: a← ϑ(τ)
14: Ra ← Ra ∪Rτ
15: if rmaxa < R
τ then
16: rmaxa ← Rτ
17: if Rτ ≥ max(rmina , Ra − SDRa) then
18: Da ← Da ∪ τ
19: if Rτ ≥ rmaxa − ε then
20: rmina ← decay(rmina )
7.4 The Apprentice Firemen Game
The Climb Game is often studied as a repeated game. We are interested in solving an
equivalent game extended over the temporal dimension, where joint trajectories τ result
in outcomes comparable to the joint-actions from the Climb Game [38, 99] variations used
during our previous empirical evaluations. We formulate a temporally-extended versions
of team bimatrix game based on the Climb Game that we call the Apprentice Firemen
Game (AFG), where two (or more) agents located within a gridworld are tasked with
locating and extinguishing fires. First, however, the agents must locate an equipment
pickup area and choose one of the items listed in Table 7.1 below. The task is fully
cooperative, i.e. both agents are required to extinguish one fire. As outlined in Table 7.1
both agents detonating an explosive device (fighting fire with fire) is the most effective
combination, equivalent to the joint action 〈A,A〉 in the Climb Game. While the fire
extinguisher is more effective than the fire blanket, agents choosing one run the risk
of being hit by debris if the other agent triggers an explosive device, whereas the fire
blanket offers protection. Therefore the fire extinguisher and fire blanket are equivalent
to actions B and C respectively.
The independent learners in our evaluation are not explicitly told which actions other
agents have performed. However, we hypothesize they can learn to avoid miscoordina-
tion in the AFG when able to observe each other during transitions that determine an
episode’s outcome, reducing the impact of optimal joint action 〈A,A〉 being a shadowed
equilibrium. To test this hypothesis we conduct experiments using two layouts outlined
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Description Action (a ∈ A) Effectiveness Risk
Explosive Device A High High
Fire Extinguisher B Medium High
Fire Blanket C Weak None
Table 7.1: Apprentice Firemen Game Equipment
below (and illustrated in Figure 7.4), where equipment pickup decisions are irrevoca-
ble for the duration of each episode. At the start of an episode one randomly chosen
obstacle in the main area is set on fire. Episodes end when both agents occupy cells
next to the fire, upon which a terminal reward is returned. To eliminate confounding
factors all non-terminal transitions yield a reward of 0. We introduce a 10,000 step limit
upon observing that trained agents delay miscoordination outcomes through avoiding
the fire. The agents receive a miscoordination reward of -1.0 upon reaching this limit.
The action space is discrete and includes moving up, down, left, right and NO-OP.
Pickup actions occur automatically upon independent learners entering an equipment
cell empty handed. DDQNs perform well when receiving rewards within [−1, 1], which
led us to choose the reward structures listed in Figures 7.5 – 7.7 for the deterministic,
partially and fully stochastic reward spaces of the AFG respectively. For stochastic
transitions randomly moving civilians can be added who obstruct paths.
Layout 1: Observable irrevocable decisions Two agents in a 16 × 15 gridworld
begin each episode in opposite corners of a compartment separated from the main area.
The agents must exit the compartment, gather equipment from a shared pickup area
and subsequently extinguish the fire, meaning that agents observe each other during the
irrevocable equipment selection process. One agent can, therefore, observe the other
agent’s choice and subsequently select a best response to avoid miscoordination - in
terms of the original Climb (bimatrix) game, this allows agents to act as if it was a
perfect-information commitment version of the game with a follower and leader.
Layout 2: Irrevocable decisions in seclusion Two agents in a padded 53 × 53
gridworld begin each episode in separate chambers. To mimic the simultaneity of the
choice of actions in the Climb (bimatrix) game, each agent is limited to 13×13 centered




Similar to work by Leibo et al. [114] the simple visualisation of our domains helps with
regards to training speeds and being able to run multiple training runs in parallel per
GPU, while still posing a significant multi-agent deep reinforcement learning challenge.
Therefore, given the number of cells within the main area that agents can occupy (90),
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(a) Layout 1 (b) Layout 2
Figure 7.4: AFG layouts with fires (yellow), obstacles (grey) and equipment A (red),
B (green) & C (blue). Firemen are initially white, but following a pickup adopt the
















Figure 7.5: Terminal rewards for the Deterministic AFG.
fire locations (25), agent color combinations (16) and actions (5) we estimate 16,020,000
state-action pairs per layout before factoring in civilians and additional layout specific
cells. We therefore follow the example of recent publications by conducting evaluations
in gridworlds with sufficient complexity to warrant a multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning approach [74, 114, 155]. Networks consist of 2 convolutional layers with 32 and
64 kernels respectively, a fully connected layer (1024 neurons) and an output node for
each action1. We use learning rate α = 0.0001, discount rate γ = 0.95 and ε-Greedy
exploration with a ε decay rate of 0.999. Each D stores 250,000 transitions. Regarding
algorithm specific configurations:
NUI-DDQN. To determine the set of trajectories that τ belongs to each oracle ϑ
queries the respective agent instance regarding the ID of the equipment used. Each Da
stores 100 episodes, while the decay rate for rmina is set to 0.995.
LDDQNs. We use a leniency moderation factor K = 1.0 and a retroactive temperature
decay schedule combined with temperature greedy exploration strategy as described in
the previous chapter.
1We make our code available online: https://github.com/gjp1203/nui_in_madrl

















Figure 7.6: Terminal rewards for the Partially Stochastic AFG.











.9/.7 .2/− 1. .6/− .6
.9/.7 .2/− 1. .6/− .6
.2/− 1. 1./.0 .9/.1
.2/− 1. 1./.0 .9/.1
.6/− .6 .4/− .4 .8/.0
.6/− .6 .4/− .4 .8/.0
Figure 7.7: Terminal rewards for the Fully Stochastic AFG.
For 〈B,B〉 1.0 is yielded on 60% of occasions.
7.5.2 Experiments
To evaluate our hypothesis in Section 7.4 we collect 30 training runs of 5,000 episodes per
algorithm within each layout. For LDDQNs an additional 5,000 episodes are required to
sufficiently decay the temperatures T (oi, ui). Finally, to evaluate the impact of stochastic
transitions we introduce 10 civilians in layout 2 and conduct 30 runs of 10,000 episodes
per setting.
7.5.3 Evaluation Using Phase Plots
The ternary phase plots depicted in Tables 7.2 – 7.4 provide insights regarding the
learning dynamics of the agents. Each line illustrates the average shift in the trajectory
distributions throughout the runs conducted, using a rolling window of 1000 episodes.
The black squares at the centre of each plot represent the averaged initial T a distributions
while the red dots represents the final distribution. Each corner represents 100% of
trajectories τ ∈ T a for the labelled action a ∈ A. For example, if both lines end
with red dots in the top corner of a simplex, then the two agents are predominately
producing trajectories τ ∈ TA, and have converged upon the optimal Nash Equilibrium
〈A,A〉. The agents have therefore learned policies where the optimal equipment is being
selected from the pickup area in the AFG, as outlined in section 7.4.
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Deterministic rewards. Under pathologies (Chapter 3, Section 3.1) we discuss how
maximum based learners can prevent relative overgeneralization in the deterministic
reward Climb Game. Similarly the phase plots for deterministic reward settings con-
firm that with sufficient optimism / leniency, independent learners can prevent relative
overgeneralization while facing the curse of dimensionality (HDDQN β = 0.5, LDDQN
and NUI-DDQN in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4). Meanwhile, HDDQN (β = 0.9) shows
that agents with insufficient optimism gravitate towards the shadow equilibrium 〈C,C〉.
Interestingly, in layout 2 with 10 civilians (Table 7.4) HDDQN (β = 0.9) agents are
completing the climb steps discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2 towards 〈B,B〉, while
β = {0.5, 0.7} converge towards superior joint policies compared to layout 2 without
civilians. Further investigation is required to establish why.
Stochastic Rewards. As evident by the phase plots in Tables 7.2 – 7.4, the optimism
that helps HDDQNs prevent relative overgeneralization in the deterministic reward set-
tings can lead agents to converge upon sub-optimal joint policies when learning from
partially or fully stochastic rewards. For HDDQN (β = 0.5), for instance, we ob-
serve an increase in τ ∈ TB for partially stochastic, and τ ∈ TC by Agent 2 for fully
stochastic rewards. LDDQNs, meanwhile, are less vulnerable, gravitating towards opti-
mal joint-policies despite stochastic rewards and relative overgeneralization in layout 1
and when receiving partially stochastic rewards in layout 2 with no civilians. However,
LDDQNs struggle when receiving fully stochastic rewards in layout 2, and have lim-
ited success once civilians are added. NUI-DDQNs, meanwhile, predominately converge
upon optimal joint-policies. When receiving partially stochastic rewards NUI-DDQNs
are initially tempted by the misleading rewards received for 〈B,B〉, before converging
on a joint-policy with the majority of trajectories τ ∈ TA. For fully stochastic rewards
a slight increase in τ ∈ TC can be observed.
7.5.4 Learning Best Response Policies
In Section 7.4 we proposed that independent learners should learn to avoid miscoor-
dination trajectories within layout 1 due to observing each other during interactions
with the equipment pick-up area. To compare the policies learned in layouts 1 and 2
(without civilians), we compute the average coordinated rewards RC for each training
run. We compute RC using the rewards from the final 1000 episodes that did not end in
miscoordination outcomes {〈A,B〉, 〈B,A〉}. Runs with RC ≈ 0.8 have converged upon
the optimal joint-policy, where 〈A,A〉 is the most frequently observed outcome. For the
majority of settings higher RC values are achieved by agents in layout 1. The scatter
plots in Table 7.5 provide evidence to support our hypothesis. Each marker within the
scatter plots represents the RC for an individual run. To provide further clarity we sort
the runs by RC. We observe that HDDQN β = 0.7 and β = 0.9 converges upon a policy
with RC ≈ 0.8 numerous times in each reward setting in layout 1, while only twice in
layout 2 (HDDQN β = 0.7, Partially Stochastic & Fully Stochastic) 2. Interestingly, we
2We provide additional RC scatter plots for each evaluation setting in Appendix B.
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Table 7.2: Phase plots for runs conducted within Layout 1 (0 civilians), illustrating
the average shift in the action A distributions throughout the runs conducted, using a
rolling window of 1,000 episodes. The black squares and red dots represent the initial
and final distributions, while DET, PS and FS are abbreviations for deterministic,
partially stochastic and fully stochastic rewards, respectively.
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Table 7.3: Phase plots for runs conducted within Layout 2 (0 civilians), illustrating
the average shift in the action A distributions throughout the runs conducted, using a
rolling window of 1,000 episodes. The black squares and red dots represent the initial
and final distributions, while DET, PS and FS are abbreviations for deterministic,
partially stochastic and fully stochastic rewards, respectively.
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Table 7.4: Phase plots for runs conducted within Layout 2 wtih 10 civilians,
illustrating the average shift in the action A distributions throughout the runs
conducted, using a rolling window of 1,000 episodes. The black squares and red dots
represent the initial and final distributions, while DET, PS and FS are abbreviations
for deterministic, partially stochastic and fully stochastic rewards, respectively.
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find that for HDDQN (β = 0.5, Partially Stochastic) and LDDQN (Deterministic & Par-
tially Stochastic) a larger number of runs converge upon joint-policies where RC ≈ 0.8
in layout 2. NUI-DDQNs, meanwhile, perform consistently when receiving deterministic
and partially stochastic rewards in both settings, while a couple of runs faltered for fully
stochastic rewards within layout 2. It is worth noting that even for NUI-DDQN runs
with low RC, 〈A,A〉 remains a frequently observed outcome.
Deterministic Partially Stochastic Fully Stochastic
HDQN β = 0.7
HDQN β = 0.9
Table 7.5: Scatter plots depicting the average coordinated rewards RC for
HDDQNs with β = 0.7 and β = 0.9.
7.5.5 Impact of Stochastic Transitions
Introducing 10 civilians to layout 2 allows us to examine the challenges faced by multi-
agent deep reinforcement learners when attempting to prevent relative overgeneralization
while making decisions using noisy utility values backed up from stochastic follow-on
transitions. In Figure 7.8 we compare the Q-values from actions leading to the selection
of equipment within both 0 and 10 civilian settings from two individual NUI-DDQN
runs with partially stochastic rewards. We observe that Q-values oscillate significantly
upon introducing civilians, with Q-values belonging to sub-optimal equipment B pickups
frequently rising above those belonging to A. Stochastic transitions can, therefore, lead
to the moving target problem (Section 3.1.5), in this case resulting in extended periods
of miscoordination. However, by maintaining negative update intervals, NUI-DDQN
can overcome miscoordination and revert back to a policy that generates trajectories
τ ∈ TA.
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(a) 0 Civilians (b) 10 Civilians
Figure 7.8: NUI-DDQN Pickup Q-values
7.5.6 Considerations Regarding LDDQNs
The phase plots in Tables 7.2 – 7.4 indicate that given further hyperparameter tuning an
increase in trajectories τ ∈ TA should be possible for LDDQNs. However, while searching
for an optimal set of hyperparameters we encountered the optimal policy destruction
problem [223]: while LDDQNs fail to converge upon 〈A,A〉 with insufficiently decayed
temperature values, rapidly decaying temperature values leaves LDDQNs vulnerable
during the periods of miscoordination discussed in Section 7.5.5. We therefore choose a
patient approach, with the consequence that even after 10,000 episodes the agents have
still not converged. To illustrate this dilemma we conduct additional runs in a simplified
partially stochastic reward version of layout 1 with only 1 fire location 3. By varying the
number of obstacles surrounding this fire, and thereby controlling the number of Access
Points from which the agents can extinguish it, we observe the rolling percentage of
〈A,A〉 outcomes increases significantly faster when the number of Tt(o, u) values that
need decaying decreases (See Figure 7.9). We conduct 20 runs for each access point
setting.
Figure 7.9: Running 〈A,A〉 % by LDDQNs dependent on fire Access Points.
Agents could overlap next to the fire for 1 Access Point.
3Illustrations of the layouts can be found in the Appendix B.3.
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7.6 Future work
Below we discuss two interesting topics for future work in this area:
1. We conducted trials using 20 sets of fixed policies trained in a simplified layout 1,
finding evidence that leader-follower dynamics emerge during training, where one
agent waits to observe the other’s equipment choice. We assigned the policies to
disjoint sets ΠA and ΠB based on the percentage of τ ∈ TA and τ ∈ TB their
roll-outs produced. Upon subsequently running trials with each leader-follower
combination, we find half of πB followers choose A when paired with a πA leader
and vice-versa. We are currently investigating why only some independent learners
develop this adaptive ability.
2. For simplicity, the actions a ∈ A returned by the oracle ϑ for the AFG are pre-
defined. Going forward recent work on the topic of theory of mind by Rabinowitz
et al. [166] could pave the way for a learned oracle ϑ. The authors build a data-
efficient meta-learner that learns models of the agents that it encounters. Through
observing trajectories τ their resulting theory of mind network architecture is used
to predict next-step actions, the consumption of objects within the environment
and the successor representation. This opens up the possibility of applying NUI-
DDQN to more complex domains where a learning approach is required to identify
actions a ∈ A.
7.7 Summary
Independent learners within systems that require a multi-agent deep reinforcement learn-
ing approach are receiving an increasing amount of attention within the literature, as
evident from the related literature discussed in Section 3.3.1. However, the majority of
this research focuses on the impact of stochasticity and the amplified moving target prob-
lem (sample obsolescence problem) caused by experience replay memories [53, 89, 234].
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to propose novel independent learning
algorithms towards mitigating the relative overgeneralization pathology – together with
the other five pathologies outlined in Section 3.1 – within domains that require a deep
approach.
Outside of independent learning, in recent years novel centralized training for decen-
tralized execution approaches have helped address the credit assignment problem within
complex domains, e.g., through training networks to approximate centralized but fac-
tored Q-value functions in fully-cooperative games and taking advantage of the fact that
optimal actions across the agents are equivalent to the set of optimal actions for each
individual agent [89, 169, 189, 197]. However, recent work found that factorized value-
functions can succumb to relative overgeneralization [33]. Another promising approach
inspired by difference rewards is COMA, which addresses the credit assignment problem
through computing a counterfactual baseline through sidelining agents. However, while
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the ability of COMA to mitigate relative overgeneralization remains an open question,
this approach relies on a centralized critic and the availability of a default action to side-
line agents in order to compute the counterfactual baseline. The approaches discussed
in this chapter do not suffer from these constraints.
The most relevant work with regards to addressing relative overgeneralization in a
multi-agent deep reinforcement learning context is Wei et al.’s [224] Multiagent Soft
Q-Learning, an algorithm which converges towards a superior local optima compared to
MA-DDPG [120] within continuous action domains suffering from relative overgeneral-
ization. Multiagent Soft Q-Learning augments rewards with an entropy term, thereby
increasing the likelihood of finding multiple modes within a continuous action space com-
pared to the discrete action space used in our experiments [75, 224]. However, Multiagent
Soft Q-Learning is currently a centralized training for decentralized execution approach
that has only been tested within a single state continuous game for two agents, with the
authors currently investigating the algorithm’s scalability to independent learners within
sequential continuous games. In contrast, in this chapter we evaluate the ability of inde-
pendent learning approaches to overcome relative overgeneralization and the other five
pathologies outlined in Section 3.1 within domains where the agents must learn policies
while confronted with a large high-dimensional state-space. Our empirical evaluation
highlights the challenges multi-agent deep reinforcement learning agents must overcome
to avoid converging upon sub-optimal joint policies when making decisions using noisy
approximated utility estimates backed-up from stochastic follow-on state-transitions and
rewards.
To summarize our contributions:
1. We presented the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG), which is a new and chal-
lenging environment that simultaneously confronts learners with five pathologies:
relative overgeneralization, stochasticity, the moving target problem, the alter ex-
ploration problem and deception.
2. We evaluate hysteretic [152] and lenient [155] learners on the AFG. While le-
nient learners are more likely to mitigate the pathologies in complex setting where
agents must independently make irrevocable decisions in seclusion determining
an episode’s outcome, neither approach consistently converges upon the optimal
joint-policy.
3. Motivated by this finding we designed a new algorithm NUI-DDQN that is based
on negative update intervals. Our algorithm identifies and discards episodes that
end in miscoordination. In doing so, it reduces the noise introduced by the large
punishments that result from miscoordination. We show that NUI-DDQN con-
sistently converges towards the optimal joint-policy within each setting. Further-
more, we observe that the stateless version of NUI-DDQN, Q-learning with NUI,
can prevent relative overgeneralization within the Fully Stochastic Climb Game,
while using a hyperparameter configuration that allows for a 100% convergence
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This chapter concludes the thesis. We first provide a summary of the contributions
discussed in each of the previous chapters in relation to the research questions formulated
in Section 1.4. We subsequently discuss limitations of our work, and conclude with ideas
for future research in this area.
8.1 Contributions and Answers to the Research Questions
We proposed five research questions in Section 1.4. Below we shall answer each of these
questions in turn based on the findings presented in the respective chapters.
Q1: Can existing independent learning approaches mitigate multi-agent learning patholo-
gies within n-player repeated single-stage strategic-form team-games?
Chapter 4 & 5
Strategic-form games have a long history of being used to evaluate novel multi-
agent learning algorithms [38, 118], be it in competitive zero-sum games [24],
general-sum games [8, 114, 173], or in fully-cooperative team-games [33, 38, 99,
110, 130, 131, 159, 160, 223]. Over the past twenty years a significant propor-
tion of multi-agent reinforcement literature has been dedicated towards develop-
ing and evaluating methods that enable independent learners to mitigate learn-
ing pathologies within within n-player repeated single-stage strategic-form team-
games [38, 99, 110, 130, 131, 159, 160, 223]. In Chapter 4 we re-evaluate the ability
of the current state-of-the-art algorithms to address the following learning patholo-
gies: relative overgeneralization, miscoordination, the alter-exploration problem,
moving target problem and stochastic rewards. We re-evaluate the following inde-
pendent learning algorithms: decentralized Q-learning [38], hysteretic Q-learning
[130], FMQ [99], Recursive-FMQ [131] and Lenient Multi-Agent Reinforcement
Learning 2 (LMRL2) [223]. Finding methods that can mitigate both relative
overgeneralization and stochasticity remains an open problem within multi-agent
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reinforcement learning literature [38, 99, 110, 130, 131, 159, 160, 223, 224]. Fur-
thermore, the current state-of-the-art methods require a significant amount of hy-
perparameter tuning, even within relative simple two-player strategic-form games.
Therefore, in contrast to previous work in this area our evaluation focuses on iden-
tifying a robust set of hyperparameters for each algorithm that enables consistent
convergence upon optimal joint-policies across domains, towards scaled penalty
values and an increase in the number of independent learners. Our evaluations
take place within two and four-player versions of the Penalty Game [38], and the
deterministic, partially and fully stochastic Climb Games [38, 99].
We identify hyperparameter configurations for decentralized Q-learning and hys-
teretic Q-learning that improve upon the results reported in multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning literature [99, 131, 223]. Furthermore, our findings are in-line with
the evaluation conducted by Wei and Luke [223], with LMRL2 emerging as the
most robust existing approach. However, our hyperparameter sweep shows that
LMRL2 requires hyperparameter tuning to enable a high convergence rate within
each of the games studied. Furthermore, we observe a drop in the convergence
rate within the stochastic Climb Game variations upon increasing the number of
independent learners, or increasing the scale of the penalty values. In domains
suffering from relative overgeneralization and stochastic rewards we observe a de-
terioration of Q-values following one of the lenient learners unilaterally changing
their policy. In Chapter 5 we find this to be a result of miscoordination occurring
following asynchronous leniency updates, where only one of the learners lowers the
utility value of the current optimal action following a transition. This can result
in an alternative action having the highest estimated utility. The subsequent de-
terioration is caused by a lack of leniency for well explored actions combined with
an increased likelihood of miscoordination due to the other agent(s) not having
adjusted their policy (i.e., the moving target problem). As a result the learners
will be unlikely to return to the previous action, even if the new action proves
sub-optimal. Therefore, in summary, the current state-of-the-art independent
learning approaches fail to consistently mitigate multi-agent learning pathologies
within n-player repeated single-stage strategic-form team-games.
Q2: Can algorithmic modifications improve the policies learnt by lenient learners?
Chapters 5 & 7
In Chapter 4 we gain valuable insights regarding why state-of-the-art indepen-
dent learning algorithms fail to consistently converge upon optimal joint-policies
in strategic-form games that confront learners with relative overgeneralization
and stochastic reward spaces. As a result we address two of leniency’s weak-
nesses in Chapter 5: learners unilaterally deviating from the current joint-policy
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due to asynchronous lenient Q-value updates; and (ii) the alter-exploration prob-
lem, which resurfaces as the amount of leniency is decreased over time. In Sec-
tion 5.1 we introduce Distributed Lenient Q-learning (DLQ) to address the alter-
exploration problem. DLQ separates learning into two distinct phases. First the
learners establish the maximum reward available for each action during a maxi-
mum reward learning phase; equivalent to distributed Q-learning with an uniform
action selection policy. The learners subsequently switch to using leniency com-
bined with a greedy action selection strategy to prevent the alter exploration
problem. In addition we introduce synchronized leniency updates to mitigate
the moving target problem. We therefore distinguish between Synchronized-DLQ
(SDLQ) and Asynchronous-DLQ (ADLQ). In Section 5.2 we empirically show that
SDLQ learners mitigate miscoordination through switching between incompatible
joint-actions during the same time-steps. This allows SDLQ to achieve state of
the art performances within the Fully Stochastic Climb Game. Furthermore, in
Section 7.1.4 we observe that SDLQ is robust towards noisy transitions where
independent learners execute an unintended action with a probability. We also
find that ADLQ outperforms LMRL2 within the majority of fully and partially
stochastic Climb Game settings.
In Section 5.3 we scale DLQ to low-dimensional Markov games, introducing a
staggered transition from explorer to exploiter and optimistic to average reward
learner. We evaluate the full version of DLQ within two Markov games that have
proven challenging for lenient learners: the Relative Overgeneralization 3 (RO3)
and Gradient 2 games [223]. Interestingly, we identify hyperparameter configu-
rations that significantly improve upon the convergence rate previously reported
for LMRL2 within RO3 [223]. However, while LMRL2 is sensitive towards the
choice of leniency moderation factors within RO3, both types of DLQ deliver
convergence rates above 98.5% across settings.
Finally, we evaluate both SDLQ and ADLQ within Gradient 2, a domain where
LMRL2 is capable of achieving a high convergence rates on a correct joint-polices,
but due to the number of states struggles to find complete policies, where learners
behave correctly in each state of the domain. Interestingly, one of the states in
Gradient 2 presents a challenge for synchronized leniency updates, due to each ac-
tion combination resulting in the same potential max reward, and only two actions
being available to each agent. However, the rewards in this state are stochastic,
meaning the learners are in fact being confronted with miscoordination. We find
that, if SDLQ agents lock onto a suboptimal action combination, then the learn-
ers are destined to switch between joint-policies that result in miscoordination as
the synchronized leniency updates are applied. In contrast ADLQ can break this
cycle. Furthermore, a staggered exploration strategy allows ADLQ to converge
upon a significantly higher number of complete polices compared to LMRL2.
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In summary, DLQ improves upon the current-state-of-the-art algorithms in a
number of challenging strategic-form and Markov games from the literature. In
contrast to previous independent learning methods DLQ is easier to tune and
provides hyperparameter configuration that deliver high convergence rates across
evaluation domains. Most significantly, our approach can consistently overcome
relative overgeneralization within the Fully Stochastic Climb Game, a domain that
has long proven challenging for independent learners [99, 130, 131, 223]. Further-
more, we find that DLQ scales better than existing approaches with regards to the
number of agents and the size of penalty values. However, this raises questions
regarding domains where DLQ might reach its limits. In particular, as we have
seen with Gradient 2, domains do exist where Synchronized Distributed-Lenient
Q-learning struggles. Additionally, due to the absence of standards for learning
agents, the assumption of all algorithms within a multi-agent system being im-
plemented with the same hyperparameter configurations, or even using the same
algorithm, is unrealistic [100]. Therefore, while we have found evidence that in a
number of games using synchronized leniency updates can indeed increase conver-
gence rates, we leave the formal identification of the domain properties required
for convergence upon an optimal joint-policy for future work.
Q3: Can we design high-dimensional domains for evaluating the susceptibility of deep
reinforcement learners towards multi-agent learning pathologies?
Chapters 6 & 7
While multi-agent deep reinforcement learning is a relatively young field, there
already exists a growing collection of domains that can be used for benchmark-
ing novel algorithms [89]. For instance, the StarCraft II emulator1 – a real-time
based strategy game where that requires independent units to act based on lo-
cal observations – has established itself as domain for evaluating approaches for
mitigating the credit assignment problem [54, 169, 189, 197]. In addition a num-
ber of domains exist within which cooperative, competitive and mixed (i.e., both
cooperative and competitive) learning can be evaluated [89], e.g., Pommerman
[170], Half Field Offense [14], and MuJoCo Multiagent Soccer [119]. In addi-
tion a number of domains can be found within the multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning literature that present learners with (sequential) social dilemmas
[114, 190]. Meanwhile, in Chapters 6 and 7 we introduce two high-dimensional
fully-cooperative team-games with a large state-space, designed to evaluate the
susceptibility of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning algorithms towards the
learning pathologies outlined in Section 3.1:
1.) CMOTP Extensions: In Section 6.4.1 we extend the Coordinated Multi-
Agent Object Transportation Problems (CMOTPs) [31], which requires two agents
1https://github.com/oxwhirl/pymarl
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to deliver one item of goods to a drop-zone within a grid-world. The task is
fully-cooperative, meaning to shift the goods both agents must move in the same
direction. However, first the agents must exit a separate compartment one by
one and locate the goods. The learners receive a sparse positive reward upon
placing the goods inside the drop-zone. To add to the challenge the learners’ ob-
servations consist of a bird’s eye view of the environment. Therefore, independent
learners must first learn to distinguish themselves from their team-mate using
the pixel values. We introduce two extensions to the CMOTP: narrow-passages
and multiple (deceptive) dropzones that yield stochastic rewards. We find the
narrow-passages requiring thousands of transitions for independent learners to
reach the drop-zone when using random exploration. Therefore, even when using
a large experience replay memory D, deep reinforcement learners may only store
a hand-full of state-transitions with a positive reward. We observe that indepen-
dent learners benefit from maintaining an optimistic disposition in this domain
(see Section 6.5). However, within the stochastic reward CMOTP overoptimistic
learners can be led astray by stochastic rewards. A slippery surface can be added
to the domain to introduce stochastic transitions, a common practice in grid-
world domains. Therefore, our CMOTP variations present independent learners
with the pathologies of deception, miscoordination, the moving-target problem,
the alter-exploration problem and stochasticity.
2) The Apprentice Firemen Game: In Section 7.4 we introduce the Appren-
tice Firemen Game, a temporally-extended version of the team bimatrix game
the Climb Game [38, 99]. In the AFG two agents located within a grid-world are
tasked with locating and extinguishing fires. As with the CMOTP, the AFG is
fully cooperative, i.e. two agents are required to extinguish one fire. First, how-
ever, the agents must locate an equipment pickup area and each choose an item for
extinguishing a fire. However, not all items are compatible, resulting in outcomes
comparable to the joint-actions from the Climb Game [38, 99]. Therefore, the
AFG confronts independent learners with the same pathologies as the CMOTP,
with the addition of relative overgeneralization. For additional stochasticity we
add civilians to the grid-world environment, which obstruct the learners paths
towards the fires.
For single agent deep reinforcement learning the Arcade Learning Environment [16]
and the OpenAI Gym [25] have established themselves as the most frequently used
suits for benchmarking algorithms. The more challenging domains found within
these bench-marking suits provide a means for assessing the performance of new
approaches when faced with known pathologies. The multi-agent literature mean-
while provides a rich taxonomy of multi-agent learning pathologies. As we have
discussed, traditionally multi-agent reinforcement learning pathologies have been
studied within the context of strategic-form and stochastic games. Meanwhile, our
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domains provide a means for evaluating the ability of multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning agents to overcome learning pathologies within high-dimensional
domains with a large state-space. While learners can succumb to a number of
the pathologies listed in Section 3.1 within other domains from the literature, we
have demonstrated that our domains provide a means to assess an algorithm’s
susceptibility towards each learning pathology, in particular relative overgeneral-
ization and stochasticity. Furthermore, through making our CMOTP extensions
[155] and the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG) [154] publicly available2, our en-
vironments have recently been recognised as belonging to a growing list of open
source benchmarking environments for multi-agent deep reinforcement learning
[61, 88, 89, 121].
Q4: Can leniency be scaled to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning?
Chapter 6
The deep multi-agent reinforcement learning literature provides a number of ap-
proaches towards mitigating learning pathologies that can prevent convergence
upon an optimal joint-policy. For instance, solutions using fingerprints [53] and
importance sampling [53], and hysteretic Q-learning [152] have been put forward
to help independent learners overcome the sample obsolescence problem within
domains suffering from the curse of dimensionality. Meanwhile, approaches using
networks to approximate centralized but factored Q-value functions [169, 189, 197]
and counterfactual baselines [54] have been introduced to address the credit as-
signment problem. However, overcoming relative overgeneralization in particular
in combination with stochasticity remains an open challenge [33, 224]. In Chapters
4 and 5 we observe that even for approaches designed to address relative overgen-
eralization and stochasticity, consistent convergence upon an optimal joint-policy
is not guaranteed, even in n-player strategic-form games. However, our empirical
evaluation confirms findings from the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature
that lenient learning is indeed most suited existing approach towards mitigating
these pathologies in combination with those outlined in Section 3.1.
In Chapter 6 we introduce the Lenient (Double) Deep Q-Network (LDDQN),
demonstrating that leniency can be scaled to deep multi-agent reinforcement
learning. In Section 6.6 we show that LDDQN is more likely to converge on
correct joint-policies than Hysteretic DDQNs (HDDQNS) within the stochastic
reward CMOTP. As with DLQ, we find that staggering the temperature decay
to prevent premature temperature cooling helps LDDQNs converge upon optimal
joint-policies. Furthermore, we observe that learners benefit from increased ex-
ploration within initial states until the average rewards have been established in
follow-on states. To accomplish this we introduced two extensions to leniency:
2https://github.com/gjp1203/nui_in_madrl
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(i) a retroactive temperature decay schedule to prevent the premature decay of
temperatures for state-action pairs; (ii) a T (ot)-Greedy exploration strategy that
allows agents to remain exploratory in states with a high average temperature
value. Our LDDQN hyperparameter analysis reveals that the highest perform-
ing agents within the stochastic reward CMOTP use a steep temperature decay
schedule that maintains high temperatures for early transitions combined with a
temperature modification coefficient that slows down the transition from optimist
to average reward learner, and an exploration exponent that delays the transition
from explorer to exploiter.
Q5: Can independent learners overcome relative overgeneralization while making de-
cisions using noisy utility values backed up from stochastic follow-on transitions?
Chapter 7
In Chapter 7 we turn to the Apprentice Firemen Game (AFG) to evaluate to
what extent LDDQN can overcome relative overgeneralization within a multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning context. However, while LDDQNs are more
robust than HDDQNs within this setting, upon increasing the stochasticity the
learning dynamics of LDDQNs are less consistent. We hypothesize that stochas-
ticity in this setting is causing optimal policy destruction [223], where oscillating
Q-Values can cause the moving target problem, a pathology towards which LD-
DQN is vulnerable upon decaying the temperature values. We introduce (deep)
Q-learning with Negative Update Intervals (NUI-DDQN) as a means to mitigate
the noise induced by relative overgeneralization and stochasticity on utility values.
NUI-DDQN is designed for temporally-extended versions of team bimatrix games.
We show that NUI-DDQN is capable of identifying and discarding episodes that
end in miscoordination within the AFG. In doing so, NUI-DDQN reduces the
noise introduced by the large punishments that result from miscoordination. We
show that NUI-DDQN consistently converges towards the optimal joint-policy
within each setting. Furthermore, we introduce a stateless version of NUI-DDQN
capable of converging on optimal joint-polices within all the n-player repeated
strategic-form games used for our empirical re-evaluations in Chapter 4. Similar
to SDLQ we achieve this convergence rate across setting with only one hyperpa-
rameter configuration. However, in contrast to SDLQ the learners do not rely on
synchronized leniency updates.
With LDDQN and NUI-DDQN we therefore introduce two approaches towards
mitigating relative overgeneralization and stochasticity within domains suffering
from the curse of dimensionality both with regards to state-space. As men-
tioned above, other state-of-the-art approaches, including algorithms using cen-
tralized training for decentralized execution, are currently vulnerable towards
these pathologies within fully-cooperative team-games [33]. To our knowledge the
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only other work on addressing relative overgeneralization within a deep multi-
agent reinforcement learning context is Multiagent Soft Q-Learning [224] (see
Section 3.3.1). However, while this approach is designed for a continuous action
space, it is currently a centralized training for decentralized execution approach
that has only been tested within a single state continuous game for two agents,
with the authors currently investigating the algorithm’s scalability to independent
learners within sequential continuous games. In contrast, NUI-DDQN and (with
less consistency) LDDQN can overcome relative overgeneralization and the other
five pathologies outlined in Section 3.1 within domains suffering from the curse of
dimensionality. Our empirical evaluation therefore shows that multi-agent deep
reinforcement learning agents can avoid converging upon sub-optimal joint poli-
cies when making decisions using noisy approximated utility estimates backed-up
from stochastic follow-on state-transitions and rewards.
8.2 Summarising
Numerous challenges remain open in the field of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement
learning, where due to multiple agents learning in parallel considerations are frequently
required regarding the moving target (non-stationarity) problem, the credit assignment
problem, and minimizing miscoordination [89]. As we have seen throughout this thesis,
even for learners situated within fully-cooperative (team) games, there exists a number
of multi-agent learning pathologies that can prevent convergence upon an optimal joint-
policy, including relative overgeneralization, the alter exploration problem, stochasticity
(with regards to rewards and transitions), miscoordination and deception.
Over the past decades the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature has proposed
a number of approaches towards addressing these challenges. For instance, methods
introduced to mitigate the credit assignment problem include difference rewards and
potential based reward shaping. Both are designed to simplify the learning process via
shaping the reward signal and providing additional information, through computing a
counterfactual baseline or discounted difference of a potential function respectively [27,
28, 44–46, 67, 69, 124]. However, these approaches require either domain knowledge to
design the potential function, or the ability to sideline each agent in turn to compute the
counterfactual baseline [49, 54]. Other works attempt to simplify complex multiagent
interactions through abstraction, for instance via factored value functions [6, 71, 72, 89].
With regards to learning in fully-cooperative domains, numerous approaches have been
proposed to address the listed pathologies [21, 99, 130, 131, 156, 159, 223]. However,
despite these efforts the multi-agent reinforcement literature has lacked approaches that
can consistently mitigate the relative overgeneralization pathology in combination with
stochasticity, even within repeated strategic-form games [33, 223, 224].
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In recent years the field of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning has emerged that
requires additional considerations. For instance, when using deep reinforcement learning
agents implemented with an experience replay memory, sample obsolescence can occur
due to stored transitions no longer reflecting the current environment dynamics as other
learners update their own policies. Furthermore, methods inspired by more traditional
domains often require modifications when deployed within domains suffering from the
curse of dimensionality [52, 53, 89]. However, while there have been attempts at ap-
plying difference rewards [54] and factorization approaches to domains that warrant a
deep approach [169, 189, 197], the multi-agent deep reinforcement learning literature
has lacked work considering the extent to which the pathologies of relative overgener-
alization, the moving target problem, the alter exploration problem, stochasticity (with
regards to rewards and transitions), miscoordination and deception can be mitigated
within complex fully-cooperative domains.
This thesis, builds on previous approaches designed to mitigate the above patholo-
gies [21, 99, 130, 131, 156, 159, 223], and contributes towards a better understand-
ing of the challenges faced by independent learners within temporally extended high-
dimensional fully-cooperative domains that require a multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning approach. Furthermore, our work in Chapters 4 and 5 provide valuable insights
regarding the extent to which the moving-target and alter-exploration problems prevent
lenient learners from consistent convergence upon correct joint-policies within repeated
n-player single-stage strategic-form games suffering from relative overgeneralization and
stochastic rewards.
Our contributions include a number of novel independent learning approaches to ad-
dress these challenges, namely (Synchronized) Distributed Lenient Q-learning (Chapter
5), Lenient (Double) DQN (Section 6.2), Scheduled Hysteretic (Double) DQN (Section
6.3), Q-Learning with Negative Update Intervals (Section 7.1) and Negative Update In-
tervals DDQN (Section 7.3). In our empirical evaluations we find that each approach
improves on the previous state of the art for a number of multi-agent reinforcement
learning challenges. However, while significant progress has been made, we are unable
to identify an approach that represents a silver bullet. Indeed, as discussed throughout
this thesis, a compromise is often necessary to enable independent learners to overcome
multi-agent learning pathologies within different settings. In the final section of this
thesis we consider the limitations of our algorithms, and how these can be addressed in
future work.
8.3 Limitations and Future Work
While we introduce novel algorithms towards addressing independent learning patholo-
gies, we find each approach works only under specific conditions. Synchronized-DLQ
relies on the synchronized property, which is difficult to enforce within real world do-
mains [100]. Furthermore, in Section 5.4.2 we identify a reward space where synchronized
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updates result in independent learners switching between sub-optimal joint-policies. Fur-
ther considerations are required to address this issue. Through introducing a retroactive
temperature decay schedule (TDS) that prevents premature temperature cooling, and a
T (ot)-Greedy exploration strategy, our Lenient (Double) DQN approximately replicates
the staggered temperature decay used by DLQ. However, we find LDDQN is vulnerable
towards relative overgeneralization in domains with increased stochasticity, as evident
from our results in Section 7.5.6. Therefore, improving the robustness of DLQ within
Markov games, and subsequently scaling the approach to multi-agent deep reinforcement
learning presents an interesting challenge for future research.
Q-learning with Negative Update Intervals is currently designed for the set of n-player
strategic-form games where Assumption 1 holds. Meanwhile, the scaled version, NUI-
DDQN, is limited to temporally-extended versions of team bimatrix games. As discussed
in Section 7.6, we feel that the next step for this algorithm is to add extensions capable
of identifying the higher level actions that an agent’s policy implemented throughout the
course of an episode, allowing the learners to maintaining negative update intervals for
different types of state-transition trajectories. Furthermore, NUI-DDQN is designed for
environments that confront independent learners with relative overgeneralization. We
consider that the algorithm is likely to struggle in domains with coordination challenges.
For instance, little is to be gained from using NUI-DDQN within the narrow-passage
CMOTP (Section 6.4.1), where, due to there only being one type of trajectory, the
learners default to (Double) DQNs. Implementing hybrid approaches for domains that
include both of these challenges could represent an interesting topic for future work in
this area, e.g., combining negative update interval with a lenient loss function.
We consider that within high-dimensional temporally extended domains there exists
significant scope for visualizing and interpreting the policies learned by the independent
learners. We hypothesize that methods for visualizing and understanding deep reinforce-
ment learning agents provide a means through which to gain insights into the extent
to which independent learners are aware of each other, e.g., while independent learning
agents are not explicitly aware of each others’ actions, they do have the potential to
implicitly infer the actions taken by other agents through limited observations. For ex-
ample, Mordatch and Abbeel [141] observe that decentralized learning agents incapable
of explicit communication often learn to communicate via cues.
Recently there have been interesting breakthroughs in the area of visualizing and un-
derstanding deep reinforcement learning agents, for instance, by using saliency maps [65,
142]. Via these maps salient features within the environment can be identified that de-
termine an agent’s actions. Much can be learned from these saliency maps within a
multi-agent deep reinforcement learning context. We have begun our own attempts at
visualizing the policies learnt by agents within the Apprentice Firemen Game with a
shared pickup area. We have interesting preliminary findings, where the saliency maps
of learners that we class as followers (who wait for the other agent to make their se-
lection) show higher saliency scores towards the coordinates of the other agent prior
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to their equipment selection, compared to after the pick-up task has been completed.
Upon completing the pick-up task meanwhile we observe an increase in the saliency
scores towards the fires within the environment. These preliminary findings raise inter-
esting questions. For instance, can we predict if two agents who have converged upon
an optimal joint-policy will remain optimal when separated and paired with different
teammates (who have potentially learned a different set of cues)? We hypothesize that
this methodology may path a way for further studying the non-verbal communication
behaviours discussed by Mordatch and Abbeel [141], and look forward to continuing this
line of work.
A further issue that needs addressing within multi-agent reinforcement learning is
a more centralized approach towards maintaining scores from benchmarking. This in
particular is highlighted by the extensive hyperparameter search conducted by Wei and
Luke [223], and the fact that 7 years prior Matignon et al. [132] already found a more
optimal set of hyperparameters within the Partially Stochastic Climb Game for decen-
tralized and hysteretic Q-learners. Given that over the coming years there is likely
to be an explosion in the number of domains for evaluating different approaches (and
paradigms) of multi-agent deep reinforcement learning, efforts are required to ensure
that work is not repeated. The community could, for instance, benefit from following
the examples of computer vision and single agent deep reinforcement learning, where
leader-boards are maintained for standard benchmarking tasks.
We observe that our work has already inspired researchers to investigate the advan-
tages of applying leniency to multi-agent deep reinforcement learning. Zheng et al. [234]
introduce a Weighted Double-DQN that makes use of a lenient reward network along
with a scheduled replay strategy to improve the convergence rate within stochastic co-
operative environments. Gong et al. [61] combined our retroactive temperature decay
schedule, T (ot)-Greedy exploration strategy and leniency augmented experience replay
memory tuples with synchronous n-step methods (advantage actor-critic) to strike a
balance between using potentially obsolete state transitions during training, proposing
a lenient ERM-helped synchronous n-step deep Q-network (LESnDQN), finding that
LESnDQN is more sample efficient on the CMOTP. Finally, Lu and Amato [121] pro-
pose a distributional reinforcement learning approach towards improving decentralized
hysteretic deep reinforcement learning’s vulnerability towards stochastic rewards. A
time difference likelihood (TDL) measure is used to guide the choice of learning rate
for each update, thereby controlling the amount of optimism applied by the learners.
The TDL enables the learners to estimate if the transition occurred with an exploratory
teammate, and if therefore a lower learning rate should be applied. The authors find
their resulting Likelihood Hysteretic Implicit Quantile Network (IH-IQN) to be easier
to tune and more sample efficient than LDQN within the CMOTP variations and a
meeting-in-a-grid task.
Despite the limitations discussed in this section, our work introduces a number of ex-
tensions to the start of the art of multi-agent (deep) reinforcement learning research. We
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propose a multitude of approaches towards mitigating multi-agent learning pathologies,
while also visualizing why these methods have an advantage over previous approaches.
While we have been unable to provide a silver bullet toward multi-agent (deep) rein-
forcement learning pathologies, we hope that the material in this thesis paves the way for




In this section we provide visualisations for all hyperparameter configurations used
during our n-player repeated strategic form game evaluations of LMRL2, LRML3, Q-
learning with NUI, hysteretic Q-learning, FMQ and RFMQ in Chapters 4, 5 and 7. As
in previous sections we provide heat-maps illustrating the correct run percentage for
each hyperparameter configuration for each algorithm. For each plot we provide the
algorithm, game, penalty scaling factor (PSF), and the number of agents.
A.1 Frequency Maximum Q-value
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.1: Algorithm: FMQ, Game: The Penalty Game
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.2: Algorithm: FMQ, Game: The Climb Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.3: Algorithm: FMQ, Game: The Partially Stochastic Climb Game
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.4: Algorithm: FMQ, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb Game
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A.2 Recursive Frequency Maximum Q-value
(a) PG, Agents: 2 (b) PG, Agents: 4
(c) CG, Agents: 2 (d) CG, Agents: 4
(e) PSCG, Agents: 2 (f) PSCG, Agents: 4
(g) FSCG, Agents: 2 (h) FSCG, Agents: 4
Figure A.5: RFMQ results for the Penalty Game (PG), Climb Game (CG),
Partially Stochastic Climb Game (PSCG), and Fully Stochastic Climb Game (FSCG)
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A.3 Hysteretic Q-learning
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.6: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Penalty Game,
Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 50
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.7: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Penalty Game,
Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 500
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.8: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Penalty Game,
Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 5000
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.9: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Climb Game,
Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 50
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.10: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Climb Game,
Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 500
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.11: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Climb Game,
Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 5000
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.12: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Partially Stochastic
Climb Game, Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 50
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.13: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Partially Stochastic
Climb Game, Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 500
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.14: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Partially Stochastic
Climb Game, Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 5000
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.15: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb
Game, Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 50
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.16: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb
Game, Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 500
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.17: Algorithm: Hysteretic Q-learning, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb
Game, Exploration: Boltzmann, MaxTemp = 5000
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A.4 Lenient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.18: Algorithm: LMRL2, Game: The Penalty Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.19: Algorithm: LMRL2, Game: The Climb Game
Appendix A. Strategic-Form Game Results 168
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.20: Algorithm: LMRL2, Game: The Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.21: Algorithm: LMRL2, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb Game
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A.5 Synchronized Distributed-Lenient Q-learning
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.22: Algorithm: SDLQ, Game: The Penalty Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.23: Algorithm: SDLQ, Game: The Climb Game
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.24: Algorithm: SDLQ, Game: The Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.25: Algorithm: SDLQ, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb Game
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A.6 Asynchronized Distributed-Lenient Q-learning
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.26: Algorithm: ADLQ, Game: The Penalty Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.27: Algorithm: ADLQ, Game: The Climb Game
Appendix A. Strategic-Form Game Results 172
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.28: Algorithm: ADLQ, Game: The Partially Stochastic Climb Game
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.29: Algorithm: ADLQ, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb Game
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A.7 Q-learning with Negative Update Intervals
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: Hight
Figure A.30: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Penalty Game, Burn-In
Steps: 1000
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.31: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Penalty Game, Burn-In
Steps: 500
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.32: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Penalty Game, Burn-In
Steps: 100
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.33: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Climb Game, Burn-In
Steps: 1000
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.34: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Climb Game, Burn-In
Steps: 500
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.35: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Climb Game, Burn-In
Steps: 100
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.36: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Partially Stochastic
Climb Game, Burn-In Steps: 1000
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.37: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Partially Stochastic
Climb Game, Burn-In Steps: 500
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.38: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Partially Stochastic
Climb Game, Burn-In Steps: 100
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.39: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb
Game, Burn-In Steps: 1000
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(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.40: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb
Game, Burn-In Steps: 500
(a) Agents: 2, PSF: Low (b) Agents: 2, PSF: Medium (c) Agents: 2, PSF: High
(d) Agents: 4, PSF: Low (e) Agents: 4, PSF: Medium (f) Agents: 4, PSF: High
Figure A.41: Algorithm: Q-learning with NUI, Game: The Fully Stochastic Climb
Game, Burn-In Steps: 100
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A.8 Results Summary
In the table below we provide a summary of the highest convergence rate achieved by
each algorithm within each setting using tuned hyperparameters:
Game Agents Penalty NUI SDLQ ADLQ LMRL2 Hysteretic Q-learning FMQ RFMQ
Penalty Game
2
Low 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Medium 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.9% 100% 91.2%
High 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% NA 100% 0.6%
4
Low 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% NA 100% 89.0%
Medium 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% NA 100% 67.7%
High 100% 100% 100% 99.9% 100% NA 99.4% 24.8%
Climb Game
2
Low 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 24.0% 100% 99.9%
Medium 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% NA 97.5% 69.6%
High 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% NA 50.8% 0%
4
Low 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% NA 45.2% 29.9%
Medium 100% 100% 100% 98.3% 97.8% NA 45.1% 36.8%
High 100% 100% 100% 98.1% 50.3% NA 29.2% 7.3%
Partially Stochastic Climb Game
2
Low 100% 100% 100% 100% 87% 28.2% 100% 99.4%
Medium 100% 100% 100% 99.9% 70.3% NA 97.3% 64.5%
High 100% 100% 100% 100% 69.5% NA 48.1% 0%
4
Low 100% 100% 100% 100% 63.9% NA 43.4% 27.6%
Medium 100% 100% 100% 72.2% 62.3% NA 45.6% 37.7%
High 100% 100% 100% 73.2% 50.9% NA 32.4% 7.9%
Fully Stochastic Climb Game
2
Low 100% 100% 100% 90.2% 37.5% 26.8% 25.4% 64.7%
Medium 100% 100% 93.3% 62.0% 25.2% NA 24% 0%
High 100% 100% 99.6% 56.8% 21.9% NA 6.9% 0%
4
Low 100% 100% 83.5% 96.3% 33.4% NA 8.6% 53.5%
Medium 100% 100% 87.1% 92.3% 26.5% NA 7.3% 1.9%
High 100% 100% 98.9% 90.94% 13.7% NA 7.4% 1.8%
Table A.1: Summary of the best results achieved using tuned hyperparameter
configurations. Boldface indicates evaluation that resulted in the (joint) highest
convergence rate. For decentralized Q-learning we only conduct experiments using the
low-reward two-player games, with the exception of the Penalty Game. This is due to
decentralized Q-learning’s exhibiting low convergence rates, even in the low-reward
setting. For RFMQ we note that the results can be improved by (significantly)




Experiment Details & Evaluations
B.1 Hyperparameters
Table B.1 lists the hyperparameters used for our empirical evaluation in Chapter 7.
To reduce the time required to evaluate LDDQN we apply python’s xxhash to masked
observations (i.e., removing civilians).
Component Hyperparameter Range of values
DDQN Base
Learning rate α 0.0001
Discount rate γ 0.95
Target network sync. steps 5000
ERM Size 250’000
ε-Greedy Exploration
Initial ε value 1.0
ε Decay factor 0.999
Minimum ε Value 0.05
Leniency
MaxTemperature 1.0
Leniency Modification Coefficient K 1.0
TDS Exponent ρ -0.1
TDS Exponent Decay Rate d 0.95
Initial Max Temperature Value ν 1.0
Max Temperature Decay Coefficient µ 0.9998
Action Selection Exponent 0.25
Hashing xxhash
NUI-DDQN
ERMu Capacity 100 Episodes
Decay threshold 50 Episodes
rminu decay rate 0.995
Table B.1: Hyper-parameters
B.2 Learning Best Response Policies
Table B.2 provides additional RC scatter plots for each evaluation setting. Each marker
within the scatter plots represents the RC for an individual run. To provide further
clarity we sort the runs by RC. We observe that for the majority of settings higher
RC values are achieved by agents in layout 1. Interestingly only HDDQN (β = 0.5,
PS Rewards) and LDDQN (DET & PS Rewards) achieved higher RC values in layout
2. NUI-DDQNs meanwhile perform consistently when receiving deterministic and PS
rewards, while a couple of runs faltered for FS rewards within layout 2. It is worth
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noting that even for NUI-DDQN runs with low RC, (A,A) remains a frequently observed
outcome:




Table B.2: Scatter plots illustrating the average coordinated reward RC for each
training run. The x-axis is sorted by RC values.
B.3 LDDQN Variable Access Points Experiments
Figure B.1 illustrates the AFG layouts used for the evaluations discussed in Section
7.5.6. We also provide the resulting phase plot for each layout.
(a) 1 Access Point (b) 2 Access Points (c) 3 Access Points (d) 4 Access Points
(e) 1 Access Point (f) 2 Access Points (g) 3 Access Points (h) 4 Access Points
Figure B.1: Phase plots illustrate delayed convergence of LDDQNs as a result
of increasing the number of possible state-action pairs.
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vide Scaramuzza, Event-based vision meets deep learning on steering prediction
for self-driving cars, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition, 2018, pp. 5419–5427.
[129] Michael Mathieu, Camille Couprie, and Yann LeCun, Deep multi-scale video pre-
diction beyond mean square error, arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05440 (2015).
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agent reinforcement learning, Reinforcement Learning, Springer, 2012, pp. 441–
470.
[149] Frans A Oliehoek and Christopher Amato, A concise introduction to decentralized
POMDPs, vol. 1, Springer, 2016.
[150] Frans A Oliehoek, Matthijs TJ Spaan, and Nikos Vlassis, Optimal and approximate
Q-value functions for decentralized POMDPs, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Re-
search 32 (2008), 289–353.
[151] Shayegan Omidshafiei, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras, Karl Tuyls,
Mark Rowland, Jean-Baptiste Lespiau, Wojciech M Czarnecki, Marc Lanctot,
Julien Perolat, and Remi Munos, α-rank: Multi-agent evaluation by evolution,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.01373 (2019).
Bibliography 196
[152] Shayegan Omidshafiei, Jason Pazis, Christopher Amato, Jonathan P. How, and
John Vian, Deep decentralized multi-task multi-agent reinforcement learning under
partial observability, 70 (2017), 2681–2690.
[153] Ian Osband, Charles Blundell, Alexander Pritzel, and Benjamin Van Roy, Deep
exploration via bootstrapped DQN, Advances in neural information processing sys-
tems, 2016, pp. 4026–4034.
[154] Gregory Palmer, Rahul Savani, and Karl Tuyls, Negative Update Intervals in Deep
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, Proceedings of the 18th International Con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 43–51.
[155] Gregory Palmer, Karl Tuyls, Daan Bloembergen, and Rahul Savani, Lenient
Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning, Proceedings of Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems, 2018, pp. 443–451.
[156] Liviu Panait, Theoretical convergence guarantees for cooperative coevolutionary
algorithms, Evolutionary computation 18 (2010), no. 4, 581–615.
[157] Liviu Panait and Sean Luke, Cooperative multi-agent learning: The state of the
art, Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems 11 (2005), no. 3, 387–434.
[158] Liviu Panait, Keith Sullivan, and Sean Luke, Lenience towards teammates helps
in cooperative multiagent learning, Proceedings of Autonomous Agents and Multi-
Agent Systems, 2006.
[159] , Lenient learners in cooperative multiagent systems, Proceedings of Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, ACM, 2006, pp. 801–803.
[160] Liviu Panait, Karl Tuyls, and Sean Luke, Theoretical advantages of lenient learn-
ers: An evolutionary game theoretic perspective, Journal Machine Learning Re-
search 9 (2008), no. Mar, 423–457.
[161] Lauren Parker, James Butterworth, and Shan Luo, Fly safe: Aerial swarm robotics
using force field particle swarm optimisation, arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.07647
(2019).
[162] Emanuele Pesce and Giovanni Montana, Improving coordination in multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning through memory-driven communication, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1901.03887 (2019).
[163] Mitchell A Potter and Kenneth A De Jong, A cooperative coevolutionary approach
to function optimization, International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving
from Nature, Springer, 1994, pp. 249–257.
Bibliography 197
[164] Bob Price and Craig Boutilier, Implicit imitation in multiagent reinforcement
learning, Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, Cite-
seer, 1999, pp. 325–334.
[165] Martin L Puterman, Markov decision processes: discrete stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming, John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
[166] Neil Rabinowitz, Frank Perbet, Francis Song, Chiyuan Zhang, S. M. Ali Eslami,
and Matthew Botvinick, Machine theory of mind, International Conference on
Machine Learning (Jennifer Dy and Andreas Krause, eds.), vol. 80, PMLR, 10–15
Jul 2018, pp. 4218–4227.
[167] Neil Rabinowitz, Frank Perbet, Francis Song, Chiyuan Zhang, SM Ali Eslami, and
Matthew Botvinick, Machine theory of mind, International Conference on Machine
Learning, 2018, pp. 4215–4224.
[168] Roberta Raileanu, Emily Denton, Arthur Szlam, and Rob Fergus, Modeling others
using oneself in multi-agent reinforcement learning, International Conference on
Machine Learning, 2018, pp. 4254–4263.
[169] Tabish Rashid, Mikayel Samvelyan, Christian Schroeder Witt, Gregory Farquhar,
Jakob Foerster, and Shimon Whiteson, Qmix: Monotonic value function factori-
sation for deep multi-agent reinforcement learning, International Conference on
Machine Learning, 2018, pp. 4292–4301.
[170] Cinjon Resnick, Wes Eldridge, David Ha, Denny Britz, Jakob Foerster, Julian To-
gelius, Kyunghyun Cho, and Joan Bruna, Pommerman: A multi-agent playground,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.07124 (2018).
[171] Tim Salimans, Ian Goodfellow, Wojciech Zaremba, Vicki Cheung, Alec Radford,
and Xi Chen, Improved techniques for training GANs, Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, 2016, pp. 2234–2242.
[172] Larry Samuelson, Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection, vol. 1, MIT press,
1998.
[173] Tuomas W Sandholm and Robert H Crites, Multiagent reinforcement learning in
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Biosystems 37 (1996), no. 1-2, 147–166.
[174] Tom Schaul, John Quan, Ioannis Antonoglou, and David Silver, Prioritized Expe-
rience Replay, arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05952 (2015).
[175] Benjamin Schnieders, Shan Luo, Gregory Palmer, and Karl Tuyls, Fully convo-
lutional one-shot object segmentation for industrial robotics, Proceedings of the
18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019,
pp. 1161–1169.
Bibliography 198
[176] Benjamin Schnieders and Karl Tuvls, Fast convergence for object detection by
learning how to combine error functions, 2018 IEEE/RSJ International Conference
on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), IEEE, 2018, pp. 7329–7335.
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